

Dalia's efforts to obtain the economic benefit of the TRI shares for the Orly Trust.

**TPR's 2008 Foreclosure on the Collateral for the D&K Note**

15 Nor can Dalia Genger be removed as Trustee on the basis of TPR's August 31, 2008, declaration that the D&K Note was in default (TAP Ex. S) and TPR's subsequent foreclosure on D&K's TPR shares that D&K had pledged to secure the Note. Despite its use of emotional and conclusory words, the TAP alleges no act that Dalia Genger did to participate in the foreclosure. And, importantly, Dalia Genger, as Trustee of the Orly Trust, could not prevent TPR from declaring a default and foreclosing on the promissory Note made by D&K LP that the Orly Trust had guaranteed.

16 Plaintiff cannot dispute, as the Prior Decision found, that Orly Trust is not a shareholder of TPR (Prior Decision, at 6) and neither was Dalia Genger individually a shareholder of TPR after 2007. (*Supra* ¶4(a))

17 Also unavailing is the argument that D&K's Note was not supposed to be enforceable. First, the Note says nothing of the kind. To the contrary, why would the Note be secured by D&K's pledged TPR stock, if the Note were intended to be unenforceable? And why would the Note be guaranteed by the Orly Trust and by the Sagi Trust if it were intended to be unenforceable? And if intended to be unenforceable, why would those written guarantees expressly provide "that the Holder may enforce this Note, to the extent of such liability, as if the [Orly Trust] were the Maker thereof." TAP ¶ 18, Ex. B, emphasis added.

18 Moreover, by admitting that the Note had been paid in accordance with its terms until 1999 and admitting that "[a]s of mid-2006, the D&K Note 'had an approximate value of \$11,000,000 as a result of accrued interest'" (TAP ¶ 29), TAP belies its contention that the note was uncollectable.

19 Nor does or could the TAP allege that TPR ever renounced its rights under the Note and guarantee by destroying the Note or by delivering the Note or a signed writing cancelling or renouncing the Note, as required by NY UCC §3-605(1) for the Note to become unenforceable. It is hornbook law that the enforceability of a Note is not affected by a mere statement by the maker or guarantor that the Note is unenforceable. As the court held in *Ber v. Johnson*, 163 A.D.2d 817, 818 (4th Dep't 1990):

Because defendants' original obligation constituted a note and guarantee, it was required to be in writing (see, Uniform Commercial Code § 3-104 [1], [2]; General Obligations Law § 5-701 [a] [2]) and the Statute of Frauds precludes an oral executory modification. '[W]here an original agreement comes within [the] provisions of the statute of frauds requiring certain agreements to be in writing, the statute of frauds renders invalid and ineffectual a subsequent oral agreement changing the terms of the written contract, no matter how slight the attempted variation or by whom it was made' ( 61 NY Jur 2d, Frauds, Statute of, §140, at 217-218; see, M. H. Metal Prods. Corp. v April, 251 NY 146, 150; Van Iderstine Co. v Barnet Leather Co., 242 NY 425, 430; Heroux v Page, 107 AD2d 862, 863; Awad & Co. v Pillsbury Mills, 9 AD2d 870, lv denied 8 NY2d 705, appeal dismissed 8 NY2d 747; cf., General Obligations Law §§ 5-1103, 15-301 [1], [2]). Thus, defendants may not rely on plaintiff's alleged oral acceptance of the stock as the basis for their defense of modification.

20 Thus the 2006 statement by Sagi Genger that D&K LP and its partners deny the enforceability of the Note would not constitute a defense to TPR's declaration of default and foreclosure, as a matter of law.<sup>4</sup> Nor would enforceability of the Note have been affected if Dalia Genger had stated "the Note was never intended to be foreclosed upon," as the TAP ¶33 claims. But she did not so state; in the document cited basis for that assertion Dalia Genger in a Pre-Judgment Divorce Mediation merely stated that foreclosure by Dalia Genger "to take for myself an interest that Arie and I intended for the children" would undo estate planning, and thus

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<sup>4</sup> Equally irrelevant is testimony by David Parnes (TAP ¶31), who was *functus officio*.

the Arbitrator found that Arie Genger should not have been awarded half the value of the D&K Note (TAP Exs. I & J, emphasis added.)

21 Thus as a matter of law, the Note and guarantee were enforceable in accordance with their terms. Moreover, TPR's declaration of default of the D&K Note also occurred during the period when Dalia Genger had been instructed by Surrogate Roth to take no action. And the TAP alleges no fact to support its generalized rhetoric that Dalia Genger participated in TPR's foreclosure. Thus Dalia Genger's failure to take some unspecified action which could not have prevented the foreclosure could not be a basis to remove her as trustee.

#### The Events that Occurred After this Court Recognized Dalia Genger as Trustee

##### The January 2009 D&K LP Meeting Agreement

22 The Meeting of Partners of D&K LP – Jan. 31, 2009 & Agreement, TAP Exhibit O, belies TAP's allegation (TAP ¶48) that it granted Sagi "unfettered authority to encumber the Orly Trust TRI Shares." As shown above (¶ 4(G)), on November 23, 2007 - before Dalia Genger became Trustee - D&K had amended its Partnership Agreement (by action of the Orly Trust's Trustee then: not by Dalia Genger) to give D&K authority to mortgage, pledge or otherwise encumber D&K's Limited Partners' (the Sagi and Orly Trusts') interests in Trans-Resources, Inc. (TRI) common stock (LP TRI Interest), subject to each Limited Partner's "right to redeem its LP TRI Interest to the full extent of such LP's pro-rated participation, responsibility or liability for the unpaid amount of the [D&K] Note." (Emphasis added.) TAP Ex. K, ¶ 22 at p. 11. The complained of section of the January 31, 2009, D&K LP Partnership Meeting and Agreement (TAP Ex. P) expressly stated "to clarify" that the prior authority was only to be

exercised "in substantially the same manner in which TPR Investment Associates, Inc. shares were pledged in connection with the aforementioned [D&K] note." Thus the January 21, 2009 agreement did not grant "unfettered authority to dispose of the Orly Trust TRI Shares" or indeed grant any authority; rather it clarified and if anything *limited* the prior grant of authority. Therefore it did not harm the Orly Trust. Moreover, the TAP does not and cannot allege that D&K ever purported to pledge the Orly Trust's interest in TRJ stock.

23 And since the TAP can point to nothing improper that had previously been done, there was no harm from D&K LP's 2009 pro forma indemnification and release of D&K LP's former general partner.<sup>5</sup>

#### **The Orly Trust's Interest in the Orly Trust TRI Shares**

24 The TAP's allegation (¶53) that Dalia Genger violated her fiduciary obligations by refusing to agree not to dispose of the Orly Trust TRI Shares is unsupported by any document or specific factual allegation. Moreover, in light of Orly joining Arie Genger a plaintiff in a Supreme Court action purportedly on behalf of the Orly Trust to have such shares become the property not of the Orly Trust but of Arie Genger, such allegation appears to be from Lewis Carroll's "*Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There*", a complete reversal of fact. However, even assuming the allegation were true, a trustee's refusal at the behest of a life time beneficiary to keep the entire trust corpus in a single, illiquid security of a closely-held entity which the Delaware Supreme Court has held is controlled by others, *Genger v. TR Investors et al.*, 26 A.3d 180 (De. 2011), would not be a violation of a Trustee's fiduciary duty, but rather would

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<sup>5</sup> It should also be noted that the release only extends "to the fullest extent permitted" thus, on its face, is limited in scope to avoid any potential breach of fiduciary duty.

be an act of prudence. Especially where that Delaware court's findings raise most serious questions as to whether the Orly Trust has any interest in TRI shares at all. *Ibid.*

#### The Settlement and the Court Orders

25 While the TAP claims that Dalia Genger's actions to settle certain claims of the Orly Trust were in violation of the July 1, 2009 Order of this Court, it does not attach a copy of that Order, relying instead a copy of Orly's June 22, 2009 First Amended Petition in this proceeding (TAP Ex. W) and a snippet of the transcript of the court proceedings on the return date (TAP Ex. X). Perhaps the reason the TAP does not attach or quote that Order is that Dalia Genger has been in full compliance with it. That Order (a copy of which is Exhibit 10 hereto) required Dalia Genger, as Trustee:

to give notice by overnight mail to petitioner's [Orly's] counsel of any 1) offer to purchase the Orly Trust's 19.3% interest in TRI within 10 days of receiving such offer and 2) act by Respondent [Dalia Genger], her agents and all other persons acting on her behalf to assign, mortgage, pledge, redeem, encumber, sell, or otherwise alter the Orly Trust's interest in TRI at least 10 days prior to such act.<sup>6</sup>

(Note that the July 1, 2009 Order does not require notice of "any transaction that impacted the Orly Trust TRI Shares", as the TAP mischaracterized it in TAP ¶90 (a)). The TAP does not and cannot not allege that Dalia Genger received any "offer to purchase the Orly Trust's 19.3% interest in TRI" or that she did anything that constitutes a "purchase, assignment, mortgage, pledge, redemption, encumbrance, sale, or other alteration of the Orly Trust's interest in TRI".

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<sup>6</sup> Contrary to the TAP's allegation, ¶47 n. 5, that Order did not require prior notice of Dalia Genger's filing a lawsuit against the Trumps, TPR, and TRI for a declaratory judgment that the Orly Trust is the owner of the TRI shares it bought in 2004.

26 Of course, the fact that the Orly Trust's transactions did not violate the July 1, 2009 Order does not end the question of whether the TAP properly alleges a claim that they are reasons why Dalia Genger should be removed as Trustee. But to appreciate why the TAP does not allege such a legally cognizable claim, this Court must examine the context of the acts, as well as what was done.

#### The Context of the Settlement

27 Three facts constitute the *status quo ante* before the settlement of which the TAP complains:

- a. Although Plaintiff does not like it, Dalia Genger is the Trustee of the Orly Trust, as was confirmed by the Prior Decision.
- b. The Orly Trust was the guarantor of 48% of the D&K 1993 Note in favor of TPR, secured by D&K's pledge of its TPR shares. Not only does the pledge establish that the D&K Note was to be paid, as shown discussed *supra*, but the TAP recognizes that D&K made millions of dollars of payments thereon through 1999. And the TAP does not contend (and Petitioner Orly Genger has never contended and cannot contend) that D&K did not owe the D&K Note or that the Orly Trust was not liable for its guaranteed share of the unpaid portion of the D&K Note. (Any such contention would amount to an allegation the Arie Genger committed tax fraud by making a disguised transfer without paying gift tax.) Thus, even after TPR foreclosed on the pledged TPR shares, the Orly Trust owed approximately \$4.5 million on its guarantee for its share of the balance of the D&K Note.

c. The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that Arie Genger's acts to cause TPR to transfer TRI Shares to the Orly Genger Trust (and to Arie Genger and the Sagi Genger Trust) did not transfer legal or record ownership (without deciding whether it transferred beneficial ownership) *Genger v. TR Investors et al.*, 26 A.3d 180 (De. 2011), thus leaving TPR as the continued legal and record owner of the TRI shares purportedly transferred to the Orly Trust or to the proceeds of those shares if TPR's purported August 2008 sale of them to the Trump Group was valid. The Trump Group agreed to pay TPR \$10.3 million for TPR's August 2008 purported sale of the "Orly Trust TRI Shares", which sum is being held by my law firm in escrow, pursuant to an agreement executed by Dalia Genger, as Trustee, TPR, the Trump Group, and Orly Genger herself, pending a final determination of the ownership of those TRI shares by a competent court with full jurisdiction over Dalia Genger, as Trustee, TPR, the Trump Group. Conversely, based on Orly Genger's representation to Surrogate Roth in a November 5, 2008 letter (Exhibit 2 hereto, page 2), if TPR's purported August 2008 sale was not valid, the value of the "Orly Trust" Shares of TRI that TPR purported to sell would be "in excess of \$150,000."

#### The Settlement that Secured Millions for the Orly Trust

28 In October, 2011, Dalia Genger, as Trustee of the Orly Trust, entered into a Settlement Agreement with TPR and D&K. As Trustee, Dalia Genger has the legal authority to settle claims by and against the Trust. See N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 11-1.1(13) (A trustee has the power "[t]o contest, compromise or otherwise settle any claim in favor of the estate, trust or fiduciary or in favor of third persons and against the estate, trust or fiduciary."); Orly Genger 1993 Trust Agreement, Eleventh Article, Sec. 7 at page 26 (which states that "[i]n addition to and in amplification of the powers given by law to trustees" the trustee of the Orly Trust shall have the

power “[t]o settle, adjust, compromise, or submit to arbitration any dispute, claim, or controversy in which any trust hereunder may be in any way interested.”) TAP Ex. A.

29 Of course, “stipulations of settlement are judicially favored” *IDT Corp. v. Tyco Group*, 13 N.Y.3d 209, 213-14 (N.Y. 2009) *citing Matter of Kanter*, 209 A.D.2d 365, 365 (1st Dep’t 1994), and in exercising the authority to settle a claim of or against the Trust, a Trustee has a broad range of discretion. *See In re Cmty. Serv. Soc. of New York*, 275 A.D.2d 171, 181 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“where a trustee has discretionary power, the exercise of that power is not to be the subject of judicial interference, ‘at least if exercised reasonably and in good faith’” (internal citation omitted)). *See also In re IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co.*, Index No. 101530/98, Supreme Ct., N.Y. Co., Op. at 5-6 (Aug. 16, 2000) Exhibit 11 (*held*: Settlement agreement entered into by trustee entitled to judicial deference and upheld over beneficiaries’ objection as the trustee had made a “showing of the reasonableness of the proposed settlement” and the objecting beneficiaries “ha[d] not submitted any evidence to show that the trustee’s actions may have been based on some ulterior motive or that the trustee is somehow itself interested in the transaction other than in its fiduciary capacity”.)

30 Here this Court will see that the settlement with TPR and D&K was objectively beneficial to the Orly Trust’s interests.

a Prior to the settlement the Orly Trust owed TPR approximately \$4.5 million on its guarantee of the D&K Note. The settlement changed that to a \$4 million unsecured Note to TPR (TAP Ex. BB), and TPR paid the Orly Trust \$100,000 for the Trust’s legal fees, providing moneys to pay for litigation to establish the interest of the Orly Trust with respect to the TRI shares that Arie Genger purported to have transferred to the Orly Trust. (TAP Ex. GG, Settlement Agreement ¶1, 3-4). Thus the Orly Trust gained \$600,000.

b Also, in the settlement TPR relinquished to the Orly Trust any economic interest TPR had in the TRI Shares and assigned to the Orly Trust TPR's rights to any economic benefits of the TRI shares. This includes, but not limited to, any proceeds from the sale thereof, i.e., the \$10.3 million otherwise owed to TPR pursuant to the terms of the August 22, 2008 letter agreement with the Trump entities if a court determines that such sale conveyed the Orly Trust TRI Shares to the Trump Group. This is a benefit to the Orly Trust of at least the \$10.3 million that my firm holds in escrow and possibly substantial multiples thereof as Orly has contended in her November 5, 2008 letter to this Court, Exhibit 2.

c Also, the settlement ends the relationship between the Orly Trust and D&K and "cancel[s] and void[s]" (TAP ¶88) the Amended D&K Partnership Agreement and the "Meeting Agreement" of which Orly complains in this action, eliminating any contention that the Orly Trust was damaged by those agreements, as the TAP reluctantly concedes (TAP ¶88) and thus removing a source of continued friction with Sagi Genger.<sup>7</sup>

d Also, the settlement agreement should end the multiple contentious litigations which must cost Orly Genger, or whosoever is paying her legal fees, substantial moneys.

While the settlement agreement, of course, contains releases, there is no release in favor of Dalia Genger, nor did Dalia Genger, individually, receive any moneys from the settlement. Thus the settlement contains substantial benefits for the Orly Trust and no benefits for Dalia Genger.

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<sup>7</sup> The TAP again misleads the Court when it contends "that these two agreements purported to enable" TPR's foreclosure. TAP ¶89. The foreclosure was pursuant to the D&K Note and Pledge Agreement that were executed in 1993, TAP Ex. B, and had nothing to do with these later agreements.

31 While the original Settlement Agreement provided it was controlled by Delaware Law and for exclusive Delaware jurisdiction over any disputes, subsequently the original settlement agreement was amended and restated to provide that it is controlled by New York law and that Delaware jurisdiction is non-exclusive.

32 Several months later, TPR agreed to sell the Orly Trust Note to Manhattan Safety Company, Ltd. ("Manhattan"), which agreed to loan an additional \$200,000 to the Orly Trust. Dalia Genger, as Trustee, anticipated the need for additional funds for its litigation to establish the Orly Trust's right with respect to the TRI shares. Thus as Trustee she entered into a new Credit and Forbearance Agreement and Second Amendment and Restated Promissory Note with Manhattan together with new unsecured Notes; the Orly Trust's Note to TPR was returned to the Orly Trust (See Exhibit 12) and on May 15, 2012, my firm's escrow account received the \$200,000 for the benefit of the Orly Trust. These Notes are neither due nor in default<sup>8</sup>, and there has been no notice to the contrary nor any attempt by Manhattan to compel payment.<sup>9</sup> Nor do the Credit and Forbearance Agreement or the Notes pledge anything as security or otherwise "allow the potential foreclosure against valuable collateral" as alleged in TAP ¶8. Thus, after this new agreement and Notes, the Orly Trust's debt was still less than its prior obligation to TPR as

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<sup>8</sup> Contrary to TAP's assertion, the federal court's dismissal of the *Padowitz & Meisler, LLP v. TPR Investment Associates, Inc.*, interpleader action for lack of jurisdiction is not an event of default nor an event of maturity of the Note to Manhattan, as it did not resolve the issues of beneficial ownership of the TRI shares.

<sup>9</sup> On Monday, August 13, 2012, I spoke by telephone with Manhattan's President, Greg Gilpon-Payne, who confirmed that Manhattan has not sent the Orly Trust any purported notice of default or otherwise demanded payment of the Note. And Dalia Genger, as Trustee of the Orly Trust, agreed to notify Orly Genger, through her counsel, of any purported notice of default or attempt to collect the Note within two business days of receipt thereof.

guarantor of the D&K Note and the Trust has received a \$100,000 payment from TPR and a \$200,000 loan from Manhattan.

33 Contrary to the *ipse dixit* assertion in TAP ¶76, the Orly Trust will be able to pay those Notes, either from TRI dividends if the Orly Trust is held to be the legal owner of the TRI shares<sup>10</sup>, or from the \$10.3 million held in escrow if the court finds otherwise.

34 Equally significantly, Dalia Genger has received no funds from the Settlement or the transaction with Manhattan. Indeed, Dalia Genger has received no funds from the Trust – the Trust Agreement provides that the Trustee shall not receive commissions. See Orly Genger 1993 Trust Agreement, Eighth Article, at page 18, Ex. A. Nor has the Orly Trust paid Dalia Genger's substantial legal fees for her defense of this action or the two companion Supreme Court actions by Orly Genger and by Arie Genger and Orly Genger, or the action Dalia Genger brought in Supreme Court against Arie Genger seeking to recover for the Orly Trust damages for Arie Genger's breach of his contract to cause the transfer to the Orly Genger Trust full title to the TRI shares. *Dalia Genger v. Arie Genger*, Index No. 113862/2010 (Sup. Ct. NY Co.)

35 Contrary to the allegation of the TAP, the settlement and the Orly Trust's issuance of the various notes did not violate any court order. I discuss them in chronological order.

#### This Court's July 1, 2009 Order Was Not Violated

36 On July 1, 2009, this Court ordered Dalia Genger, as Trustee:

to give notice by overnight mail to petitioner's [Orly's] counsel of any 1) offer to purchase the Orly Trust's 19.3% interest in TRI within 10 days of receiving

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<sup>10</sup> Until final court determination of the ownership issues regarding the "Orly Trust TRI Shares" and those TPR purported to sell to Arie Genger, TRI's dividends attributable to those shares are being held *in escrow* by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. Exhibit 13, April 23, 2012 email from Thomas Allingham, II, Esq. so confirming.

such offer and 2) act by Respondent [Dalia Genger], her agents and all other persons acting on her behalf to assign, mortgage, pledge, redeem, encumber, sell, or otherwise alter the Orly Trust's interest in TRI at least 10 days prior to such act. (Ex. 10)

(Note that the July 1, 2009 Order does not require notice of any transaction that "*impacted* the Orly Trust TRI Shares", as the TAP mischaracterized it in TAP ¶90 (a)(emphasis added)). Nothing in the Settlement Agreement, the Manhattan Agreement or the Notes is a purchase, assignment, mortgage, pledge, redemption, encumbrance, sale, or other alteration of the Orly Trust's interest in TRI which was not pledged to secure any of the notes. To the contrary, in the Settlement Agreement TPR relinquished to the Orly Trust any economic interest TPR had in the TRI Shares and assigns to the Orly Trust TPR's rights to any economic benefits of the TRI shares including any proceeds from the sale thereof, including but not limited to the \$10.3 million in proceeds otherwise owing to TPR in the future pursuant to the terms of the August 22, 2008 letter agreement with the Trump entities. This is in sharp contrast to Orly Genger's position supporting Arie Genger's attempt in the companion action, *Arie and Orly Genger v Sagi Genger et al.*, index no. 651089/2010, which seeks to take from the Orly Trust rights to the TRI Shares, the settlement fortifies the Orly Trust's position that it is entitled to the TRI shares. Thus there was no violation of the Surrogate's Court July 1, 2009 Order.

**The September 8, 2010 Stipulation in this Proceeding Was Not Violated**

37 By Stipulation on September 2, 2010, Orly and Dalia and their counsel, Orly's July 16, 2010 Order to Show Cause was withdrawn and Dalia agreed to give Orly's counsel notice "of any attempt to vote any TRI Shares held by the Orly Trust." TAP, Ex. Y. The TAP does not and cannot not allege that Dalia Genger made any attempt to vote any TRI Shares held by the Orly Trust. Thus there was no violation of the September 10, 2010 Stipulation.

**The Supreme Court's June 28, 2010 Order Was Not Violated**

38 In its June 28, 2010, Decision and Order in *Orly Genger in her individual capacity and on behalf of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust (both in its individual capacity and on behalf of D & K Limited Partnership) v. Dalia Genger et al.*, Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. Index No. 109749/09, which the TAP curiously calls "the New York TPR action", at pp. 31-32, the Supreme Court enjoined and restrained Defendants in that action:

during the pendency of this action from doing or suffering to be done, directly or through any attorney, agent, servant, employee or other person under the supervision or control of defendant or otherwise, any of the following acts: removing the [D& K Limited Partnership's 48% ownership interest in the common stock of TPR Investment Associates ("TPR")] from the state, or otherwise transferring, selling, pledging assigning, or otherwise disposing of the [Orly Trust TPR] Shares. (TAP Ex. X at p. 32)

Nothing in the Settlement Agreement, the Manhattan Agreement or the Notes removed the [D& K Limited Partnership's 48% ownership interest in the common stock of TPR Investment Associates ("TPR")] from the state, or otherwise transferred, sold, pledged, assigned, or otherwise disposed of the [Orly Trust TPR] Shares, which in fact the Orly Trust no longer owned and were owned by TPR by virtue of the foreclosure. Thus, contrary to the TAP's assertions (e.g., ¶90 (b)), there was no violation of the Supreme Court's June 28, 2010 Order.

**The Supreme Court's December 28, 2011 Order Was Not Violated**

39 On December 28, 2011, in *Arie Genger and Orly Genger, in her individual capacity and on behalf of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust, v. Sagi Genger, et al.*, Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co., Index No. 651089/2010, the Supreme Court ordered that defendants TPR and The Trump Group shall give Plaintiffs "ten business days notice for future tractions that may impact the subject [TRI] shares". TAP Ex. AA at p. 15. That Order did not impose any restrictions on Dalia Genger, and nothing in the Settlement Agreement, the Manhattan Agreement or the Notes

adversely impacts the Orly Trust's interest in TRI. Thus there was no violation of the Supreme Court's December 28, 2011 Order.

40 Therefore, the Third Amended Petition fails to set forth any plausible grounds that would give adequate grounds to remove Dalia Genger as Trustee.

#### **The TAP Fails to Join an Indispensable Party**

41 The Orly Genger Trust provides that its remainder, should Orly Genger die without issue<sup>11</sup>, goes to the Sagi Trust. Thus the Sagi Trust is an interested party that should be joined and served with the Third Amended Petition.

#### **CONCLUSION**

42 The TAP asks this Court to appoint Joel Isaacson as Trustee of the Orly Trust, and her prior Petitions asked for the appointment of other named persons. As the Orly Trust requires the Trustee to serve without commissions, the Court can be sure that if it appointed Orly's designee, he would use his discretion to distribute the corpus to Orly, whose actions demonstrate that she still is in thrall of her father, even to the extent of joining him as plaintiff in the Supreme Court action to have the TRI shares go to Arie rather than the Orly Trust. Undoubtedly, he has loaned her the very substantial funds she used to wage the legal warfare in so many courts, and thus cash that should go to Orly for her living expenses and then to her issue, should she have children and if not to the Sagi Trust would likely go instead to Arie Genger. It is to prevent this perversion of the original intent that Dalia Genger remains as Trustee, knowing that Orly's paternal bias will undoubtedly result in continued lawsuits against Dalia and stress.

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<sup>11</sup> Orly Genger is unmarried and has no children.

43 As the TAP is legally sufficient to remove Dalia Genger as Trustee, the TAP  
should be dismissed without leave to replead.

November 19, 2012

  
Robert A. Meister

# Exhibit 1

JAN 02 2009

SURROGATE'S COURT : NEW YORK COUNTY

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In the Matter of the Trust Established  
on December 13, 1993, by ARIE GENGER  
for the Benefit of ORLY GENGER.

File No. 0017/2008

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This is a contested application by the primary beneficiary  
(Orly Genger) of an irrevocable inter vivos trust established by  
her father, Arie Genger, seeking the appointment of a successor  
trustee or, alternatively, the appointment of a "special trustee"  
to investigate alleged wrongdoing concerning the trust.

Petitioner's mother, Dalia Genger (grantor's former wife),  
contends that she is the duly appointed successor trustee and  
that there is no basis to appoint another fiduciary for any  
purpose.

The trust agreement, dated December 13, 1993, provides for  
discretionary income and principal distributions to Orly for life  
with remainder to her descendants or, if none, to the grantor's  
descendants in trust.

Article SEVENTH (B), (D), (E), and (G) of the trust  
instrument sets forth the following procedure for the resignation  
of trustees and the appointment of their successors.

A trustee may resign by delivering a signed and acknowledged  
instrument of resignation in person or by certified or registered  
mail to the other trustee and to either the grantor or the income  
beneficiary. Such resignation is effective upon the receipt of  
the acknowledged instrument by the other trustee (if there is

one) and the grantor or the income beneficiary or at such later date as may be specified in the instrument.

A trustee may appoint his or her successor by delivering a signed and acknowledged instrument in the same manner as described above for resignation. Any such appointment, however, is valid only if the appointee qualifies by delivering a signed and acknowledged instrument of acceptance in person or by certified or registered mail to each trustee and the grantor or the income beneficiary within 30 days after the later of 1) the date on which a copy of the appointment instrument is delivered to him or her, and 2) the effective date of the appointment as set forth in the appointment instrument. It is observed that there is no provision that requires a resigning trustee to appoint a successor or that there always be two trustees in office.

The original two trustees served until October 2004, when they resigned and appointed David Parnes and Eric Gribitz as their successors. On February 12, 2007, Mr. Gribitz resigned without appointing a successor. On April 26, 2007, Mr. Parnes resigned and appointed as his successor Leah Fang in a signed and acknowledged instrument. Although Ms. Fang noted her acceptance at the bottom of such instrument, her signature was not acknowledged. However, in another document entitled "Release" executed and acknowledged by Ms. Fang the same day, she, as

trustee, purported to discharge Mr. Parnes from liability. It is undisputed that thereafter Ms. Fang acted as trustee. Indeed, Ms. Fang's contention that she received a number of requests for information from petitioner and that petitioner referred to her in writing and orally as trustee is not disputed by petitioner.

On December 12, 2007, Ms. Fang, without resigning in accordance with the trust agreement, attempted to appoint Patricia Enriquez, as successor trustee. Her designation of Ms. Enriquez, however, was by an unacknowledged letter in which she referred to her own resignation as taking effect upon Ms. Enriquez's acceptance of the appointment. Ms. Enriquez accepted by signing the letter, but such acceptance was not acknowledged and, in any event, there is nothing in the record to suggest that such "acceptance" was delivered in accordance with the trust instrument. Two weeks later, an attorney for Ms. Enriquez notified petitioner's counsel by email that her client had advised that she had no intention to overcome the procedural omissions.

On January 3, 2008, Ms. Fang and Dalia Genger signed before a notary a memorandum in which Ms. Fang stated that "to the extent that I am still vested with any powers to appoint trustees of the [trust], I confirm your appointment." The next day, Ms. Fang executed an acknowledged instrument of resignation and appointment of successor trustee naming Dalia as her successor.

and Dalia, on the same day, executed an acknowledged instrument of acceptance. It is undisputed that such documents were delivered in accordance with the trust requirements.

We address first that portion of the instant application which seeks the appointment of a successor trustee on the ground that Dalia was not validly appointed. In such connection, petitioner argues first that, because Ms. Fang's signature on the bottom of Mr. Parnes's appointment instrument was not acknowledged, she never accepted the position in accordance with the trust agreement (and thus could not appoint Dalia her successor). However, such argument ignores the "Release" mentioned above that Ms. Fang executed the same day. Such instrument, which was signed and duly acknowledged, unequivocally establishes Ms. Fang's acceptance of the position. Since petitioner does not challenge the authenticity of such instrument or Mr. Parnes' contention, supported by the record, that it was delivered in accordance with the trust instrument and, as noted above, petitioner thereafter communicated with Ms. Fang as trustee, Ms. Fang properly qualified as successor trustee.

Petitioner's second argument that, in any event, Ms. Fang's appointment of Dalia was ineffective because Ms. Fang had previously resigned as trustee is also without merit. Simply put, Ms. Fang had not previously resigned because her letter to Ms. Enriquez did not contain the formalities (i.e., an

acknowledgment) required by the trust agreement. Moreover, although not a model of clarity, the letter makes clear that Ms. Fang did not intend to leave the trust without a trustee in the event that Ms. Enriquez failed to qualify, which is exactly what happened. Thus, Ms. Fang had authority to appoint Dalia as her successor.

Since there is no dispute that the instrument of resignation and appointment executed by Ms. Fang on January 4, 2008, and Dalia's instrument of acceptance of the same date were executed and delivered in accordance with the trust agreement, Dalia is the duly appointed successor trustee of the trust. To find otherwise would be to ignore the chronology of events and the purpose of the provisions at issue, namely to ensure that the trust always has a fiduciary ready, willing and able to act. The fact that petitioner does not wish her mother to be the fiduciary because she considers her an adversary in a broader intra-family dispute does not provide a basis to ignore the grantor's intent, as reflected in the trust instrument, that an acting trustee, and not the beneficiary, decides who shall become a successor trustee. Accordingly, petitioner's application to appoint a successor trustee is denied.

We next turn to petitioner's alternate request for relief, namely that a "special trustee" be appointed for the "purpose of investigation and taking discovery with respect to the wrongful

dealings concerning the assets and income of the trust."

It is noted initially that petitioner's only allegations of "wrongful dealings" concern a close corporation, TPR Investment Associates, Inc. She contends that her brother Sagi, who is an officer of TPR, and Dalia, who was a shareholder at the time this proceeding was commenced, are engaged in a "wrongful scheme" to divert assets to themselves and, as a result, Dalia "could not possibly" investigate wrongdoing at TPR, which the petition describes as the "greatest" asset of the trust.

However, the premise of the application, namely that the trust's interest in TPR would enable the trustee to investigate or seek relief from TPR, does not appear to be correct. Petitioner does not dispute Dalia's assertion, supported in the record, that the trust is not a shareholder of TPR at all. Rather, D&K LP, an entity in which the trust owns a 48 percent interest, in turn owns approximately 50 percent of TPR. Petitioner does not explain what appears to be a material misstatement concerning TPR's relationship to the trust. Nor does she identify how a trustee under such circumstances might be in a position to "investigate and address the TPR issues".

In any event, assuming arguendo that a trustee would somehow be able to investigate alleged misconduct at TPR, petitioner's vague and speculative allegations of "wrongful conduct" at TPR from which Dalia purportedly benefitted do not warrant the

appointment of a "special trustee". Similarly, petitioner's allegations (made upon information and belief) that Dalia had knowledge of alleged improper acts by former trustee, David Parnes, in relation to TPR are patently insufficient to warrant the remedy of a "special trustee". In such connection, it is noted that Mr. Parnes and Ms. Fang have been directed to account for their proceedings as trustees (Matter of Genger, NYLJ, Feb. 25, 2008, at 29, col 3), giving petitioner a forum to seek relief for most of the conduct about which she complains.

Finally, it is observed that petitioner has not alleged that Dalia has refused a request for information, which would warrant relief (SCPA 2102), or has failed as trustee to protect trust assets. Indeed, it appears that Dalia (who states that she is ready and able to act as fiduciary) has yet to assume the duties of trustee in deference to her daughter's position in this litigation. As a validly appointed trustee, she should be given the opportunity to do what she deems necessary to manage and protect the trust's assets.

Based upon the foregoing, the appointment of a "special trustee" is unwarranted at this time and, accordingly, the application is denied, without prejudice to renewal if future

[REDACTED]

circumstances warrant such relief.

This decision constitutes the order of the court.

S U R R O G A T E

Dated: December 31, 2008

# Exhibit 2

**MARKEWICH AND ROSENSTOCK LLP**

8 East 41<sup>st</sup> Street • Fifth Floor • New York, New York 10017  
tel: (212) 542-8156 fax: (212) 481 1761 [cmarkewich@urlavollp.com](mailto:cmarkewich@urlavollp.com)

Lawrence M. Rosenstock  
Eva Rachel Markewich

Robert Markewich  
of counsel

November 5, 2008

---

Hon. Renee R. Roth  
Surrogate's Court, New York County  
31 Chambers Street, 5<sup>th</sup> Floor  
New York, New York 10007

Re: In the Matter of Orly Genger  
File No. 0017/2008

Dear Surrogate Roth:

We write on behalf of the Petitioner, Orly Genger, with reference to her *sub judice* Petition as beneficiary of the Orly Genger Trust ("Orly Trust"). Recent events require that we, again, urge you to appoint Martin Coleman as Trustee. As set forth in detail below, there are several litigations in process that will impact the value of Trust assets, and the Orly Trust needs to have a Trustee who can participate in those litigations without conflict. There is also an outstanding matter regarding possession of a stock certificate belonging to the Orly Trust, but which is currently being held captive by another party.

Our Amended Petition sought the immediate appointment of a Trustee to administer the Orly Trust and safeguard its assets. We were thwarted in that request by objections from Sagi Genger ("Sagi"), the remote contingent remainderman of the Orly Trust, who manipulated various friends and relatives of his (his friend, David Parnes ("Parnes"); his sister-in-law Leah Feng; his sister-in-law's romantic partner, Patricia Enriquez; and his mother Dalia Genger ("Dalia")) to, *serialim*, name one another Trustee and to take control of the Orly Trust, to the detriment of Orly.

Since our last contact with the Court, we believe Sagi and Dalia have acted in concert to devalue the Trust's most valuable asset, shares of a privately-held company called Trans Resources Inc. ("TRI"), a company founded by Orly's and Sagi's father, Arie Genger ("Arie").

The Orly Trust and a trust for the benefit of Sagi, (the "Sagi Trust"), were created by Arie in 1993. In 2004, when Arie and Dalia divorced, the two Trusts purchased TRI stock that at one time was marital property. This stock previously had been held by TPR<sup>1</sup>, an entity in which Arie and Dalia held their family resources. As part of the marital settlement, the TRI stock held by TPR was sold to the Orly Trust, the Sagi Trust and Arie. As a result of the sales, the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust each owned to approximately 19% of the outstanding TRI stock, and Arie owned approximately 15% of the TRI stock. The Trusts also executed irrevocable proxies granting to Arie the right to vote their shares of TRI stock. As a result, Arie continued to control TRI through the Genger family holdings of approximately 53% of the stock.

---

The remaining 47% TRI stock is held by third parties unrelated to the Gengers but related to each other ("Third Parties"). Last month, the Third Parties attempted a coup, by convincing Sagi to arrange the sale to them of the Sagi Trust's shares ("Sagi TRI Shares"). The purported sale was effected by a document signed by Rochelle Fang, Sagi's mother-in-law, who was then Trustee of the Sagi Trust. As soon as Rochelle, as Trustee, signed the purchase and sale agreement (the "PSA") regarding the Sagi TRI Shares, Rochelle – presumably at Sagi's request – resigned as Trustee. In Rochelle's place, David Parnes became Trustee of the Sagi Trust. Of course, this musical chairs game with the Trustee to the Sagi Trust is the same game played by the same people – Parnes, Sagi and Sagi's in-laws, the Fangs – regarding the trusteeship of the Orly Trust.

The PSA reflected a price for the Sagi TRI-Shares that is merely a fractional amount of their worth. Based on the 2008 earnings of TRI, the value of the Sagi TRI Shares is in excess of \$150,000,000. Nonetheless, under the PSA, the Third Parties purport to purchase the Sagi TRI Shares for \$26,715,416 – i.e., at a discount of approximately \$125,000,000 or more.

In the meantime, the Third Parties also have filed suit seeking to void the original transfer of the TRI shares from TPR to the two Trusts, claiming the sale was improper under the TRI shareholders agreement. Since the Third Parties claim that the stock owned by the Sagi Trust was never rightfully transferred to the Sagi Trust, the Third Parties insisted that the PSA be approved and executed not only by the Sagi Trust, but also by TPR. Upon information and belief, Dalia, as the controlling shareholder of TPR, consented to the sales

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<sup>1</sup> In the Amended Petition, Orly requested limited letters to investigate the operations of TPR. TPR originally was owned 49%, indirectly, and equally, by the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust, and 51% by Dalia. Recently, Dalia sold 2% of her shares to Sagi's mother-in-law, Rochelle Fang. Of particular concern to Orly is the fact that TPR has paid out well over a million dollars in compensation and other funds to Sagi and Dalia, without making comparable payments to Orly.

document affirming that if the Sagi Trust's TRI shares are, in fact, still owned by TPR, then TPR agrees to the sale to the Third Parties. By consenting to the sale, Dalla, simultaneously: (i) agreed to a share price for TRI at significantly below its actual value; (ii) conceded the possibility that the Orly Trust is not the owner of its most valuable asset - the TRI shares that had been transferred to it by TPR; (iii) agreed to cede control of TRI to the Third Parties; (iv) potentially caused a de-valuation of the Orly Trust's TRI shares; and (v) potentially caused a de-valuation of the Orly Trust's interest in TPR.

There are currently several litigations involving TPR and/or TRI, which directly affect the Orly Trust, including:

- 
- GLEN CLOVA INVESTMENT CO. v. TRANS-RESOURCES, INC. and TPR INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES INC. pending in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York;
  - ROBERT SMITH, TR INVESTORS, LLC AND GLEN CLOVA INVESTMENT CO. v. TRANS-RESOURCES, INC. pending in the Delaware Chancery Court;
  - TR INVESTORS, LLC, GLEN CLOVA INVESTMENT CO., NEW TR EQUITY I, LLC, and NEW TR EQUITY II, LLC v. ARIE GENGER and TRANS-RESOURCES, INC. pending in the Delaware Chancery Court.
  - NEW TR EQUITY, LLC v. TRANS-RESOURCES, INC., pending in the Delaware Chancery Court.

These actions will have a direct impact on the Orly Trust's holdings, and the control and value of such holdings. It is, therefore, essential that a trustee immediately be appointed for the Orly Trust, so that decisions can be made to determine what steps to take with respect to these litigations and, in particular, whether the Orly Trust should seek to intervene in these lawsuits. It is likely that the only way to preserve the value of the TRI shares in the Orly Trust will be to Intervene in some if not all of the litigations.

Sagi and Dalla are acting on their own accounts in the litigations. There is no one acting on behalf of Orly or the Orly Trust. The Orly Trust must have representation in the litigations that is independent from the Sagi Trust and TPR, as controlled by Dalla. Clearly, Dalla would not be independent. She is obviously in a position of conflict, having already approved a severely depressed valuation of the TRI stock. This conflict is separate and apart from the conflict that already existed, as set forth in the Amended Petition, as a result of Dalla taking money out of TPR, to the exclusion of the Orly Trust,

which has an independent significant ownership interest in TPR, albeit indirectly through another entity controlled by Dalia.

In addition to our concerns about the extant litigations, we are also concerned that Dalia and Sagi will attempt to sell the Orly Trust's TRI shares to the Third Parties – again, at a depressed value. In fact, we have sought to obtain the share certificate evidencing the Orly Trust's ownership of the TRI shares and have been thwarted by TRI's counsel. The need to take possession of that share certificate is yet another, separate, reason, why there is immediate need for the appointment of a Trustee other than Dalia.

For these reasons we respectfully request that the Court immediately resolve the outstanding application and appoint Martin Coleman as Trustee. (Although the Trustee must serve without commission, pursuant to the Trust Instrument, Mr. Coleman has agreed to take on this job.)

Respectfully yours,

  
Eve Rachel Markewich

ERM:js

cc: Jonathan G. Kortmansky, Esq.  
Steven Hyman, Esq.  
Matthew Hoffman, Esq.  
Seth Rubenstein, Esq.  
Mary Santamarina, Esq.

# Exhibit 3

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 08/11/2010  
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 83

INDEX NO. 109749/2009  
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 08/11/2010

SUPREME COURT: NEW YORK COUNTY

ORLY GENTER in her individual capacity and on behalf of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust (both in its individual capacity and on behalf of D & K Limited Partnership),

Plaintiff,

- against -

DALIA GENTER, SAGI GENTER, LEAH FANG, D & K GP LLC, and TPR INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Defendants.

Index No.: 109749/09

**SECOND AMENDED  
VERIFIED COMPLAINT**

Plaintiff Orly Genger in her individual capacity and on behalf of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust (both in its individual capacity and on behalf of D & K Limited Partnership), by her attorneys, Zeichner Ellman & Krause LLP, alleges, upon information and belief, for her Second Amended Verified Complaint against the defendants in this action as follows:

**NATURE OF THE ACTION**

1. As described below, Dalia and Sagi Genger, together with various business entities controlled by them and Leah Fang, engaged in a fraud and conspiracy designed to completely loot the Orly Genger 1993 Trust (the "Orly Trust") of its value. The defendants' various acts of self-dealing, material misrepresentations, and material omissions, in breach of their respective fiduciary duties and in violation of New York law, injured Orly Genger, the Orly Trust, and D & K Limited Partnership.

in TPR, from challenge or diminution in value.

36. In addition, Sagi owes fiduciary duties to Orly arising from the close relationship of trust and confidence between him and his sister. Orly reposed complete trust, confidence and reliance upon her brother Sagi to protect both her interests and her Trust's interests, including her Trust's ownership interests in TPR and the TRI Shares, and to alert her to anything that may adversely affect her or her Trust's assets.

E. Dalia Gives Sagi Complete Control of TPR

37. On October 30, 2004, Dalia, as 52.96% owner of TPR, entered into a shareholder agreement with TPR, concerning the future management of the company. Pursuant to this shareholder agreement (attached hereto as Exhibit 6), Dalia gave D&K, which owned 49% of TPR, the authority to appoint one board member to TPR's two-member board of directors. Sagi used his managerial control over D&K to appoint himself as D&K's representative on TPR's board. In addition, the shareholder agreement appointed Sagi as CEO of TPR. As TPR's majority shareholder, Dalia named herself as TPR's remaining board member.

38. Sometime in 2007, Sagi stripped Dalia of her majority interest in TPR by selling a 2% interest in TPR to Rochelle Fang, his mother-in-law. At the time of the sale, TPR's assets were worth between approximately \$11,000,000 and \$12,000,000, plus the value of the Note.

39. Around the time of her appointment as successor trustee to the Orly

Trust in January 2008, Dalia divested herself of the balance of her TPR shares.

40. Through the above-mentioned transactions, Sagi obtained direct control over TPR and its interest in the Note. Notably, Sagi's role as CEO of TPR (the creditor on the Note) is in direct conflict with his role as manager of D&K (the debtor on the Note), whose role was to repay the Note or to contest the Note's enforceability.

41. Moreover, Sagi's dual control over both TPR and D&K directly conflicts with Sagi's and D&K GP's undiluted fiduciary duties to D&K's limited partners, including the Orly Trust, to manage, maintain and protect D&K's assets from challenge or diminution in value. Sagi would later use his dual positions at TPR and D&K to engage in self-dealing in connection with the Note and to damage the Orly Trust and Orly, in violation of his fiduciary duties.

42. Notably, other New York courts have recognized Sagi's willingness to engage in self-dealing, ignore clear conflicts of interest, and collude with his mother, Dalia, to the detriment of the other Genger family members. See Orders and Transcripts attached hereto as Exhibit 7.


F. Fang and then Dalia Gain Control over the Orly Trust

43. In connection with the Settlement Agreement, Dalia required that the Trustees of the Orly Trust and the Sagi Trust (Sash A. Spencer and Lawrence M. Small) resign and be replaced with Sagi's longtime friends, David Parnes and Eric Gribetz. Mr. Gribetz, subsequently retired as trustee without appointing a successor in


VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK,  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK.

ORLY GINGER, being duly sworn, says that she is the plaintiff named in the foregoing second amended verified complaint; that she has read the foregoing second amended verified complaint, and that the complaint is true to her own knowledge except as to those matters therein stated to be alleged upon information and belief, and that as to those matters she believes them to be true.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
ORLY GINGER

Sworn to before me this  
4<sup>th</sup> day of August, 2010

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

ANTHONY ROSARIO  
Notary Public, State of New York  
No. 01R06212071  
Qualified in Bronx County  
Commission Expires 10/05/2023

# Exhibit 4

**MARKEWICH AND ROSENSTOCK LLP**

8 East 41<sup>st</sup> Street • Fifth Floor • New York, New York 10017  
tel: (212) 542-3156 fax: (212) 481 1761 [rosenstock@mrlawllp.com](mailto:rosenstock@mrlawllp.com)

Lawrence M. Rosenstock  
Eve Rachel Markewich

Robert Markewich  
of counsel

August 28, 2008

**BY HAND AND MAIL**

Dalia Genger  
200 East 65<sup>th</sup> Street, 32W  
New York, New York 10021

Re: 1993 Orly Genger Trust


Dear Ms. Genger:

It has come to our attention that you may be considering attempting to act on behalf of the Orly Genger Trust (the "Trust").

We remind you that you have no authority to act for the Trust and that on March 4, 2008 Surrogate Roth directed that no actions were to be taken with reference to the Trust assets. Should you violate the Court order, or in any way interfere with the ownership and/or value of the Trust assets or take any action with respect to Trust assets, we will hold you personally responsible for any loss or damage that may be incurred and seek to hold you in contempt. To the extent others are involved in guiding or facilitating wrongful conduct on your part, we will also seek remedies against them.

We reserve any and all rights with respect to your conduct concerning the Trust.

Very truly yours,

  
Lawrence M. Rosenstock

LMR:js

cc: Jonathan G. Kortmansky, Esq. (by hand)

Sullivan & Worcester LLP

Orly Genger

MARKEWICH AND ROSENSTOCK LLP

8 East 41<sup>st</sup> Street • Fifth Floor • New York, New York 10017  
tel: (212) 542-3156 fax: (212) 481 1761 *lrosenstock@mrlawllp.com*

Lawrence M. Rosenstock  
Eve Rachel Markewich

Robert Markewich  
of counsel

August 28, 2008

**BY HAND AND EMAIL**


Jonathan G. Kortmansky, Esq.  
Sullivan & Worcester LLP  
1290 Avenue of the Americas  
New York, New York 10104

Re: 1993 Orly Genger Trust

Dear Mr. Kortmansky:

I am writing you on behalf of Orly Genger, the beneficiary of the Orly Genger Trust(the "Trust"). By letter dated August 28, 2008, a copy of which is enclosed, we advised Dalia Genger, among other things, that when we were before the court on this matter on March 4, 2008, Surrogate Roth directed that no actions were to be taken with respect to Trust assets. As attorneys for Dalia Genger we expect that you will so advise your client of this direction and to take all appropriate steps to see that she complies with Surrogate Roth's order.

Very truly yours,



Lawrence M. Rosenstock

LMR:js

cc: Hon. Surrogate Renee R. Roth  
Orly Genger

# Exhibit 5

**STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT**

by and among

**TR INVESTORS, LLC,**

**GLEN CLOVA INVESTMENT CO.,**

**NEW TR EQUITY I, LLC**

and

**NEW TR EQUITY II, LLC**

as Purchasers,

**SAGI GINGER 1993 TRUST**

as Seller

and

**TPR INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.**

Dated as of August 22, 2008

*[Handwritten signatures]*

STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT

THIS STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT ("Agreement"), dated as of the 22<sup>nd</sup> day of August, 2008, by and among TR Investors, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("TR Investors"), Glenclova Investment Co., a Cayman Islands corporation, ("Glenclova"), New TR Equity I, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("Equity I") and New TR Equity II, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("Equity II" and collectively with TR Investors, Glenclova and Equity I, the "Purchasers"), the Sagi Geiger 1993 Trust ("Seller"), and TPR Investment Associates, Inc., a Delaware corporation ("TPR").

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, Seller is the record and beneficial owner of an aggregate of one thousand one hundred two and eight-tenths (1,102.80) shares of common stock (the "Common Stock"), par value \$0.01 per share, of Trans-Resources, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company");

WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell to TR Investors, and TR Investors desires to purchase from Seller, two hundred seventy five and seven-tenths (275.70) shares of Common Stock (the "TR Investors Shares");

WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell to Glenclova, and Glenclova desires to purchase from Seller, two hundred seventy five and seven-tenths (275.70) shares of Common Stock (the "Glenclova Shares");

WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell to Equity I, and Equity I desires to purchase from Seller, two hundred seventy five and seven-tenths (275.70) shares of Common Stock (the "Equity I Shares"); and

WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell to Equity II, and Equity II desires to purchase from Seller, two hundred seventy five and seven-tenths (275.70) shares of Common Stock (the "Equity II Shares" together with the TR Investors Shares, the Glenclova Shares and the Equity I Shares, the "Shares").

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth herein, the parties hereto, intending to be legally bound hereby, agree as follows:

1. Sale of Shares. Upon the terms of this Agreement, the Purchasers, severally and not jointly, hereby purchase, acquire and accept from Seller, and the Seller hereby sells, conveys assigns, transfers and delivers to the Purchasers, all right, title and interest in and to the Shares as follows:

(a) TR Investors hereby purchases, acquires and accepts from Seller, and the Seller hereby sells, conveys assigns, transfers and delivers to TR Investors, all right, title and interest in and to the TR Investors Shares, free and clear of any and all liens, obligations or encumbrances;

(b) Glenclova hereby purchases, acquires and accepts from Seller, and the Seller hereby sells, conveys assigns, transfers and delivers to Glenclova, all right, title and interest in and to the Glenclova Shares, free and clear of any and all liens, obligations or encumbrances; and

(c) Equity I hereby purchases, acquires and accepts from Seller, and the Seller hereby sells, conveys assigns, transfers and delivers to Equity I, all right, title and interest in and to the Equity I Shares, free and clear of any and all liens, obligations or encumbrances.

(d) Equity II hereby purchases, acquires and accepts from Seller, and the Seller hereby sells, conveys assigns, transfers and delivers to Equity II, all right, title and interest in and to the Equity II Shares, free and clear of any and all liens, obligations or encumbrances.

2. Consideration and Closing Deliveries.

(a) Upon the terms of this Agreement, in consideration of the sale of the Shares to the Purchasers and the other agreements of the Seller contained herein, the Purchasers, herewith cause to be delivered to the Seller through and pursuant to the Escrow Agreement (as defined below), in full payment for the aforesaid sale of the Shares, an aggregate amount equal to twenty six million seven hundred fifteen thousand four hundred sixteen dollars (\$26,715,416) (the "Purchase Price") as follows:

(i) in respect of the TR Investors Shares, (a) by wire transfer of a portion of the Purchase Price equal to \$1,718,750 in immediately available funds to the Escrow Agent (as hereinafter defined) and then by the Escrow Agent to a bank account designated in writing by the Seller, and (b) a portion of the Purchase Price equal to \$4,960,104 by wire transfer to the Escrow Agent to be held by the Escrow Agent pursuant to Section 2(b) hereof;

(ii) in respect of the Glenclova Shares, (a) by wire transfer of a portion of the Purchase Price equal to \$1,718,750 in immediately available funds to the Escrow Agent (as hereinafter defined) and then by the Escrow Agent to a bank account designated in writing by the Seller, and (b) a portion of the Purchase Price equal to \$4,960,104 by wire transfer to the Escrow Agent to be held pursuant to Section 2(b) hereof; and

(iii) in respect of the Equity I Shares, (a) by wire transfer of a portion of the Purchase Price equal to \$1,718,750 in immediately available funds to the Escrow Agent (as hereinafter defined) and then by the Escrow Agent to a bank account designated in writing by the Seller, and (b) a portion of the Purchase Price equal to

\$4,960,104 by wire transfer to the Escrow Agent to be held pursuant to Section 2(b) hereof.

(iv) in respect of the Equity II Shares, (a) by wire transfer of a portion of the Purchase Price equal to \$1,718,750 in immediately available funds to the Escrow Agent (as hereinafter defined) and then by the Escrow Agent to a bank account designated in writing by the Seller, and (b) a portion of the Purchase Price equal to \$4,960,104 by wire transfer to the Escrow Agent to be held pursuant to Section 2(b) hereof.

(b) The parties are herewith entering into an Escrow Agreement (the "Escrow Agreement"), among the Purchasers Seller and Troutman Sanders LLP, as escrow agent (the "Escrow Agent"), pursuant to which the Purchasers, severally and not jointly, are depositing the amounts set forth in Sections 2(a)(i)(b), 2(a)(ii)(b), 2(a)(iii)(b) and 2(a)(iv)(b) hereof (collectively, the "Escrow Amount") to be held pursuant to this Agreement and the Escrow Agreement.

(c) As promptly as practicable, Seller shall deliver to the Escrow Agent, either (i) stock certificates representing the Shares issued in the name of Seller, accompanied by stock powers duly executed in blank with appropriate transfer stamps, if any, affixed, and any other documents that are necessary to transfer title to the shares to the Purchasers (or any designee of the Purchasers), free and clear of any and all liens, obligations or encumbrances, or (ii) stock certificates issued in the names of TR Investors, Glenclova, Equity I and Equity II for the TR Investor Shares, the Glenclova Shares, the Equity I Shares and the Equity II Shares, respectively, in each case free and clear of any and all liens, obligations or encumbrances.

(d) Subject to Section 2(e) hereof, upon the delivery of stock certificates required by Section 2(c), the Escrow Agent shall release the Escrow Amount to the Seller in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Escrow Agreement.

(e) Notwithstanding the foregoing, Seller may at any time following the date hereof, direct the Escrow Agent to release up to an aggregate of \$500,000 of the Escrow Amount, provided such amounts are held in escrow at such time, to a charity or charities of its choice pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Escrow Agreement.

3. Closing. The closing of the transactions contemplated in this Agreement (the "Closing") is taking place at the offices of The Trump Group at 3:00 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time, on the date hereof (the "Closing Date").

4. Representations and Warranties of Seller. In connection with the purchase and sale of the Shares referred to in Section 1 hereof and the execution and performance of this Agreement, Seller represents and warrants to the Purchasers as follows:

(a) Seller is the record and beneficial owner of all right, title and interest in and to all of the Shares and had good and transferable title thereto, free and clear of all liens, obligations, encumbrances, restrictions, pledges, charges, options, preemptive rights, subscription rights, warrants, calls, security interests, and claims of every kind.

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M&P

(b) Seller has the full right, power, and authority to sell and deliver the Shares in accordance with this Agreement.

(c) The delivery of the Shares delivered pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 hereof will transfer valid title thereto, free and clear of all liens, obligations, encumbrances, restrictions, pledges, charges, options, preemptive rights, subscription rights, warrants, calls, security interests, and claims of every kind.

(d) The execution, delivery, and performance of this Agreement, the consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby, and the compliance with or fulfillment of the terms and provisions of this Agreement or of any other agreement or instrument contemplated by this Agreement, do not and will not (i) contravene any law, rule, or regulation of any state or of the United States; (ii) contravene any order, writ, award, judgment, decree, or other determination that affects or binds Seller or the Company, or any of their respective properties; (iii) conflict with, result in a breach of, constitute a default under, or give rise to a right of termination under any contract, agreement, note, deed of trust, mortgage, trust, lease, governmental or other license, permit, or other authorization, or any other instrument or restriction to which Seller or the Company is a party; or (iv) require Seller to obtain the approval, consent, or authorization of, or to make any declaration, filing, or registration with, any third party or any foreign, federal, state, county, or local court, governmental authority, or regulatory body.


(e) Seller is not subject to any order, writ, award, judgment, decree, or determination, is not a party to or bound by any contract, agreement, note, deed of trust, mortgage, trust, lease, governmental or other license, permit, or other authorization, or other instrument or restriction that could conflict with, impair, impose restrictions or otherwise prevent or delay the execution, delivery, or performance of this Agreement or the consummation of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.

(f) This Agreement is the legal, valid, and binding agreement of Seller and is enforceable in accordance with its terms, subject to (i) bankruptcy, insolvency, fraudulent conveyance, reorganization, moratorium, or other laws or equitable principles relating to or affecting the enforcement of creditors' rights generally, and (ii) the effect of general principles of equity, including, without limitation, concepts of materiality, reasonableness, good faith and fair dealing (regardless of whether considered in a proceeding in equity or at law).

(g) None of the representations and warranties of Seller contained herein and none of the written information or written documents furnished to the Purchasers or any of their respective representatives by Seller or its representatives is false or misleading in any material respect or omits to state a fact herein or therein necessary to make the statements made herein not misleading in any material respect.



(h) Seller has made an independent decision to sell the Shares based on the information available to it and that it has determined is adequate for that purpose, Seller has had the opportunity to review all information which it deems relevant to its decision to sell.


the Shares, and Seller has not relied on any information (in any form, whether written or oral) furnished by or on behalf of the Purchasers or the Company in making that decision.

(l) Neither the Purchasers, nor the Company has given any investment advice or rendered any opinion to Seller as to whether the sale of the Shares is prudent or suitable, and Seller is not relying on any representation or warranty other than those made by the Purchasers expressly in this Agreement.

(j) Seller is a sophisticated investor with respect to the Shares and has adequate information concerning the Shares. Seller believes, by reason of its and its beneficiary's business and financial experience and the information and knowledge that its beneficiary holds with respect to the Company and its business, that it is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the sale and of protecting its own interest and the interest of its beneficiary in connection with the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. Seller has had the opportunity to have legal counsel review and advise it with respect to the terms of this Agreement.

(k) Seller acknowledges that (i) the Purchasers currently may have material information regarding the condition (financial or otherwise), results of operations, businesses, properties, plans, and prospects of the Company that may be material to a decision to sell the Shares ("Excluded Information") and that such Excluded Information may affect the value of the Shares. Seller further acknowledges that it has determined to sell the Shares notwithstanding its lack of knowledge of the Excluded Information. Seller represents that it has adequate information concerning the business and financial condition of the Company and its affiliates to make an informed decision regarding the sale of the Shares pursuant hereto and has independently and without reliance upon the Purchasers made its own analysis and decision to sell the Shares pursuant hereto. Seller acknowledges that the sale of the Shares is the result of independent arm's-length negotiations between Seller and the Purchasers.

5. Representations and Warranties of the Purchasers. In connection with the purchase and sale of the Shares referred to in Section 1 hereof and the execution and performance of this Agreement, each Purchaser represents and warrants, severally and not jointly, to Seller as follows:

(a) Such Purchaser has the full right, capacity, power, and authority to execute and deliver this Agreement, to consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement, and to comply with the terms, conditions, and provisions of this Agreement.

(b) The execution, delivery, and performance of this Agreement, the consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby and the compliance with or fulfillment of the terms and provisions of this Agreement or of any other agreement or instrument contemplated by this Agreement, do not and will not (i) contravene any law, rule, or regulation of any state or of the United States; (ii) contravene any order, writ, award, judgment, decree, or other determination that affects or binds such Purchaser or any of its properties; (iii) conflict with, result in a breach of, constitute a default under, or give rise to a right of termination under any contract, agreement, note, deed of trust, mortgage, trust, lease, governmental or other license, permit, or other authorization, or any other instrument or restriction to which such

Purchaser is a party or by which any of its properties may be affected or bound; or (iv) require such Purchaser to obtain the approval, consent, or authorization of, or to make any declaration, filing, or registration with, any third party or any foreign, federal, state, county, or local court, governmental authority, or regulatory body that has not been obtained in writing prior to the date of this Agreement.

(c) Such Purchaser is not subject to any order, writ, award, judgment, decree, or determination nor a party to nor bound by any deed of trust, mortgage, trust, lease, governmental or other license, permit, or other authorization, contract, agreement, note, or other instrument or restriction that could conflict with or prevent the execution, delivery, or performance of this Agreement or the consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby.

(d) This Agreement is the legal, valid, and binding agreement of such Purchaser and is enforceable in accordance with its terms, subject to (i) bankruptcy, insolvency, fraudulent conveyance, reorganization, moratorium, or other laws or equitable principles relating to or affecting the enforcement of creditors' rights generally and, (ii) the effect of general principles of equity, including, without limitation, concepts of materiality, reasonableness, good faith and fair dealing (regardless of whether considered in a proceeding in equity or at law).

(e) Such Purchaser hereby acknowledges receipt of copies of the Irrevocable Proxy, dated as of October 29, 2004, issued by Seller in favor of Aric Genger with respect to the Shares (the "Proxy"), a back-up form of voting trust agreement and voting trust certificate delivered in connection with the Proxy and the letter agreement dated October 29, 2004 with respect to the transfer of the Shares from TPR to Seller.

(f) Such Purchaser has no actual knowledge of any contract, agreement, note, or other instrument or restriction to which the Seller is subject that could conflict with or prevent the execution, delivery, or performance of this Agreement or the consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby.

6. Covenants. Promptly following the execution hereof, Seller shall use all best efforts to cause the Company to recognize Seller as the record and beneficial owner of the Shares in the Company's stock registry. In furtherance of the foregoing, Seller shall use all best efforts to promptly submit through the Escrow Agent or directly as instructed by the Purchasers a lost certificate affidavit in respect of the Shares to the Company, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, and cause the Company to deliver to it (or the Escrow Agent as instructed by the Purchasers) a validly issued stock certificate in respect of the Shares to Seller in Seller's name. To the extent that Seller is asked by the Purchasers to commence a lawsuit or other proceeding in furtherance of the foregoing, the Purchasers shall select legal counsel for such matters, and shall pay the legal expenses and fees in connection therewith on Seller's behalf.

JG  
RF

7. Indemnification. Seller agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless each Purchaser and its affiliates and controlling persons, and its and their respective directors, officers, employees and agents (collectively, the "Indemnified Group"), at any time after the Closing Date, from and against all demands, claims, actions, or causes of action, assessments,

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losses, damages, deficiencies, liabilities (including strict liability), costs, and expenses of investigation, including, without limitation, interest, penalties and reasonably attorney's fees and expenses and consultants fees (collectively, "Damages") asserted against, resulting to, imposed upon, or incurred by any member of the Indemnified Group, directly or indirectly, by reason of or resulting from:

- (a) a breach of any representation, warranty, covenant, or agreement of the Seller contained in or made pursuant to this Agreement or any related agreement;
- (b) any failure of the Company to recognize the Seller as the record and beneficial owner of the Shares; and
- (c) any Shares that are subject to any liens, obligations or encumbrances.

8. Survival of Representations, Warranties, Covenants, and Agreements. All representations, warranties, covenants, and agreements made in this Agreement shall survive the execution of this Agreement, the closing of the transactions contemplated hereby, and the delivery of the certificates or other evidence of the Shares sold hereunder for a period of three (3) years after the Closing.

9. Rescission. Each of the Purchasers and Seller hereby agree, that in the event that any member of the Indemnified Group makes a claim for indemnification pursuant to Section 7(b) or 7(c), the Purchasers, may in their sole and absolute discretion, elect to void the transactions contemplated hereby and promptly receive a full refund by Seller of the Purchase Price.

10. Valid Transfer. If at any time following the Closing Date, it is determined that Seller is not the record and beneficial owner of the Shares as of the date hereof by virtue of the transfer of the Shares to it by TPR being deemed to have been void or for any other reason, and that all right, title and interest in and to the Shares is held by TPR, subject only to the plaintiff's asserted rights under the Stockholders Agreement asserted in the action styled Glenelova Investment Co. v. Trans-Resources, Inc. and TPR Investment Associates, Inc., Case No. 08-CIV-7140 (JFK), pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the parties hereby agree that (a) this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby shall be deemed to have been entered into and consummated with TPR, (b) the Purchasers shall retain all right, title and interest in and to the Shares as if purchased from TPR pursuant to this Agreement, (c) TPR shall look only to Seller for any payments made by the Purchasers pursuant to this Agreement, (d) the Purchasers shall have no liability or obligation to TPR in respect of the Shares, and (e) all representations, warranties, covenants and agreements made by Seller herein, shall be deemed to have been made by TPR as of the date hereof.

SF  
RF  
NY  
MM

11. Other Shares. If at any time following the Closing Date, it is determined that Aric Genger is not the record and beneficial owner of the 794.40 shares of Common Stock of the Company purportedly transferred to him by TPR in October, 2004 and/or that Orly Genger 1993 Trust is not the record and beneficial owner of the 1,102.80 shares of Common

Stock of the Company purportedly transferred to such Trust by TPR in October, 2004, and that TPR is determined to be the record or beneficial owner of any such shares, in either or both cases by virtue of the transfer of such shares being deemed to have been void or for any other reason (the shares being so effected being referred to herein as the "Affected Shares") then TPR shall promptly transfer 64% of the Balance Shares (as such term is defined in the Stockholders Agreement dated March 30, 2001, among TPR, TR Investors, Glenlova and the Company (the "Stockholders Agreement") to TR Investors and Glenlova in accordance with the terms of Section 1.6 of the Stockholders Agreement whether or not such agreement is then still in effect.

**12. Entire Agreement.** This Agreement and the Letter Agreement set forth the entire agreement between the parties hereto with respect to the purchase and sale of the Shares contemplated herein and supersedes all prior written or oral agreements or understandings between the parties hereto relating to the subject matter hereof.

**13. Benefit.** This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the respective legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns of the parties. This Agreement may not be assigned by the Purchasers or Seller.

**14. Notices.** All notices and other communications, whether required or otherwise, made under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been given if personally delivered or mailed by registered, certified, or first-class mail, postage prepaid, or sent by overnight delivery, telex, telegram, or facsimile transmission:

If to Seller, to it at:

Sagi Genger 1993 Trust  
1211 Park Avenue  
New York, New York 10128  
Attention: Mr. Sagi Genger  
Fax: (802) 375-2949

If to Purchasers, to the appropriate Purchaser at:

TR Investors, LLC  
c/o The Trump Group  
4 Stage Coach Run  
East Brunswick, New Jersey 08816  
Attention: James M. Lieb, Esq.  
Fax: (732) 390-3319

New TR Equity I, LLC  
c/o The Trump Group  
4000 Island Blvd  
Williams Island, Florida 33160  
Attention: Mr. Jules Trump

New TR Equity II, LLC  
c/o The Trump Group  
4000 Island Blvd  
Williams Island, Florida 33160  
Attention: Mr. Eddie Trump  
Fax: (305) 933-9514

Glenalova Investment Co.  
c/o Carmel Investment Fund  
TK House  
Bayside Executive Park  
West Bay Street and Blake Road  
Nassau, Bahamas  
Attention: Mr. Robert Smith  
Fax: (242) 327-2289

with copy, in each instance, to:

Mark S. Hirsch, Esq.  
404 Park Avenue South, 6<sup>th</sup> Floor  
New York, New York 10019  
Fax: (917) 546-7009

or to such other address or to such other person as one party shall have last designated by notice to the other party hereto. Notices delivered personally or by overnight delivery shall be effective upon delivery. Notices properly addressed and delivered by mail, return receipt requested, shall be effective upon deposit with the United States Postal Service. Notices sent by telex, telecopier, or facsimile transmission shall be effective upon confirmation of transmission.

**15. Paragraph Headings.** The headings of paragraphs contained in this Agreement are provided for convenience only. They form no part of this Agreement and shall not affect its construction or interpretation. All references to paragraphs in this Agreement refer to the corresponding paragraphs of this Agreement.

**16. Amendment.** Neither this Agreement nor any terms or provisions hereof may be changed, waived, discharged, or terminated orally, or in any manner other than by an instrument in writing signed by the party against whom the enforcement of the change, waiver, discharge, or termination is sought.

**17. Counterparts.** This Agreement may be executed simultaneously in counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument. It shall not be necessary that any single counterpart be executed by all parties provided that each party shall have executed at least one counterpart.

**18. Further Assurances.** Each of the parties hereto shall use all best efforts to do all things necessary or advisable to make effective the transactions contemplated hereby and

shall cooperate and take such action as may be reasonably requested by the other party in order to carry out fully the provisions and purposes of this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby and to vest in the Purchasers all rights in respect of the Shares, including, but not limited to, the right to vote, exercise rights under the Stockholders Agreement and transfer the Shares. From and after the Closing Date, the parties hereto agree to execute or cause to be executed such further agreements, documents or instruments as may be reasonably requested by one of the parties hereto in order to effect the transactions contemplated hereunder or to exercise any and all rights in respect of the Shares, including, but not limited to, the right to vote, exercise rights under the Stockholders Agreement and transfer the Shares.

**19. Jurisdiction.** Each party hereby consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Delaware as to all matters relating to the enforcement, interpretation, or validity of this Agreement, and if such party is a non-resident of the State of Delaware, appoints the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware as its agent for service of process.

**20. Specific Performance.** The parties agree that this Agreement may be enforced in equity, and that specific performance or other equitable relief would be an appropriate remedy in any such action, in addition to any monetary or other damages which may be proved. It is accordingly agreed that the Purchasers, in addition to any other remedy to which they may be entitled in law or in equity, shall be entitled to an injunction or injunctions to prevent breaches of this Agreement and to compel specific performance of this Agreement, without the need for proof of actual damages. Seller agrees to waive, and to cause its affiliates to waive, any requirements for the securing or posting of any bond in connection with such remedy. Seller also agrees to reimburse the Purchasers for all costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by it in successfully enforcing Seller's or its affiliates' obligations hereunder.

**21. Governing Law.** This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Delaware, without regard to any conflicts of law principles.


**22. Severability.** If any provision of this Agreement or the application thereof to any person or circumstance shall be invalid or unenforceable to any extent, the remainder of this Agreement and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby and shall be enforced to the greatest extent permitted by law.

**23. No Presumption Against the Drafter.** Each of the parties to this Agreement participated in the drafting of this Agreement and the interpretation of any ambiguity contained in the Agreement will not be affected by the claim that a particular party drafted any provision hereof.

[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this Agreement effective as of the date and year first above-written.

TR INVESTORS, LLC

By:   
Name: Jim Lieb  
Title: Executive Vice-President


GLENCOVA INVESTMENT CO.

By:   
Name: Robert Smith  
Title: Chairman


NEW TR EQUITY I, LLC

By:   
Name: Mark S. Hirsh  
Title: Executive VP/Genl Counsel

NEW TR EQUITY II, LLC

By:   
Name:  
Title:

SAGI GINGER 1995 TRUST

By:   
Name: Rochelle Fang  
Title: Trustee

TPR INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.

By:   
Name: Sagi Ganger  
Title: President

# Exhibit 6

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Westlaw

Page 1

Not Reported in A.2d, 2010 WL 2901704 (Del.Ch.)  
(Cite as: 2010 WL 2901704 (Del.Ch.))

**H**

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT  
RULES BEFORE CITING.

Court of Chancery of Delaware.

TR INVESTORS, LLC, Glenclova Investment Co.,  
New TR Equity I, LLC, New TR Equity II, LLC,  
and Trans-Resources, Inc., Plaintiffs,

v.

Arie GENTER, Defendant.

Arie Genger, Counterclaim Plaintiff,

v.

TR Investors, LLC, Glenclova Investment Co.,  
New TR Equity I, LLC, New TR Equity II, LLC,  
and Trans-Resources, Inc., Counterclaim Defendants.

C.A. No. 3994-VCS.

Submitted: April 26, 2010.

Decided: July 23, 2010.

West KeySummaryCorporations and Business  
Organizations 101 1409

101 Corporations and Business Organizations

101V Capital and Stock

101V(D) Transfer of Shares

101k1404 Restrictions and Agreements on  
Right to Transfer

101k1409 k. Actions to enforce restriction  
or right of first refusal. Most Cited Cases

(Formerly 101k82)

Founder of corporation did not give the majority stockholder notice that he transferred his shares to his son's trust shortly after the transfer, and thus the transfer had not been made appropriately for the majority to be expected to exercise its rights under a stockholder agreement within the required time frame for the majority to be chargeable with laches. The founder testified that he told the majority stockholder's agent about the transfers on a number of occasions within a year of the transfer while the

two discussed developments in the founder's divorce. The agent denied that the founder ever mentioned the transfers during this period. The only other person who testified to hearing the two discuss the matter was the founder's daughter, but her testimony gave little detail about what was said during those alleged conversations, and it was contradicted by the founder himself, who said that she was not present at the key conversation when he told the agent about the transfers.

Thomas J. Allingham II, Esquire, Anthony W. Clark, Esquire, Robert A. Weber, Esquire, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., Esquire, Brian C. Ralston, Esquire, Scott B. Czerwonka, Esquire, Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Michael P. Carroll, Esquire, Avi Gesser, Esquire, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, New York, New York. Attorneys for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION  
STRINE, Vice Chancellor.

*I. Introduction*

\*1 This dispute over the control of Trans-Resources, Inc. ("Trans-Resources") is between the company's founder and former chief executive officer, Arie Genger, and the plaintiffs, who provided capital to Trans-Resources when the company was in financial distress. The plaintiffs are all entities controlled by the Trump family, led by Jules Trump and his brother Eddie Trump (collectively, with the plaintiffs, the "Trump Group"). Jules Trump was a long-time friend of Arie Genger, and he was happy to help Genger when Trans-Resources neared insolvency in 2001.

In return for retiring nearly all of Trans-Resources' outstanding bonds, the Trump Group received a minority stake in the company and a number of protections in a stockholders agreement (the

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Not Reported in A.2d, 2010 WL 2901704 (Del.Ch.)  
(Cite as: 2010 WL 2901704 (Del.Ch.))

"Stockholders Agreement"). The Stockholders Agreement prohibited either party from transferring their shares in Trans-Resources to anyone other than a limited number of permitted transferees. That prohibition against transfer was particularly important to the Trump Group, which was concerned that Genger might transfer his shares that were held through an entity under his control, TPR Investment Associates, Inc. ("TPR"), to a member of his family. A bitter dispute had arisen between Genger and his son, Sagi Genger, during the time Genger's marriage unraveled in the early 2000s, and the Trump Group wanted no part of the family drama.

In 2004, Genger caused TPR to transfer its shares in Trans-Resources, subject to an irrevocable proxy in his favor, to his children's trusts (the "2004 Transfers"), under a settlement in the contentious divorce between him and his wife. Because those trusts were not permitted transferees, the 2004 Transfers violated the terms of the Stockholders Agreement. Under the terms of the Stockholders Agreement, that violation rendered the transfers ineffective and gave the Trump Group the right to acquire the shares that were transferred.

But Genger did not notify the Trump Group of the transfers at that time, and thereby deprived the Trump Group of its right to declare the transfers void or exercise its right to acquire the shares in 2004. Genger claims that he mentioned the 2004 Transfers to Jules Trump during a private conversation in 2004, but his testimony did not convince me that this was true. The most convincing reading of the evidence is that the Trump Group did not receive notice of the 2004 Transfers until nearly four years later, when Genger once again asked Jules Trump for help when Trans-Resources was in financial distress. Moreover, informal notice to Jules Trump would not constitute the notice that was required to be given to the Trump Group entities under the Stockholders Agreement.

By 2008, Trans-Resources' bank was unwilling to negotiate with Genger, so Genger asked Jules

Trump not only for money but also to negotiate a reduction in Trans-Resources' debt with the bank. The evidence shows that, while Genger and the Trump Group were negotiating the terms of the second round of funding, Genger disclosed for the first time that the 2004 Transfers had occurred.

\*2 Although shocked at Genger's failure to notify him of the 2004 Transfers, Jules Trump nevertheless negotiated a reduction in Trans-Resources' debt and agreed to pay that debt in return for voting control of the company. Genger initially agreed to those terms as a compromise for the Transfer violation, but, after securing an alternative source of financing, backed out of the deal. Angered that he had favorably renegotiated Trans-Resources' debt obligations and that the Trump Group was left without their key part of the bargain, Jules Trump initiated litigation and also contacted Sagi Genger in order to negotiate a deal with both TPR and the trust controlled by Sagi Genger (the "Sagi Trust") whereby the Trump Group would buy all of the shares transferred to the Sagi Trust by TPR in the 2004 Transfers. Having made a bargain with both the wrongful transferor, TPR, and the transferee, the Sagi Trust, the Trump Group viewed itself as having covered all its bases in addressing Genger's violation of the Stockholders Agreement. With the shares wrongfully transferred to the Sagi Trust by TPR, the Trump Group held a majority of Trans-Resources' stock.

The Trump Group then purported to reconstitute the Trans-Resources board of directors and, when Genger challenged the reconstitution, filed this action pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 225 to determine who controlled the board. Making that determination largely turns upon interpreting how the Stockholders Agreement applies to both parties' often excessively sharp conduct. As explained fully below, I conclude that the Trump Group controls the Trans-Resources board for the following reasons: (1) the Trump Group never received notice of the 2004 Transfers, which were made in violation of the Stockholders Agreement, until June 2008; and

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Not Reported in A.2d, 2010 WL 2901704 (Del.Ch.)  
(Cite as: 2010 WL 2901704 (Del.Ch.))

(2) the Trump Group did not ratify those Transfers when it bought the transferred shares from Sagi Genger and TPR. Because it never ratified the wrongful transaction, the Trump Group was free to deal with the relevant transferor, TPR, and its transferee, the Sagi Trust, and settle the matter by acquiring the wrongly transferred shares in an agreed upon negotiation. In doing so, the Trump Group clearly reserved its position that TPR made a void transfer, has proven that its position was correct, and is entitled, as a result, to be deemed to have taken the shares from TPR as a settlement of the improper Transfers. In the alternative, even if the Trump Group ratified the 2004 Transfers—which it did not—I find that the Trump Group did not purchase the shares from Sagi Genger subject to the proxy in favor of Arie Genger. Therefore, the Trump Group holds a majority equity and voting stake in Trans-Resources, and its ability to vote its shares is unaffected by the proxy.

## II. *Factual Background*

The following are the facts as I find them after trial.

### A. The Trump Group Saves Genger's Company, Trans-Resources, From Bankruptcy In 2001

In 1985, Genger formed Trans-Resources, a Delaware corporation that eventually became the parent of three specialty fertilizer and industrial chemical companies.<sup>FN1</sup> As mentioned before, Genger's majority stake in Trans-Resources was held through TPR, another Delaware corporation. By 2001, Trans-Resources was nearly insolvent as its subsidiaries struggled in the marketplace due to a strong euro, vigorous competition from South American rivals, and miscalculations in a recent decision to expand a key plant.<sup>FN2</sup> At that time, Trans-Resources' bonds had a notional value of \$230 million, but their market value had plummeted.<sup>FN3</sup>

FN1. Tr. 830 (A.Genger); Stipulated Pre-trial Order at 3.

FN2. Tr. 837-38 (A.Genger).

FN3. *Id.* at 12 (J. Trump).

\*3 Because negotiations with the fractious group of investors that had invested in Trans-Resources' bonds were proving futile, Genger was delighted when Jules Trump approached him with an offer to buy Trans-Resources' bonds. FN4 Genger and Jules Trump, who both had residences on Williams Island in Miami, Florida, had been friends since at least the late 1990s.<sup>FN5</sup> From that time until very near the commencement of this litigation, Genger and Jules Trump's families regularly socialized, dined, and vacationed together.<sup>FN6</sup>

FN4. *Id.* at 938 (A.Genger).

FN5. J. Trump Dep. 27, 88; A. Genger Dep. 62-63.

FN6. J. Trump Dep. 27-28; E. Trump Dep. 32; see also A. Genger Dep. 156-57 (indicating that Genger and Jules Trump also took regular strolls together around the walking path on Williams Island).

Eventually, two entities controlled by Jules and Eddie Trump, plaintiff TR Investors, LLC ("TR Investors") and plaintiff Glenclova Investment Co. ("Glenclova"), bought all but \$100,000 of Trans-Resources' debt.<sup>FN7</sup> Shortly after buying Trans-Resources' bonds, TR Investors and Glenclova converted their debt into equity.<sup>FN8</sup> Under an exchange agreement, TR Investors and Glenclova collectively received 2,676,4428 Trans-Resources shares, which amounted to a substantial stake equal to 47.15% of Trans-Resources' equity.<sup>FN9</sup>

FN7. Tr. 117 (J. Trump), 837 (A.Genger).

FN8. *Id.* at 119 (J. Trump).

FN9. JX-100 (Exchange Agreement (March 30, 2001)).

### B. Genger And The Trump Group Execute A Stockholders Agreement That Requires Notice To Be

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Not Reported in A.2d, 2010 WL 2901704 (Del.Ch.)  
(Cite as: 2010 WL 2901704 (Del.Ch.))

*Given If Genger Transfers His Shares In Trans-Resources*

Jules Trump's offer came with strings. In exchange for bailing out Trans-Resources and agreeing to take a minority interest in Trans-Resources, Trump insisted on the Stockholders Agreement that gave the Trump Group strong representation and veto rights.<sup>FN10</sup> Importantly in light of the present dispute, the Stockholders Agreement provided restrictions on, and in some instances prohibitions against, the transfer of stock.<sup>FN11</sup>

FN10. Tr. 843 (A.Genger) ("[P]art of the deal was to reconstitute the board and to enable Trump family to enable the Trump family to be on the board, to have we created a balance of so that I cannot do anything which is not unanimous. There were all kinds of provisions on that.").

FN11. JX-101 (Stockholders Agreement (2001)) (the "Stockholders Agreement") §§ 2.1, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3.

In particular, Section 2.1 of the Stockholders Agreement prevented a party from transferring or pledging Trans-Resources stock to any party other than a party expressly permitted to receive such a transfer (a "Permitted Transferee"). Section 2.1 provides in relevant part:

From and after the date hereof, no Stockholder shall directly or indirectly, offer, transfer, sell, assign, pledge, encumber, hypothecate or otherwise dispose of any Shares (including any derivative transaction) (a) until after December 21, 2003, and, thereafter, only as provided in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of this Agreement, or (b) after written notice to the Company and the other Stockholders ... to (i) in the case of either of the Initial Non-TPR Stockholders or their respective Permitted Transferees (A) to [certain Permitted Transferees], or (ii) in the case of TPR or a Permitted Transferee thereof, to (w) Arie Genger, (x) any entity or entities in which TPR or Arie Genger directly owns a majority of the equity in-

terest and directly controls a majority of the voting power ... (y) the estate of (z) any immediate family members or lineal descendants of Arie Genger, or trusts of which they are the sole beneficiaries-in-interest, who receive such Shares in consequence of the death of Arie Genger, which transferee(s) become a party to this Agreement....<sup>FN12</sup>

FN12. *Id.* § 2.1 (emphasis added).

\*4 That is, Permitted Transferees were: (1) in the case of transfers from any of the Trump Group entities, any entity in which either TR Investors or Glenclova had at least a 20% economic interest and a least a 30% voting interest; and (2) in the case of transfers from TPR, any of the following: (i) Arie Genger himself; (ii) any entity in which TPR or Genger directly owned a majority of the equity interest and a majority of the voting power at the time of the transfer, and Genger agreed to continue to maintain such ownership at all times thereafter; (iii) the estate of Arie Genger; or (iv) any of Genger's immediate family members or lineal descendants, or trusts of which they are the sole beneficiaries-in-interest, who receive the transfer of shares as a result of Genger's death.<sup>FN13</sup> If a party to the Stockholders Agreement intended to make a transfer to a non-Permitted Transferee, then the other party had a right of first refusal, under Section 3.1, which provides in relevant part:

FN13. *Id.*

[I]f a Stockholder (the "Selling Stockholder") shall desire to sell, assign or transfer any Shares held by it to any person other than a Permitted Transferee (the "Offered Shares") and shall be in receipt of a bona fide written offer to purchase the Offered Shares (the "Offer"), [t]he Selling Stockholders shall give the Company and to each Covered Stockholder who is not the Selling Stockholder (the "Non-Selling Stockholders") written notice containing the terms and conditions of the Offer ... provided that for purposes of

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this Section 3.1, if the Selling Stockholder is (x) a TPR Stockholder, then only the Non-TPR Stockholders shall be deemed to be Non-Selling Stockholders; and (y) a Non-TPR Stockholder, then only the TPR Stockholders shall be deemed to be Non-Selling Stockholders....

Until 30 days after receipt of such notice, the Non-Selling Stockholders shall have the right to elect to purchase all of the Offered Shares at the price offered by the prospective purchaser and specified in such notice. FN14

FN14. *Id.* § 3.1.

The purpose of expressly limiting transfers to an enumerated list of Permitted Transferees was to ensure that the Trump Group would be dealing only with Genger, or one of the entities he controlled, in the future, and not with anyone else. FN15 Jules Trump was particularly concerned about limiting the Trump Group's exposure to the acrimony plaguing Genger's family, FN16 but, after much pressure from Genger, reluctantly acceded to including Genger's family members as Permitted Transferees *only* as an estate planning consequence in the event of Genger's death. FN17

FN15. Tr. 121 (J. Trump), 842-44, 854, 891-92 (A.Genger).

FN16. *Id.* at 121 (J. Trump) ("I had confidence in Aric and we were willing to go forward with him. But I was not willing to go forward with a bunch of people who would be fighting with each other and ultimately end up greenmailing each other."); *see also id.* at 805-06 (O.Genger) (acknowledging the "nightmar[ish]" relations in the Genger family).

FN17. *Id.* at 252 (Hirsch).

If a transfer was made in violation of Section 2.1, then the Stockholders Agreement provided two remedies. First, Section 2.4 provided that "[a]ny at-

tempt by a Stockholder to transfer Shares in violation of this Agreement shall be void and the Company agrees that it will not effect such a transfer or treat any alleged transferee as the holder of such Shares." FN18 Second, Section 3.2(a) of the Stockholders Agreement gave the Trump Group the right to purchase TPR's shares in Trans-Resources if Genger: (1) transferred shares to a non-Permitted Transferee; or (2) effected a change of control in TPR. Section 3.2(a) provides in relevant part:

FN18. Stockholders Agreement § 2.4.

\*5 The Covered Stockholders other than the hereinafter defined Terminating Stockholder (the "Purchasing Stockholders") shall have the right to elect to purchase the Shares held by a Stockholder (the "Terminating Stockholder" ...) at the Agreement Price (as defined in Section 3.4) and on the Agreement Terms upon the occurrence of any of the following events for a period ending on the later of 60 days after determination of the Agreement Price for the Terminating Shares and 90 days after the Company and the Purchasing Stockholders receive notice from any source of the occurrence of any of the following events (each Stockholder agreeing to give the others and the Company notice of any such event promptly after its knowledge of the occurrence thereof)....

(iv) the Terminating Stockholder sells, pledges, encumbers, hypothecates or otherwise transfers any interest in (including any derivative transaction), or purports to sell, pledge, encumber, hypothecate or otherwise transfer any interest in (including any derivative transaction), any of its Shares, except as permitted by and in full compliance with the terms of this Agreement.... FN19

FN19. *Id.* § 3.2(a) (emphasis added).

Therefore, Section 3.2(a) gave the Trump Group 90 days to elect to purchase TPR's shares after it "receive[d] notice from any source" that a transfer had been made to a non-Permitted Trans-

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eree, or that a change of control had occurred.  
FN20

FN20. *Id.*

Section 6.5 outlined the form of notice required under the various provisions of the Stockholders Agreement:

All notices required to be delivered pursuant to this Agreement shall be delivered in person or by telegraphic or other facsimile transmission or sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, and shall be addressed to the Company at its principal business office, to the attention of its Chief Executive Officer, to a Non-TPR Stockholder, to the Representatives, and any other Stockholders at the address of the Stockholder shown in the Company's stock ledger or to such other address as such other Stockholder may indicate by duly giving written notice to the Company.  
FN21

FN21. *Id.* § 6.5.

Thus, formal notice of an event such as a share transfer was to be given directly to the Trump Group entities, i.e. TR Investors and Glenclova, who were parties to the Agreement, and not to Jules Trump personally.<sup>FN22</sup> The Stockholders Agreement also contained a non-waiver clause, which provided that "[n]o waiver or failure on the part of a Company or a Stockholder in the exercise of any right, power or remedy shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any single or particular exercise by them of any right, power or remedy preclude other or further exercise thereof, or the exercise of any other right, power or remedy."<sup>FN23</sup>

FN22. As to TR Investors, it appears that notice was to be given through Mark Hirsch at TR Investors' official address, and as to Glenclova, notice was to be given through Robert Smith at Glenclova's official address. See *id.* at 40. Jules Trump was not an officer or director of either TR In-

vestors or Glenclova. Tr. 117 (J. Trump).

FN23. Stockholders Agreement § 6.8.

Finally, under Section 1.6 of the Stockholders Agreement, TR Investors and Glenclova were entitled to an addition 1.85% of TPR's shares in Trans-Resources (the "Balance Shares").<sup>FN24</sup> The Balance Shares refer to shares that Bank Hapoalim had the option to purchase, the exercise of which would reduce TPR's shareholding by 1 .85%. Because of that option, the Trump Group allowed TPR to hold 52.85% of Trans-Resources' stock, even though the parties agreed to a 51%/49% split, on the condition that the Balance Shares would revert to TR Investors and Glenclova if the Bank's option should expire unexercised.<sup>FN25</sup>

FN24. *Id.* § 1.6.

FN25. *Id.*; see also Tr. 255-57 (Hirsh).

C. *In 2004, As Part Of The Settlement Of His Acrimonious Divorce, Genger Transfers Trans-Resources Stock From TPR To The Sagi Trust, The Orly Trust, And To Himself*

\*6 On October 26, 2004, after a drawn-out and contentious divorce proceeding, Genger entered into a final marital settlement agreement with his then-wife, Dalia Genger. Under that settlement agreement, Genger transferred his equity interest in TPR to Dalia Genger on October 29, 2004. On that same day, the Trans-Resources shares that TPR previously held were transferred as follows: approximately 13.9% of the shares were transferred to Genger himself, and separate trusts established for his two children, Orly and Sagi Genger (respectively, the "Orly Trust" and the "Sagi Trust"), were each transferred approximately 19.5% of the shares (collectively, the aforementioned "2004 Transfers"). According to the transfer agreements, the trustees of each Trust agreed to irrevocable lifetime proxies in favor of Genger (the "Prxies").<sup>FN26</sup>

FN26. JX-113 (Letter Agreement and

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Proxy (Oct. 29, 2004)) (the "Proxy").

At the time the 2004 Transfers were made, Genger did not notify TR Investors or Glenclova of the Transfers as required by the Stockholders Agreement. Genger admits that he never gave the written notice required by the Stockholders Agreement, provided the Trump Group with copies of the Proxies, or passed on a copy of the marital settlement agreement. FN27 Nevertheless, Genger argues that TR Investors and Glenclova received notice because he orally told Jules Trump about the 2004 Transfers. In particular, Genger testified that he told Jules Trump about the 2004 Transfers "many times" from the "inception, [when] the idea germinated of how to resolve my divorce, to the execution [of the 2004 Transfers]." FN28 Genger testified that he told Jules Trump of the 2004 Transfers during their regular strolls on Williams Island. FN29

FN27. Pretrial Stipulation and Order 4; Tr. 936, 940 (A.Genger), 99 (J. Trump), 628 (Dowd).

FN28. Tr. 856 (A.Genger).

FN29. *Id.*

For his part, however, Jules Trump categorically denied that Genger ever mentioned the 2004 Transfers. FN30 The only other person who testified to hearing any conversations between Genger and Jules Trump relating to the 2004 Transfers was Genger's daughter, Orly. At trial, Orly Genger testified that her father "shared ... everything" with the Trumps, FN31 and that she was present during at least one discussion between Genger and Jules Trump about the 2004 Transfers. In particular, she testified about a discussion in "late '04 or early '05" at Jules Trump's residence on Williams Island. FN32 But, Orly Genger's testimony regarding that conversation was vague, at best:

FN30. *Id.* at 159 (J. Trump) ("Q. From the time that you became TR Investors became a stockholder in 2001 to June 13th, 2008,

did anyone give you any notice of the 2004 transfers, or the change in control of TPR? Trump. Never. Never, ever.").

FN31. *Id.* at 783 (O.Genger).

FN32. *Id.* at 787. Orly Genger also briefly mentioned a conversation between Genger and Jules Trump sometime during 2007, when her brother brought a lawsuit against her father. *Id.* at 799. But the only details she provided regarding that discussion was that she remembered "them speaking specifically about th[e] lawsuit and how incredible it was that my father had given my brother TPR [Investment], [and] he was actually against him now." *Id.*

They talked about how TPR and [Trans-Resources] were split, how my-my dad spoke about how he split those two, how he hoped that now that my brother, since was sort of-it was now me, my mother, and my brother, and my brother was supposedly the financial guy supposed to take care of us in a sense, he was hoping that that he would. FN33

FN33. *Id.* at 786.

When asked for further details, she only elaborated as follows:

Q. And were there details? Was your father providing details to Mr. Trump-

O. Genger. Yeah.

Q. -in those discussions?

O. Genger. The fact that my brother was in the middle of it, you know, and just the awful nature of it. Everything was told to Jules. FN34

FN34. *Id.* at 789.

\*7 On cross-examination, Orly Genger clarified that the discussion between her father and Jules

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Trump some time in late 2004 or early 2005 definitely took place *after* the 2004 Transfers occurred, FN35 and that she did not remember her father specifically discussing the transfer of Trans-Resources shares to the Sagi Trust. FN36 But she did not provide further details about the substance of the discussion between her father and Jules Trump other than to say that the "essence" of the discussion was "that [Sagi] was now sort of in charge." FN37 The lack of specific details in her testimony undermines her credibility because of her personal interest in the outcome of this case and her obvious desire to protect her father in his feud with her brother, FN38 and because Genger himself testified that no one else was present during his alleged conversations with Jules Trump, even his daughter Orly. FN39

FN35. *Id.* at 801 ("Q. And I want to make sure I understand. [The conversation between Genger and Jules Trump]-it definitely occurred after the 2004 transfers had occurred; is that right? O. Genger. Yes.").

FN36. The precise colloquy was as follows:

Q. Now, in this conversation the issue that you recall being discussed was the transfer of control of TPR [Investment] to your brother. He would be in charge.

O. Genger. That was the essence, that he was now sort of in charge.

Q. That was the essence of it.

O. Genger. Right.

Q. Yeah. And the question of the transfer of TPR's shares of [Trans-Resources] to your trust and your brother's trust and your father, you don't recall that that was discussed during this conversation?

O. Genger. I'm sorry. Can you say it again?

Q. Yes. The question of the transfer by TPR [Investment] of its [Trans-Resources] shares-

O. Genger. Right.

Q. -to your trust, your brother's trust, and your father, that was not discussed in this conversation?

O. Genger. Not that I remember.

*Id.* at 803-04.

FN37. *Id.*

FN38. *Id.* at 813 ("Q. You stand to benefit if your father prevails in this litigation? O. Genger: I hope. Yeah, I think.").

FN39. *Id.* at 895 (A.Genger) ("The Court: It was just the two of you? Genger: Just the two of us. The Court: Not your daughter? Genger: Not my daughter.").

Besides his own testimony and the testimony of his daughter, the only other evidence to which Genger points as proof that he told the Trumps about the 2004 Transfers are two after-the-fact events. First, Genger points to a written consent that Trans-Resources' shareholders were required to sign in 2005 (the "2005 Written Consent") in order to resolve a dispute with Bank Hapoalim, with whom Trans-Resources had a long-term relationship, over Trans-Resources' outstanding debt. The signature page of the 2005 Written Consent included signature blocks for not only Arie Genger, but also the Orly Trust and the Sagi Trust, and identified Arie Genger as the proxy for the two trusts. FN40 That is, by including signature lines for the Orly Trust and the Sagi Trust as shareholders, the 2005 Written Consent disclosed that some sort of transfer had taken place. For their part, the Trumps credibly claim that they did not notice the additional signature lines in the 2005 Written Consent when they signed the page. FN41

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FN40. JX-125 (executed written consent (July 26, 2005)) (the "2005 Written Consent").

FN41. Tr. 101-05 (J. Trump), 185-92 (Hirsch)

Second, Genger claims that he mentioned the 2004 Transfers during a Trans-Resources board meeting in November 2007 at which Jules Trump was present (the "November 2007 Board Meeting").<sup>FN42</sup> For support, Genger points to the minutes of that meeting, which reflect that "Mr. Genger advised the directors that both he and Mr. Dowd had been sued by TPR Investment Associates, Inc. and other related entities with respect to their activities as officers and/or directors of TPR Investment Associates, Inc., the former parent Company of [Trans-Resources]."<sup>FN43</sup> Genger avers that this passing reference to TPR being the former parent of Trans-Resources should have tipped Trump off that the 2004 Transfers were made. As we will see, that argument is undercut, however, by the reality that Genger's loyal subordinate, Bill Dowd, appears to have manipulated the corporate minutes on other occasions to suit Genger's interests.

FN42. JX-149 (Trans-Resources board meeting minutes (Nov. 19, 2007)).

FN43. *Id.*

*D. Genger Finally Tells The Trumps About The 2004 Transfers During Negotiations To Restructure Trans-Resources' Debt*

\*8 In the spring of 2008, Trans-Resources was once again having financial troubles, now in a dispute with Bank Hapoalim, which was pressuring Trans-Resources to sell its main subsidiary, Haifa Chemical, Inc., in order to avoid foreclosure. Genger turned to the Trumps for help, asking Jules Trump if the Trump Group would provide the capital necessary to retire Trans-Resources' bank debt in exchange for an increased equity position that would give the Trump Group control of Trans-

Resources.<sup>FN45</sup> Genger relied on Jules Trump in particular not only because of their past relationship but also because Bank Hapoalim, which had indicated that it had lost confidence in Genger, was however willing to negotiate with Trump in regard to Trans-Resources' debt.<sup>FN46</sup> On May 31, 2008, Genger and Jules Trump met to discuss the general contours of an agreement (the "Funding Agreement"), which would provide for a capital infusion into Trans-Resources.<sup>FN47</sup> After that meeting, Trump negotiated with Bank Hapoalim to reduce Trans-Resources' debt load, and asked Genger to meet with Eddie Trump and Mark Hirsch, the Trumps' lawyer, in New York to work out the details of the Funding Agreement.<sup>FN48</sup>

FN44. Tr. 38-39 (J. Trump).

FN45. *Id.* at 41-42 (J. Trump).

FN46. *Id.* at 124-27, 146 (J. Trump).

FN47. *Id.* at 872 (A.Genger); 43-44, 135-36 (J. Trump).

FN48. *Id.* at 868-69 (A.Genger).

*I. Genger, Eddie Trump, And Mark Hirsch Meet On June 13, 2008*

Genger met with Eddie Trump and Hirsch in New York on June 13, 2008 (the "June 13 Meeting"). Early in the June 13 Meeting, Hirsch gave Genger a draft of the Funding Agreement. That draft listed TPR, Glenclova, and TR Investors as the company's sole shareholders, thereby strongly suggesting that the Trump Group was unaware at that time of the 2004 Transfers.<sup>FN49</sup> Upon reviewing the draft, Genger commented that TPR was no longer a Trans-Resources stockholder.<sup>FN50</sup> Both Eddie Trump and Hirsch expressed shock upon hearing that, and Hirsch reminded Genger that he was not permitted to transfer his stake in Trans-Resources without first providing notice and a right of first refusal to the Trump Group.<sup>FN51</sup>

FN49. JX-170 (email from Mark Hirsch to Jules Trump with draft agreements at

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tached (June 12, 2008)).

FN50. Tr. 283 (Hirsch), 498-99 (E.Trump).

FN51. *Id.* at 284-85 (Hirsch), 499 (E.Trump). Interestingly, the trial record includes an email from Hirsch to Jules Trump, dated June 11, 2008, in which Hirsch describes the transfer restrictions and the right of first refusal provisions in the Stockholders Agreement. JX-167 (email from Mark Hirsch to Jules Trump (June 11, 2008)). The timing of that email suggests that the Trumps might have known about the 2004 Transfers before the June 13, 2008 meeting. But I do not find this email to be proof that Genger had given the Trumps oral notice because: (1) the Trumps may have simply suspected on their own that something like the 2004 Transfers had taken place; or (2) the Trumps may have heard rumors from sources other than Genger that the 2004 Transfers had occurred. In either event, notice as required under Stockholders Agreement had not been given. Furthermore, even if the email did indicate that notice had been given, it still suggests that the timing of that notice was no earlier than June 2008.

Upon seeing their surprise, Genger did not stop and say what one would expect to be the first thing out of his mouth if Genger had already given repeated notice to Jules Trump: "Why are you acting so surprised? I told Jules all about these Transfers years ago." FN52 Rather, Genger acknowledged that he had not provided notice of the 2004 Transfers, but insisted that he had lived within the spirit of the Stockholders Agreement by maintaining control of the stock through the Proxies. FN53 And, Genger spent the better part of that day explaining the 2004 Transfers to Eddie Trump and Hirsch, FN54 which would have been unnecessary had they already known about the Transfers.

FN52. Tr. 501 (E.Trump) ("At any time during the meeting did Mr. Genger say, 'Well, I told your brother, Jules. Let's get him on the phone,' or words to that effect? E. Trump: No."). Genger's testimony on this important issue was vague at best. He only recalled telling Eddie Trump and Hirsch something to the effect of "Jules knows about it" at some point during the June 13 Meeting. *Id.* at 900 (A.Genger). But, Genger could give no further details, and he admitted that he never pressed the point or suggested that they get Jules Trump on the phone to clarify the issue. *Id.*

FN53. *Id.* at 284 (Hirsch) ("I took out the agreement to show [Genger] specifically why he could not have transferred the shares, that this was not permitted under the agreement. And he said, 'All right. You know, so I didn't tell you about it, but I didn't think I had to. I mean, what's changed? I still-I still vote the shares.'").

FN54. *Id.* at 893-94, 899 (A.Genger).

Finally, at the end of the meeting, Genger offered to arrange a meeting with his lawyer, David Lentz, who was most familiar with the details of the 2004 Transfers. FN55 Eddie Trump and Hirsch met with Lentz three days later, on June 16, 2008, to discuss the details of the 2004 Transfers. It is also noteworthy that, before that meeting, Genger never told Lentz that he had given Jules Trump oral notice of the 2004 Transfers. FN56 If notice of the 2004 Transfers had indeed been given, one would have expected Arie Genger to have at least mentioned that important detail to his own counsel. During that meeting, Lentz never suggested that Jules Trump had already known about the 2004 Transfers because Genger had told him about them years ago. FN57

FN55. *Id.* at 902-03 (A.Genger).

FN56. *Id.* at 7 (Lentz) ("Q: And Mr.

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Genger didn't tell you [before the June 16th meeting] that he claimed to have given some sort of notice to Jules Trump. That's correct; right? ... Lentz: I believe your statement is correct".

FN57. *Id.* at 990 (Lentz) ("Q. Nobody said at the meeting, then, that any notice had been given in substance; right? Lentz. Correct."); see also *id.* at 994 (Lentz) ("Q. [Y]ou went through an entire meeting about the absence of notice and people asking what, in fact, occurred. And no one from your side of the discussion spoke a peep refuting that contention; right? Lentz. Nobody rebutted it, that's correct.").

*2. Later Communications Between Genger, William Dowd, And David Lentz Admit That Genger Never Gave The Trump Group Notice Of The 2004 Transfers*

\*9 In a series of emails and memoranda produced over the two weeks following the June 16 meeting, Lentz repeatedly acknowledged Genger's failure to provide any notice of the 2004 Transfers. In a June 17, 2008 email, Lentz wrote that "[t]he Trumps never consented to and don't want [the Sagi] Trust or [Orly] Trust ... as minority partners (shareholders) in [Trans-Resources]."<sup>FN58</sup> And, in a June 26, 2008 email, Lentz wrote that "no notice was given" to the Trumps about the 2004 Transfers.<sup>FN59</sup> But, Lentz's most telling admission came in a memorandum he wrote for Genger analyzing the parties' various bargaining positions and how likely machinations by Sagi Genger would affect the outcome of the dispute (the "Lentz Memo"). In that Memo, Lentz wrote:

FN58. JX-331 (email from David Lentz to Arie Genger, Bill Dowd, and Christopher Gengaro (June 17, 2008)) (emphasis added).

FN59. JX-337 (email from David Lentz to Arie Genger, Bill Dowd, and Christopher Gengaro (June 26, 2008)).

While it is true the Trumps never got notice, the entire intent of the Shareholder's agreement has been carried out anyway. In other words, why did AG not give them actual notice? Because, AG will testify, using the TPR shell was never the intention of the Trumps and AG—the real intention was to keep the ownership of [Trans-Resources] in the Genger family under the voting and operational control of AG and the Stipulation did just that. So, AG becomes SG's best witness. AG will not say I just forgot to tell the Trumps. He will not say I tried to get away with something and thought the Trumps would not find out. He will testify that whether the corporate form of TPR or the kids' trusts w[as] used made no difference. The essence of these protections was to make sure the Genger family owned roughly 50% and that AG could vote all of those shares. That's what happened. So, while there was a technical violation, the Trumps got what they bargained for.<sup>FN60</sup>

FN60. JX-332 (memorandum from David Lentz to Arie Genger, Bill Dowd, and Chris Gengaro) (the "Lentz Memo") (emphasis added).

Later in that same Memo, Lentz added: "AG does not have clean hands because like SG, AG never told the Trumps."<sup>FN61</sup> Thus, Genger's own attorney repeatedly acknowledged that Genger had never given the Trumps any type of notice.

FN61. *Id.* (emphasis added).

*3. At The June 25, 2008 Meeting Of Trans-Resources' Board And Stockholders, Genger Himself Indicates That Notice Of The 2004 Transfers Was Not Given To The Trumps*

The Trans-Resources board met on June 25, 2008 (the "June 25 Board Meeting") and unanimously approved the Funding Agreement, which provided that the Trumps would invest an additional \$57.5 million in the company in exchange for 50% of Trans-Resources' outstanding stock, which would give the Trumps clear voting control and by

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far the largest equity position in the company.<sup>FN62</sup> That is, the totality of the Funding Agreement would address the injury to the Trump Group from the 2004 Transfers by giving it voting control of Trans-Resources. Handwritten notes by Bill Dowd, a director and Trans-Resources' chief executive officer, recorded that "AG describe[d] [Trans-Resources] stock transfer *in violation of agreement*" during the meeting.<sup>FN63</sup> That is, Genger acknowledged that the 2004 Transfers were made without providing notice to the Trumps. Tellingly, Dowd, who had worked for Genger for years, omitted that important admission from the formal minutes he drafted following the meeting.<sup>FN64</sup>

<sup>FN62.</sup> JX-181 (minutes of joint meeting of the board of directors and stockholders of Trans-Resources, Inc. (June 25, 2008)).

<sup>FN63.</sup> JX-179 (handwritten notes of Bill Dowd (June 25, 2008)) (emphasis added).

<sup>FN64.</sup> See JX-179 (draft meeting minutes (June 25, 2008)) (omitting any reference to the 2004 Transfers being made in violation of the Stockholders Agreement).

*E. Negotiations To Restructure Trans-Resources Break Down, And The Parties Eventually Commence This Litigation*

\*10 Although the Funding Agreement solved the problem with Bank Hapoalim, Genger and the Trumps still had to sort out how to ensure that the Trumps were given control of the Trans-Resources board as required under the Funding Agreement. That was a problem because Genger and the Trumps anticipated that Sagi Genger, who now had a claim to be a Trans-Resources stockholder on account of the 2004 Transfers, would litigate any attempt to transfer control from Genger to the Trumps, if for no other reason than to spite his father.<sup>FN65</sup> During June and July of 2008, Genger and the Trumps discussed options for dealing with Sagi Genger. One of the options the Trumps suggested was confronting Sagi Genger with the argument

that the 2004 Transfers violated the Stockholders Agreement, and that he was therefore not a beneficial owner of the Shares.<sup>FN66</sup> Importantly, Genger resisted this approach, likely because that would expose him to liability for representing falsely in the divorce settlement that the 2004 Transfers were not made in violation of any agreement.<sup>FN67</sup>

<sup>FN65.</sup> Tr. 318-19 (Hirsch).

<sup>FN66.</sup> *Id.*

<sup>FN67.</sup> *Id.* at 304 (Hirsch).

*1. Genger Reneges On The Funding Agreement, And The Trumps Respond With A Lawsuit*

Genger and the Trumps never reached common ground on how to approach Sagi, because Genger began to back-track on the draft terms of the Funding Agreement. Genger could afford to back out of the Funding Agreement because he had devised a way—albeit one of questionable propriety—to upstream funds from the Haifa Chemical, Inc. subsidiary to Trans-Resources, thus allowing Trans-Resources to fulfill its obligations to Bank Hapoalim, which Jules Trump had successfully reduced during his negotiations with the bank on behalf of Trans-Resources.<sup>FN68</sup> Because Genger had secured an alternative source of capital, the Funding Agreement with the Trumps was no longer the only mechanism for rescuing Trans-Resources. From that position of increased leverage, Genger began to disengage from the Funding Agreement deal. First, despite the fact that Bank Hapoalim required payment by late August, Genger requested that execution of the Funding Agreement be postponed upon the advice of counsel. Wielding a problem of his own creation, Genger asserted that Trans-Resources' Delaware lawyers had advised him that Trans-Resources needed to establish an independent committee to review the fairness of the Funding Agreement because the recipients of the 2004 Transfers might complain. Second, at an August 1, 2008 meeting, Genger's lawyers claimed, for the first time, that Genger had given Jules Trump oral notice of the 2004 Transfers years ago, and

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threatened litigation if the Trumps chose to challenge the 2004 Transfers.<sup>FN69</sup>

FN68. Dowd Dep. 281.

FN69. Tr. 65, 155-56 (J. Trump), 364 (Hirsch).

The Trumps responded on August 8, 2008 with a letter to TPR and Trans-Resources indicating that Glenclova was exercising its right under Section 3.2 of the Stockholders Agreement to purchase all of the shares subject to the 2004 Transfers, and requesting that the Trans-Resources board begin the process of establishing their purchase price.<sup>FN70</sup> On August 11, 2008, Glenclova filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking to enforce the Funding Agreement and its rights under the Stockholders Agreement.<sup>FN71</sup> On August 13, 2008, Genger responded through a letter from his attorneys, claiming that Glenclova had no right to purchase the shares because he had kept Jules Trump fully informed of the 2004 Transfers at the time they were made four years prior.<sup>FN72</sup>

FN70. JX-198 (letter from Glenclova to TPR and Trans-Resources (Aug. 8, 2008)).

FN71. JX-204 (Complaint, *New TR Equity, LLC v. Trans-Resources, Inc.* (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2008)).

FN72. JX-350 (letter from Charles Weissman to Barry Adelman (Aug. 13, 2008)).

*2. The Trump Group Purchases The Sagi Trust's Shares And Reconstitutes Trans-Resources' Board Of Directors. Leading To This Section 225 Action*

\*11 The lawsuit in federal court in New York was not the only course of action the Trumps took. On August 21, 2008, Jules Trump contacted Sagi Genger to explore the possibility of acquiring the 1,102.8 shares purportedly transferred to the Sagi Trust in 2004 (the "Sagi Shares").<sup>FN73</sup> And, on August 22, 2008, the Trumps purchased the Sagi Shares pursuant to a stock purchase agreement (the

"Purchase Agreement") between the Sagi Trust, TPR, and the Trumps' entities, TR Investors, Glenclova, New TR Equity I, LLC ("Equity I"), and New TR Equity II, LLC ("Equity II"). Importantly, the transaction included not only the Sagi Trust as a party but also the wrongful transferor, TPR. Sagi Genger could act for TPR because, after making the 2004 Transfers, Genger had ceded control of TPR to Dalia Genger, who subsequently sold her interest in TPR to her son, Sagi.<sup>FN75</sup> The Purchase Agreement contained a specific section addressing the reality that the Trump Group viewed the 2004 Transfers as void and that TPR still owned them and was obliged to sell them to the Trump Group at 2004 values. To wit, the Purchase Agreement provided that it would be considered consummated between the Trump Group and TPR if the 2004 Transfers were to be found void:

FN73. Tr. 111 (J. Trump).

FN74. JX-225 (the "Purchase Agreement").

FN75. Tr. 547 (S.Genger).

If at any time following the Closing Date, it is determined that Seller is not the record and beneficial owner of the Shares as of the date hereof, by virtue of the transfer of the Shares to it by TPR being deemed to have been void or for any other reason, and that all right, title and interest in and to the Shares is held by TPR, subject only to the plaintiff's asserted rights under the Stockholders Agreement asserted in the action styled *Glenclova Investment Co. v. Trans-Resources, Inc. and TPR Investment Associates, Inc.*, Case No. 08-CIV-7140 (JFK), pending the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the parties hereby agree that (a) this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby shall be deemed to have been entered into and consummated with TPR, (b) the Purchasers shall retain all right, title and interest in and to the Shares as if purchased from TPR pursuant to this Agreement, (c) TPR shall look only to Seller

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*for any payments made by the Purchasers pursuant to this Agreement. (d) the Purchasers shall have no liability or obligation to TPR in respect of the Shares, and (e) all representations, warranties, covenants and agreements made by Seller herein, shall be deemed to have been made by TPR as of the date hereof.*<sup>FN76</sup>

<sup>FN76.</sup> Purchase Agreement § 10 (emphasis added).

Thus, by signing an agreement with both the Sagi Trust and TPR, the wrongful transferee, the Trump Group dealt with the Genger-caused problem that Genger exploited in order to derail the Funding Agreement. By dealing directly with both the allegedly innocent transferee—the Sagi Trust—and the wrongdoer TPR—the Trump Group covered all of its bases.

Having purchased the Sagi Shares, which gave them a majority-equity position in Trans-Resources, the Trump Group then executed a written consent on August 25, 2008 that removed Genger from the Trans-Resources board, elected Eddie Trump and Hirsch to the board, and affirmed the election of Jules Trump and Robert Smith to the board. The Trump Group delivered that written consent to Trans-Resources, but Genger rejected it.<sup>FN77</sup>

<sup>FN77.</sup> Tr. 403-06 (Hirsch).

<sup>FN78</sup> In response, the Trump Group filed a single-count complaint pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 225 in order to determine the composition of the Trans-Resources board (the “Section 225 Action”). Consistent with their position throughout the summer of 2008, the Trump Group’s central claim was that the 2004 Transfers were made in violation of the Stockholders Agreement, and that it therefore had the right to purchase all of TPR’s shares pursuant to Section 3 of the Stockholders Agreement.<sup>FN79</sup> Genger responded with a counterclaim, raising a number of arguments for why the 2004 Transfers were made appropriately—chief among them his assertions that he told Jules Trump of the Transfers at

the time they were made, and that, in any event, the Trump Group’s purchase of the Sagi Shares in 2008 ratified the 2004 Transfers—and claiming that, therefore, he still controlled Trans-Resources’ board. Genger also argues that the Trump Group violated Section 2.1 of the Stockholders Agreement when Equity I and Equity II pledged Trans-Resources shares in return for financing to buy the Sagi Shares.

<sup>FN78.</sup> Compl. ¶ 10.

Soon after the Section 225 Action was filed, the parties promptly settled the matter, which resulted in a stipulated final judgment that declared that the Trump Group’s designees constituted a majority of the board.<sup>FN79</sup> But, like any other moment of agreement between the parties in this case on anything, that settlement was short-lived. On October 10, 2008—two weeks after the final judgment was entered—the Trump Group moved to re-open the Section 225 Action. They moved to reopen because they alleged that, after taking control of Trans-Resources, they discovered that Genger had destroyed documents relevant to the Section 225 Action in violation of a status quo order.

<sup>FN79.</sup> See *TR Investors, LLC v. Arie Genger*, C.A. No. 3994-VCS (Sept. 26, 2008) (ORDER).

The issue of whether Genger should be held in contempt for destroying documents in violation of this court’s status quo order was decided in 2009 in a separate trial.<sup>FN80</sup> It is unnecessary to recount here the facts or analysis involved in that trial, which are summarized in the opinion that resulted.<sup>FN81</sup> What matters for present purposes is the outcome: Genger was found to be in contempt, which raises Genger’s evidentiary burden on any issue on which he has the burden of proof by one level and renders his uncorroborated testimony insufficient to establish material facts.<sup>FN82</sup>

<sup>FN80.</sup> *TR Investors, LLC v. Genger*, 2009 WL 4696062 (Del.Ch. Dec. 9, 2009).

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FN81. See *id.* at \*1-15.

FN82. See *id.* at \*18-19.

### III. Legal Analysis

Genger has proliferated a host of theories-including new ones after trial-as to why he retains voting control over Trans-Resources, and the Trump Group has accurately described its efforts to address Genger's ever-changing arguments as playing a game of "Whack-a-Mole." FN83 It is possible, nevertheless, to sift through the heaping stew pot filled with every conceivable exculpatory theory that ever crossed his lawyers' inventive minds that Genger has cooked up and identify the chunkier ingredients. Genger's main theory is that the 2004 Transfers were made appropriately, either because he gave the Trump Group notice or because the Trump Group ratified the Transfers. Genger's primary alternative theory is that, even if the 2004 Transfers were not appropriate, the Trump Group took the Sagi Shares subject to the Proxy in his favor.

FN83. See Trump Post-Trial Ans. Br. 3. For example, Genger's counsel spent a great deal of time at post-trial oral argument in a befuddling exposition of a theory introduced into the case as a footnote in its post-trial answering brief. Compare Post-Trial Tr. 128-58 with Genger Post-Trial Ans. Br. 24, n. 18.

\*13 In the analysis that follows, I do not address all of the alternative theories Genger concocted, but rather focus on his two fundamental theories. Treating all of his secondary arguments is unnecessary because Genger has failed to bear his evidentiary burden as to those core theories on which the rest of his case depends. That is, Genger has failed to prove that he properly notified the Trump Group of the 2004 Transfers at any time before the June 13 Meeting, or that the Trump Group somehow ratified the 2004 Transfers after the fact. And, even if the Trump Group did ratify the 2004 Transfers-which it did not-Genger has failed to

prove that it took the Sagi Shares subject to the Proxy.

#### A. Standard Of Review

The standard of review I apply in analyzing the aforementioned issues is different in this case than what is typical. The party attempting to gain control of an entity in an action pursuant to 8 Del C. § 225 bears the burden of proof on any issue, the outcome of which would affect the determination of the Trans-Resources' board. FN84 Generally speaking, the burden of proof in civil cases is that the party with the burden must prove his position by a preponderance of the evidence. FN85 But, because of this court's prior ruling in the contempt trial, Genger's burden is raised a level, meaning that he must prevail on any issue in which he bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. And, as mentioned before, Genger's own uncorroborated testimony will not be sufficient to establish any material fact. FN86

FN84. See *Agranoff v. Miller*, 1999 WL 219650, at \*12 (Del.Ch. Apr.12, 1999), aff'd, 737 A.2d 530 (Del.1999). Genger conceded that he bears the burden of proof. Contempt Trial Tr. 355.

FN85. See *SinoMah Bioscience Ltd. v. Immunomedics, Inc.* 2009 WL 1707891, at \*12 (Del.Ch. June 16,2009).

FN86. See *supra* page 25.

#### B. Arie Genger Did Not Notify The Trump Group Of The 2004 Transfers Until June 13, 2008

The first issue I must address is Genger's argument that he gave the Trump Group notice of the 2004 Transfers during his conversations in late 2004 or early 2005 with Jules Trump about his divorce and that the Trump Group is chargeable with laches. FN87 This argument is central to the case because the Stockholders Agreement provides that, upon receiving notice of an improper transfer from any source, the Trump Group has 90 days to elect to purchase the shares held by the stockholder mak-

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ing the transfer, i.e. TPR.<sup>FN88</sup> If the first time the Trumps heard about the 2004 Transfers was at the June 13 Meeting, then the Trump Group acted within in the 90-day window provided in the contract because it elected to purchase TPR's shares on August 8, 2008, when it sent TPR a letter indicating that it elected to exercise its rights under Section 3.2 of the Stockholders Agreement.<sup>FN89</sup> But, if the Trumps received notice some time before May 8, 2008, then their demand to exercise their purchase rights under the Stockholders Agreement on August 8, 2008 would arguably be tardy.

FN87. Laches operates to bar a claim where "(a) [the] plaintiff knew (or should have known) of its rights or claim; (b) [the] plaintiff failed to assert its rights or claim; and (c) [the] defendant has materially changed its position or otherwise materially relied on plaintiff's failure to assert." *Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P.*, 714 A.2d 96, 104 (Del.Ch.1998); see also *Fed. United Corp. v. Havender*, 11 A.2d 331, 344 (Del.1940) ("Sitting by inactive and in what amounts to silence, when every consideration for the rights of others demanded prompt and vigorous action, and until affairs had become so complicated that a restoration of former status was difficult, if not impossible, is conduct amounting to laches.").

FN88. Stockholders Agreement § 3.2(a).

FN89. JX-198 (Letter from Glenelova to Trans-Resources and TPR (Aug. 8, 2008)).

Tellingly, Genger spent only one and a half pages in his post-trial briefing on this argument.<sup>FN90</sup>

That is likely because he knew, as shown below, that he has failed to bear his evidentiary burden on this issue. There is no credible evidence indicating that Genger ever told Jules Trump about the 2004 Transfers in late 2004 or early 2005.

FN90. See Genger Post-Trial Op. Br. 28-30.

\*14 At trial, Genger offered little more than his unbelievable and uncorroborated testimony to support his claim that he notified the Trump Group. As discussed earlier, Genger testified that he told Jules Trump about the 2004 Transfers on a number of occasions in late 2004 or early 2005 while the two discussed developments in Genger's divorce during their strolls on Williams Island.<sup>FN91</sup> For his part, Jules Trump categorically denied that Genger ever mentioned the 2004 Transfers in late 2004 or early 2005.<sup>FN92</sup> The only other person who testified to hearing Genger and Trump discuss the matter was Orly Genger. But her testimony gave little detail about what was actually said during those alleged conversations, and it was contradicted by Genger himself, who said that she was not present at the key conversation when he told Jules Trump about the Transfers.<sup>FN93</sup> Therefore, I do not find her testimony of the alleged conversations between Genger and Jules Trump credible, especially in light of her personal interest in this case.

FN91. See *supra* page 11.

FN92. See *supra* page 11.

FN93. See *supra* page 11-13.

Moreover, if Genger did in fact tell Jules Trump about the 2004 Transfers in late 2004 or early 2005, then why did he not press that point at the June 13 Meeting when Eddie Trump and Hirsch appeared shocked to hear the news? The natural thing to say in that situation would have been to make the obvious point that he had told Jules about it years ago. But, at trial, Genger only testified vaguely, haltingly, and meekly that he told them something along the lines of "Jules knows about it," and gave no other details of what he said in that regard.<sup>FN94</sup> Genger also admitted that he never pressed the point any further, even though he became "[v]ery frustrated" with the repeated questions Eddie Trump and Hirsch were asking.<sup>FN95</sup>

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For example, Genger never said that they should get Jules Trump on the phone to confirm that Genger had indeed told him about the Transfers.  
<sup>FN96</sup> Rather, Genger attempted to justify the Transfers on the grounds that he still had voting control through the Proxies.  
<sup>FN97</sup>

<sup>FN94.</sup> Tr. 900 (A.Genger).

<sup>FN95.</sup> *Id.*

<sup>FN96.</sup> *Id.*

<sup>FN97.</sup> See *supra* page 17.

Genger also failed to mention his alleged conversations with Jules Trump even when he spoke with his lawyer, David Lentz, after the June 13 Meeting.  
<sup>FN98</sup> Such an important detail would, if true, have been one of the first things Genger told his counsel. But, the evidence indicates Lentz believed at the time that Genger had never informed Jules Trump of the 2004 Transfers.  
<sup>FN99</sup> That fact is reflected most clearly in the Lentz Memo, which stated repeatedly that notice had never been provided to the Trump Group.  
<sup>FN100</sup>

<sup>FN98.</sup> See *supra* page 17.

<sup>FN99.</sup> See *supra* page 17-19.

<sup>FN100.</sup> See *supra* page 18-19.

Thus, the overwhelming thrust of the evidence indicates that everyone in Genger's camp knew full well that he had never told the Trump Group about the 2004 Transfers before the June 13 Meeting.  
<sup>FN101</sup> Indeed, Bill Dowd's notes of the June 25 Board Meeting indicate that Genger himself admitted that the Transfers were made in violation of the Stockholders Agreement.  
<sup>FN102</sup> The inescapable conclusion is that Genger did not provide the Trump Group with any form of notice before the June 13 Meeting, choosing rather to trust in his savvy to manage the Trumps if the issue ever arose.

<sup>FN101.</sup> See Tr. 631 (Dowd), 1008 (Lentz).

<sup>FN102.</sup> See *supra* page 19.

\*<sup>15</sup> Nor can Genger rely on the passing references to the possibility of a transfer in the 2005 Written Consents and the minutes of the November 2007 Board Meeting. As noted, the accuracy of the minutes of the November 2007 Board Meeting appears to be suspect.  
<sup>FN103</sup> Furthermore, the Stockholders Agreement required a specific form of notice to be given to TR Investors and Glenclova.  
<sup>FN104</sup> Even if Genger told Jules Trump about the 2004 Transfers in late 2004 or early 2005, which I conclude he did not, that would not constitute notice to TR Investors or Glenclova. But more important is the fact that passing references in the 2005 Written Notices or the minutes of the November 2007 Board Meeting do not constitute proper notice of any kind or even put the Trump Group on effective inquiry notice. Business people can miss things. The idea that the Trump Group had to review every stray reference in the board minutes or to read between the lines on the signature page of the 2005 Written Consents for signs of a possible transfer is wrong. The notice provision in the Stockholders Agreement was specific and designed to ensure that the Trump Group did not have to police the world in this way, as was the Stockholders Agreement's strong anti-waiver provision.  
<sup>FN105</sup> Finally, I am persuaded by, among other things, the draft Funding Agreement the Trump Group proposed that indicated that the Trump Group did not know of the 2004 Transfers. Notably, I conclude that the Trump Group would prevail on this issue even if they had the burden to show that they had not been given proper notice. But, because Genger admits he did not give proper notice as required under the contract,  
<sup>FN106</sup> it was his burden to show that he should nevertheless be alleviated of his obligations under the Stockholders Agreement because he gave Jules Trump oral notice and, certainly, it was his burden to prove a laches defense.

<sup>FN103.</sup> See *supra* pages 19-20.

<sup>FN104.</sup> See Stockholders Agreement § 6.5.

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FN105. See *id.* at §§ 6.5, 6.8.

FN106. See Pretrial Stipulation and Order 4.

*C. The Trump Group Did Not Ratify The 2004 Transfers*

Genger next argues that the Trump Group nevertheless ratified the 2004 Transfers. The defense of ratification is perhaps best understood by reference to its closest cousin, the doctrine of acquiescence. FN107

Acquiescence occurs when a party "has knowledge of an improper act by another, yet stands by without objection and allows the other party to act in a manner inconsistent with the claimant's property rights." FN108 Ratification differs primarily in timing: "[a]cquiescence properly speaks of assent by words or conduct *during the progress* of a transaction, while ratification suggests an assent *after the fact*." FN109 Thus, to find that a party ratified a prior act, it is first necessary to find that the ratifying party had "[k]nowledge, actual or imputed, of all material facts." FN110 Second, ratification requires an affirmative act by the ratifying party. Assent can be "implied from conduct, as well as expressed by words" but is always a "voluntary and positive act." FN111 Accepting the benefits of a transaction can be an indication of that assent. FN112

FN107. See *Frank v. Wilson & Co.*, 32 A.2d 277, 283 (Del.1943) ("Acquiescence and ratification are closely related.").

FN108. *Brandywine Dev. Group, L.L.C v. Alpha Trust*, 2003 WL 241727, at \*4 (Del.Ch. Jan.30. 2003).

FN109. *Frank*, 32 A.2d at 283 (emphasis added); see also I DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTINGER, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY, § 11.03[a], at 11-20 (2009) ("Acquiescence involves assent during the progress of a transaction, while ratification

suggests assent after the fact.").

FN110. *Frank*, 32 A.2d at 283; see also *Papaioannu v. Comm'r's of Rehoboth*, 186 A.2d 745, 749-50 (Del.Ch.1962).

FN111. *Frank*, 32 A.2d at 283; see also *WOLFE & PITTINGER*, § 11.03 [a] at 11-19 to 11-20 (stating that ratification requires proof of a relinquishment of existing, known rights, and the "acceptance of new replacement rights or benefits").

FN112. See *Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp.*, 591 A.2d 166, 177 (Del.1991) (stating that accepting the benefits of a transaction, even though the conduct in question is a breach of some duty owed to the shareholder, may bar the shareholder from obtaining equitable relief); *Frank*, 32 A.2d at 282 (finding that a shareholder "could not accept the benefit offered by the [transaction] and at the same time deny its validity"); *Giannalvo v. Sunshine Mining Co.*, 1994 WL 30547, at \*10 (Del.Ch. Jan.31, 1994), aff'd, 651 A.2d 787 (Del.1994) ("The equitable defenses of ratification and acquiescence are closely related. Under the proper circumstances, both doctrine prevent one who accepts the benefits of a transaction from thereafter attacking it."); *Danley v. Murray*, 1980 WL 268061, at \*4 (Del.Ch. July 3, 1980) ("The 'affirmance' required to create ratification ... may arise by the retention of benefits with knowledge of the unauthorized acts.") (citations omitted); *Troustine v. Remington Rand*, 194 A. 95, 99 (Del.Ch.1937) ("[E]quity will not hear a complainant stultify himself by complaining against acts in which he participated or of which he has demonstrated his approval by sharing in their benefits.").

*1. Genger Has Not Met His Burden Of Proof As To His Ratification Claim*

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\*16 Realizing that he had a very weak argument that he gave effective notice of the 2004 Transfers to the Trump Group, Genger spent most of his briefing attempting to argue that the Trump Group ratified the 2004 Transfers. Because of his prior acts of spoliation, Genger bears the burden to prove ratification by clear and convincing evidence. He has not done so.

Genger argues that the Trump Group ratified the 2004 Transfers on two occasions: (1) when it accepted shareholder approval of the Funding Agreement at the June 25 Board Meeting; and (2) when it purchased the Sagi Shares on August 22, 2008.<sup>FN113</sup> As to the June 25 Board Meeting, Genger's theory is that the Trump Group accepted Genger's vote on behalf of the Sagi and Orly Trusts at the June 25 Board Meeting when the Trans-Resources stockholders approved the Funding Agreement. Genger argues that the Trump Group benefited when Genger purportedly voted the Proxies at the June 25 Board Meeting because approval of the Funding Agreement was a step towards giving them control of the company. As to the second theory, Genger argues that the Trump Group acknowledged the Sagi Trust as the transferee of the Sagi Shares, and benefited from purchasing the Sagi Shares because buying directly from Sagi Genger allowed the Trump Group to avoid the uncertainty and cost of enforcing their rights under Section 3.2 of the Stockholders Agreement.

FN113. Later in the briefing process, Genger recast his argument about the 2005 Written Consents and the minutes of the November 2007 Board Meeting in ratification terms. That is, Genger argued that the 2005 Written Consents and the minutes of the November 2007 Board Meeting indicate that the Trump Group ratified the 2004 Transfers. The argument fares no better presented within a ratification analysis. As explained above, I find this argument unconvincing because, although representatives of the Trump Group received the 2005

Written Consent and signed its signature pages, and approved the minutes of the November 2007 Board Meeting, neither document involved the communication of a material amount of information about the 2004 Transfers to properly notify the Trump Group of the Transfers. Before a party can ratify something, it must first have "sufficient notice or means of knowledge" of the transaction or act in question. *Papaioannu*, 186 A.2d at 749-50. The 2005 Written Consent and the 2007 Board Minutes made, at best, an oblique suggestion that some event might have changed the shareholdings of Trans-Resources' stock. But neither the 2005 Written Consent nor the minutes of the November 2007 Board Meeting indicate any particular information about the 2004 Transfers, and neither event even occurred in a context where the Trump Group would have been alerted that something like the Transfers may have taken place. Therefore, Genger's ratification argument based on those pieces of evidence fails.

Genger's ratification argument fails for two primary reasons. First, Genger's argument that the Trump Group ratified the 2004 Transfers is belied by the fact that the Trump Group repeatedly stated that the Transfers were made in violation of the Stockholders Agreement. Eddie Trump and Hirsch made that point at the June 13 Meeting.<sup>FN114</sup> The fact that the Transfers were made in violation of the Agreement was repeated at the June 25 Board Meeting.<sup>FN115</sup> The letter the Trump Group sent to Trans-Resources on August 8, 2008, whereby it expressed its intention to exercise its rights to buy the 2004 Transfer shares, indicated that the 2004 Transfers were made in violation of the Stockholders Agreement.<sup>FN116</sup> And, the Trump Group's complaint in this matter claimed that the 2004 Transfers violated the Stockholders Agreement.<sup>FN117</sup> Thus, the clear and consistent message from the Trump Group to Genger at all relevant times

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was that the Stockholders Agreement had been violated. At no point did the Trump Group tell Genger that it accepted the 2004 Transfers.

FN114. *See supra* page 16.

FN115. *See supra* page 19.

FN116. *See supra* page 22.

FN117. *See Compl. ¶ 8.*

Second, Genger has also failed to show that the Trump Group benefited in any way that suggests ratification. That is, Genger's argument that the Trump Group ratified the 2004 Transfers at the June 25 Board Meeting must be rejected because Genger reneged on the Funding Agreement. Because the Agreement was never executed, the Trump Group never received the benefit that was the condition upon which it might actually not challenge the 2004 Transfers. Without the Trump Group having received the benefit that was to be given for relinquishing its claim that the 2004 Transfers were void, there is no basis to conclude that the Trump Group assented to the 2004 Transfers by accepting Genger's vote on behalf of the Sagi and Orly Trust in favor of the Funding Agreement.<sup>FN118</sup>

FN118. Genger argues that it was enough that the Trump Group "accepted for themselves as shareholders the pecuniary benefits" of the Funding Agreement, even though they never actually received those benefits because that deal was never consummated. Genger's Post-Trial Op. Br. 21. In other words, according to Genger's theory, not only is receiving a benefit an indication of ratification, but a step taken during a negotiation to receive a benefit is also. Tellingly, Genger cites no case law supporting his position.

I reject this argument for the following reason: acceptance of the benefit of a voidable transaction is an *alternative*

basis upon which to ground a conclusion that a party ratified the transaction. It is a suitable alternative to an express affirmation of the transaction because acceptance of a benefit is a relatively concrete factual occurrence that inspires confidence in a conclusion that, even though the ratifying party did not expressly enunciate her assent to the voidable transaction, she has nonetheless done some "voluntary and positive act" to indicate that assent. *Frank*, 32 A.2d at 283. Negotiations relating to a potential benefit arising from a contractual breach are a less sure foundation upon which to base a finding of a ratification because, as sophisticated commercial parties know, discussions often range across a number of different options, many of which never come to pass. In other words, negotiations about the potential benefit arising from a voidable transaction are unreliable. For that reason they cannot reasonably be considered to induce the other party's reliance, and therefore there is no basis to conclude that the party who suffered the breach is estopped from enforcing the contract. *See Romer v. Porcelain Products, Inc.*, 2 A.2d 75, 76 (Del.Ch. July 28, 1938) (finding that a complaining stockholder was barred by "the estoppel of his acquiescence"); *see generally Frank*, 32 A.2d at 283 ("The defenses of laches, acquiescence, ratification and estoppel all have some element in common."). That is, until the ratifying party actually takes the benefit, there is no basis for the estoppel. For that additional reason, I reject Genger's claim that the Trump Group ratified the 2004 Transfers at the June 25 Board Meeting.

\*17 Indeed, the Funding Agreement proves the point. The Trump Group was willing to consider a

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resolution of the violation of the Stockholders Agreement that remedied that violation by giving them voting control of Trans-Resources. In so doing, they were willing to accept some risk, based on Arie Genger's assurances that he did not face a problem from Sagi Genger if he voted the disputed shares. If that was so, and if the Trump Group was able to reach an accord that gave them voting control, all the parties affected by the 2004 Transfers would have been on board. But the lynchpin of the deal was the Genger would rectify the violation of the Stockholders Agreement by ensuring that the Trump Group had voting control. He then reneged on his assurances that the Transfers were a problem by claiming that Funding Agreement could not be accomplished because Sagi Genger might challenge the substantive fairness of the required stock issuance to the Trump Group.

Of course, the Trump Group received a benefit when it purchased the Sagi Shares from the Sagi Trust and TPR, but that benefit is not an indication of the Trump Group's ratification of the 2004 Transfers. Rather it is consideration of a settlement that resolved the very problem Genger had created. In other words, Genger's argument confuses the benefits that come from compromising claims away in return for a settlement with taking a benefit from a voidable transaction that indicates ratification. A benefit that indicates ratification is one where the ratifying party would be getting something for nothing if she were allowed to enforce the contract. FN119

Here, the Trump Group was not attempting to take advantage of the 2004 Transfers in a way that would have allowed it to obtain more than it was entitled to under the Stockholders Agreement.

FN119. See, e.g., *id.* at 278-83 (finding that a stockholder who had benefitted for years from a recapitalization plan "could not accept the benefit offered by the plan and at the same time deny its validity").

By entering into the Purchase Agreement, the Trump Group dealt with the problem that Genger's misconduct had caused it. Genger had just reneged

on the compromise Funding Agreement that would have rectified his wrongful behavior, in large measure by claiming that Sagi Genger, as an arguably innocent purchaser for value, would cause trouble and upset any deal. The Trumps reasonably suspected that Genger's resistance was also inspired by his desire to retain control. To address this problem, the Trump Group dealt with both the wrongful transferor, TPR, and the purported transferee, the Sagi Trust, so that it could cover all its bases. In doing so, the Trump Group never accepted the legitimacy of the 2004 Transfers; indeed, its consistent position was that the Transfers were void.<sup>FN120</sup> But by binding both TPR and the Sagi Trust, it could resolve the issue of ownership and control over the bloc definitively. That is, under the deal with TPR and the Sagi Trust, the Trump Group extinguished any claims it had against either TPR or the Sagi Trust as to the Sagi Shares in return for a majority stake in the company.<sup>FN121</sup> Thus, the Trump Group was only attempting to recapture from TPR what it was owed under the Stockholders Agreement: control over Trans-Resources. Indeed, the Trump Group was giving up its right to purchase the shares from TPR at 2004 prices, which likely would have allowed the Trump Group to obtain the Shares for much less than the approximately \$26 million it paid to purchase the Sagi Shares.

FN120. See *supra* pages 16-25.

FN121. See *supra* pages 22-24.

\*18 The only difference between enforcing its rights under Section 3.2 of the Stockholders Agreement against TPR and acquiring control directly through the purchase of the Sagi Shares was speed. That is, negotiating directly with both TPR and the Sagi Trust had the advantage of providing a quick and certain resolution to the problem, while enforcing Section 3.2 would likely have involved lengthy litigation. Of course, a speedy solution has value, but that value is the benefit of any settlement, and is one of the primary reasons parties settle their disputes. Undermining that incentive

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cuts against the public's well-established interest in promoting settlement.<sup>FN122</sup> At all times, the Trump Group took the position that the 2004 Transfers were void, and mentioned that position to Genger and in litigation. All the Trump did by entering into the Purchase Agreement was ensure that, if the Trump Group were proven wrong in litigation about the 2004 Transfers, it had acquired whatever interests Sagi Genger held and, therefore, he was not a further obstacle. By making a deal directly with the wrongdoer whose shares it was entitled to receive under the Stockholders Agreement, the Trump Group settled TPR's violation of that Agreement by accepting the shares on the terms negotiated, rather than under the price setting process of Section 3.2. In this regard, it is also important to note that the Trump Group was entitled to control of Trans-Resources as of 2004, when Genger breached the Stockholders Agreement. Genger's secret transfers had deprived the Trump Group of the benefits of the Stockholders Agreement for four years, and it comes with little grace for Genger now to argue that the Trump Group had to wait even longer or else it would relinquish its rights to those benefits.

FN122. See *Marie Raymond Revocable Trust v. MAT Five LLC*, 980 A.2d 388, 402 (Del.Ch.2008) ("It is well established that Delaware law favors the voluntary settlement of contested issues. Settlements are encouraged because they promote judicial economy and because the litigants are generally in the best position to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their case." (internal citations omitted)), aff'd *sub nom. Whilson v. Marie Raymond Revocable Trust*, 976 A.2d 172 (Del.2009).

Finally, I note that finding that the Trump Group did not ratify the 2004 Transfers leads to, in my view, an equitable result, despite Genger's protestations to the contrary. The problem Genger created by his serious, secretive contractual breach—the insertion of Genger's dysfunctional family into the

management of Trans-Resources—was precisely what the Stockholders Agreement was designed to avoid.<sup>FN123</sup> The Trump Group could only rectify that problem outside of litigation by negotiating with TPR and the Sagi Trust because, by effecting the Transfers, Genger made it impossible to deal with TPR alone. Genger's argument that the Trump Group ratified the 2004 Transfers because it dealt with Sagi Genger rather than telling him that the Transfers were void is particularly cynical because Genger himself insisted that the Trump Group not challenge the Sagi Trust's ownership of its Trans-Resources shares.<sup>FN124</sup> Genger was the source of all of these problems, and to find that the Trump Group ratified Genger's behavior would only reward him for his own perfidy.<sup>FN125</sup> In that regard, Genger's argument that a finding that the Trump Group did not ratify the 2004 Transfers would work an inequity because it would require the unwinding of his divorce settlement is baseless. Genger only has himself to blame for whatever mess his decision to make the 2004 Transfers has caused for his divorce settlement. If Arie Genger's violation of the Stockholders Agreement has deepened the Genger family's internecine feud, that is unfortunate. But it is not the Trump Group's problem, nor is it a basis for an appeal to this court's sense of equity.

FN123. See *supra* pages 5-8.

FN124. See *supra* page 20.

FN125. See 3 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.20 (3d ed. 2004) ("A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong at the expense of another.").

2. *The Trump Group Holds A Majority Of Trans-Resources' Stock But Is Not Entitled To The Shares Transferred To Arie Genger Personally Or To The Only Trust*

\*19 That the purchase of the Sagi Shares was a bargain with TPR and the Sagi Trust that resolved Genger's violation of the Stockholders Agreement also has ramifications for the Trump Group's

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claims, which include a theory that it has a right to purchase all of the shares TPR transferred in the 2004 Transfers-including the shares transferred to Arie Genger personally and the Orly Trust-under the terms of the Stockholders Agreement. In the Purchase Agreement whereby the Trump Group bought the Sagi Shares, the parties included a provision that ensured that, if the 2004 Transfers were found to be improper, the Agreement would be deemed to have been consummated with TPR, not the Sagi Trust.<sup>FN126</sup> Thus, the Purchase Agreement was a broad settlement that gave the Trump Group the assurance that it had all its bases covered in regard to the Sagi Shares, and that it would retain control over Trans-Resources. The Purchase Agreement also provided in relation to the shares transferred to Arie Genger personally and the Orly Trust that:

*FN126. See supra pages 23-24.*

If at any time following the Closing Date, it is determined that Arie Genger is not the record and beneficial owner of the 794.40 shares of Common Stock of the Company purportedly transferred to him by TPR in October, 2004 and/or that the Orly Genger 1993 Trust is not the record and beneficial owner of the 1,102.80 shares of Common Stock of the Company purportedly transferred to such Trust by TPR in October, 2004, and that TPR is determined to be the record or beneficial owner of any such shares, in either or both cases by virtue of the transfer of such shares being deemed to have been void or for any other reason (the shares being so affected being referred to herein as the "Affected Shares") then TPR shall promptly transfer 64% of the Balance Shares (as such term is defined in the Stockholders Agreement dated March 30, 2001, among TPR, TR Investors, Glenclova and the Company (the "Stockholders Agreement")) to TR Investors and Glenclova in accordance with the terms of Section 1.6 of the Stockholders Agreement whether or not such agreement is then still in effect.<sup>FN127</sup>

**FN127. Purchase Agreement § 11**  
(emphasis added).

Thus, the Purchase Agreement provided that, if the transfer of TPR shares to Arie Genger and the Orly Trust was found to be improper, then 64% of the Balance Shares<sup>FN128</sup> would be transferred from TPR to the Trump Group.

*FN128. See supra page 10.*

Although the 2004 Transfers violated the terms of the Stockholders Agreement, which in Section 3.2 provides that the Trump Group can purchase all of TPR's shares, the Trump Group cannot purchase the shares transferred to Arie Genger or the Orly Trust because the Trump Group must abide by the settlement terms to which it agreed in the Purchase Agreement. Because the 2004 Transfers violated the Stockholders Agreement, Arie Genger and the Orly Trust have been found to not be the record or beneficial owners of the shares transferred to them. Per Section 11 of the Purchase Agreement, that entitles the Trump Group to 64% of the Balance Shares, and nothing more beyond the Sagi Shares that it has already bought. As to the Transfer from TPR to Arie Genger himself, the major problem was the lack of notice. Under the Stockholders Agreement, Genger could receive shares from TPR so long as he: (1) gave proper notice to the Trump Group entities; and (2) signed on to the Stockholders Agreement.<sup>FN129</sup> He did neither and, as a result, cannot exercise any rights under the Stockholders Agreement. Although the Trump Group believes that Genger's violation should require him to transfer all of his Trans-Resources shares to the Trump Group, that remedy is disproportionate. That sort of relief is unnecessary to this control dispute and therefore this § 225 action. Nevertheless, Trans-Resources appears entitled, in any event, to deny Genger the right to vote his shares until he gives formal notice and signs on to the Stockholders Agreement. As to the Orly Trust, it is not before the court, and the shares it was wrongly transferred are also not necessary for the Trump Group to exercise control. Therefore, I do not issue any ruling as to

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those shares, because that is unnecessary in this § 225 action.<sup>FN130</sup> Obviously, my finding that the shares were wrongly transferred creates problems for Arie Genger, but that exposure is a result of his own secretive contract breach.

FN129. Stockholders Agreement § 2.1.

FN130. See *Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. Johnston*, 1997 WL 589030, at \*3 (Del.Ch. Sept.17, 1997) (discussing that a § 225 proceeding should generally only resolve issues affecting voting control of the corporation); *Bossier v. Connell*, 1986 WL 11534, at \*2 (Del.Ch. Oct.7, 1986) (same).

D. *The Trump Group Did Not Take The Sagi Shares Subject To The Proxy*

\*20 Even if the Trump Group ratified the 2004 Transfers—which it did not—it would still have voting control over Trans-Resources because it did not take the Sagi Shares subject to the Proxy. That conclusion is required for two reasons.

First, the language of the Proxy itself does not plainly indicate that the Proxy was to run with the Shares if they are sold. The explicit terms of the Proxy establish that it only applies so long as the Sagi Trust owns the Shares. For example, the Proxy states that the Sagi Trust appoints Genger “to vote as its proxy, all shares of common stock of TRI which are not or hereafter owned by the Trust.”<sup>FN131</sup> Also, it permits Genger to vote only “in the same manner and to the same extent as the Trust might, were the Trust present at said meeting.”<sup>FN132</sup> In this regard, the Proxy is different, for example, from the proxy at issue in *Hoff v. Dart Group, Corp.*, which gave the proxy holder the “right to exercise all rights to vote the Shares on all matter on which they are entitled to vote.”<sup>FN133</sup> Here, the Proxy does not give Genger the right to vote on all matters in which the Sagi Shares are entitled to vote; rather, the Proxy gives Genger the right to vote on all matters in which the Sagi Trust is entitled to vote, suggesting that the Proxy does

not extend to subsequent owners of the Shares.

FN131. Proxy at 1 (emphasis added).

FN132. *Id.* (emphasis added).

FN133. 1997 WL 154049, at \*2 n. 5 (Del.Ch. Mar.14, 1997) (emphasis added).

Most importantly, the Proxy does not provide in any way for the reservation of voting powers to Genger after such a sale. The only language Genger points to as evidence that the Proxy is meant to run with the Sagi Shares is the phrase that the Proxy “shall continue for the duration of Arie Genger’s life.”<sup>FN134</sup> But, in the context of the entire document, that language only means that the Sagi Trust would be bound by the Proxy until Genger died, not that the Proxy would continue to bind later owners if the Shares were transferred. If Genger wanted to keep the Proxy after a transfer, he could have easily inserted clear language—such as “this Proxy shall bind any subsequent transferees”—into the Proxy to that effect. He did not, and thus there is no reason found in the text of the Proxy to indicate that it is binding upon the Trump Group.

FN134. Proxy at 1.

Even if the language of the Proxy was ambiguous—which it is not—public policy concerns require that the Proxy be strictly construed. Historically, proxies have been interpreted narrowly and when there is an ambiguity, read as not restricting the right to vote the shares.<sup>FN135</sup> Recent market developments have only reinforced the utility of the presumption that irrevocable proxies should be narrowly construed. Separating voting control from stock ownership—which can result in “empty voting,” where an investor votes stock without having an accompanying economic interest—raises important public policy concerns.<sup>FN136</sup> For example, the decoupling of shareholder voting rights and economic interest, which is increasingly common and only loosely regulated by the securities laws,<sup>FN137</sup> is of concern because empty voting can theoretic-

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FN134. Proxy at 1.

Even if the language of the Proxy was ambiguous—which it is—not-public policy concerns require that the Proxy be strictly construed. Historically, proxies have been interpreted narrowly and when there is an ambiguity, read as not restricting the right to vote the shares.<sup>FN135</sup> Recent market developments have only reinforced the utility of the presumption that irrevocable proxies should be narrowly construed. Separating voting control from stock ownership—which can result in “empty voting,” where an investor votes stock without having an accompanying economic interest—raises important public policy concerns.<sup>FN136</sup> For example, the decoupling of shareholder voting rights and economic interest, which is increasingly common and only loosely regulated by the securities laws,<sup>FN137</sup> is of concern because empty voting can theoretic-

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ally allow investors with voting power but with an economic interest adverse to the firm to vote in ways that reduce the company's share price.<sup>FN138</sup>

FN135. See *Eliason v. Englehart*, 733 A.2d 944 (Del.1999) (finding a proxy to be revocable where the words expressly stating that it was an "Irrevocable Proxy" were only found in the authentication to the document, not in the language of the proxy itself); *Freeman v. Fabiniak*, 1985 WL 11583 (Del.Ch. Aug.15, 1985) (narrowly interpreting the grant of authority made in a proxy instrument and holding that the instrument, which conveyed the right to vote at shareholder meetings, did not authorize other action by consent); *State ex rel. McKaig v. Bd. of Directors of H.F. Dangberg Land & Livestock Co.*, 60 Nev. 382, 110 P.2d 212, 214 (Nev.1941) ("The instrument granting the vote by proxy will be strictly construed.").

FN136. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, *Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms*, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011, 1014 (2006) ("Empty Voting"); see also Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, *Encumbered Shares*, 2005 U. ILL. L.REV. 775.

FN137. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, *Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions*, 156 U. PA. L.REV. 625 (2008)

FN138. See *Empty Voting* at 1014.

\*21 Our Supreme Court's recent decision in *Crown EM&K Partners, LLC v. Kurz* underscores the importance of those public policy concerns.<sup>FN139</sup> There, the Supreme Court affirmed this court's decision that third-party vote buying merits judicial review when it disenfranchises shareholders by affecting the outcome of a vote, and con-

firmed this court's conclusion that the voting arrangement at issue was proper.<sup>FN140</sup> Its reason for so concluding is important: "[w]e hold that the Court of Chancery correctly concluded that there was no improper vote buying, because the economic interests and the voting interests of the shares remained aligned since both sets of interests were transferred from Boutros to Kutz by the Purchase Agreement."<sup>FN141</sup> In other instances, the temptations for self-dealing that arise when persons with a relatively small economic interest in a corporation has voting control have resulted in serious harm to the corporation and its other investors.<sup>FN142</sup>

FN139. 992 A.2d 377, 388 (Del.2010) ("For many years, Delaware decisions have expressed consistent concern about transactions that create a misalignment between the voting interest and the economic interest of shares.") (citations omitted).

FN140. *Id.* at 388-90.

FN141. *Id.* at 390 (emphasis added).

FN142. See, e.g., *Hollinger Intern., Inc. v. Black*, 844 A.2d 1022 (Del.Ch.2004).

In light of those concerns, a proxy purporting to irrevocably decouple voting rights from economic interest should be strictly construed. Because there is no such clear intent manifested in the Proxy here, prudent public policy requires the conclusion that the Proxy does not survive the sale of the Sagi Shares to the Trump Group.

Second, the Proxy is not irrevocable because it does not satisfy § 609 of the New York Business Corporation Law, which I conclude governs the Letter Agreement and the Proxy attached thereto in view of the lack of any policy conflict between it and the DGCL.<sup>FN143</sup> Section 609 provides that:

FN143. Letter Agreement at 2 ("This Letter Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York without re-

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gard to conflicts of law principles."). Given Delaware's respect for contractual freedom, see *Abry Partners V, L.P. v. H & W Acquisition LLC*, 891 A.2d 1032, 1061 (Del.Ch.2006) (noting that "there is also a strong American tradition of freedom of contract, and that tradition is especially strong in our State" and citing authorities), it respects choice of law agreements. See *J.S. Alberici Const. Co., Inc. v. Mid-W. Conveyor Co., Inc.*, 750 A.2d 518, 520 (Del.2000) ("Delaware courts will generally honor a contractually-designated choice of law provision so long as the jurisdiction selected bears some material relationship to the transaction."). Although our law relating to the voting of corporate shares is of paramount interest to Delaware, there is no offense to Delaware of allowing parties to subject agreements about irrevocable proxies to a law that places different strictures on such proxies than does Delaware law, absent some reason that those strictures offend a fundamental protection by the DGCL. Section 609 of the N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law does not conflict with any fundamental Delaware corporate law policies or doctrines. Therefore, I find no reason to apply Delaware law in a situation where the parties have made a clear choice of law in favor of a sister state.

A proxy which is entitled "irrevocable proxy" and which states that it is irrevocable, is irrevocable when it is held by any of the following or a nominee of any of the following: (1) A pledgee; (2) A person who has purchased or agreed to purchase the shares; (3) A creditor or creditors of the corporation who extend or continue credit to the corporation in consideration of the proxy if the proxy states that it was given in consideration of such extension or continuation of credit, the amount thereof, and the name of the person extending or continuing credit; (4) A person who

has contracted to perform services as an officer of the corporation, if a proxy is required by the contract of employment, if the proxy states that it was given in consideration of such contract of employment, the name of the employee and the period of employment contracted for; (5) A person designated by or under paragraph (a) of section 620.<sup>FN144</sup>

<sup>FN144.</sup> N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609; cf. 8 Del. C. § 212(e) (providing that a duly executed proxy will be deemed irrevocable where it: (1) states that it is irrevocable; and (2) is coupled with an interest sufficient in law to support an irrevocable power, regardless of whether the interest is in the stock itself or the corporation generally).

Genger obviously does not qualify under subsections (1), (2), (3), or (4)-that is, he is not a pledgee, creditor, contract officer, or purchaser of the Shares sold to the Sagi Trust. And, he does not qualify under sub-section (5), because § 620 of the New York Business Corporation Law applies to an agreement "between two or more shareholders," and neither Genger nor the Sagi Trust were shareholders of Trans-Resources when the Letter Agreement and the Proxy were executed.<sup>FN145</sup> Thus, the Proxy is not irrevocable under New York Law, and was revoked by the sale of the Sagi Shares to the Trump Group.<sup>FN146</sup>

<sup>FN145.</sup> N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620.

<sup>FN146.</sup> See *Tompers v. Bank of Am.*, 217 A.D. 691, 217 N.Y.S. 67, 75 (N.Y.App.Div.1926) (holding that a revocable proxy terminated "through sale of ... stock"). Even if the Proxy were irrevocable, Genger would still be bound to vote his shares for a majority of the Trump Group's directors because the Stockholders Agreement provides that "the group owning the greater number of shares as between the TPR Stockholders and the

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Non-TPR Stockholders shall designate four directors." Stockholders Agreement § 1.2. That is, Genger would have to vote the Proxy for the Trump Group's directors, because the Trump Group is indisputably the owner of a majority of Trans-Resources' shares. Economic ownership trumps, so to speak, any interest Genger has as an owner of the Proxy.

claim the benefits of that contract).

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END OF DOCUMENT

*IV. Conclusion*

\*22 Genger violated the Stockholders Agreement when he made the 2004 Transfers, and the Trump Group did not ratify those Transfers after the fact. Furthermore, the Trump Group did not take the Sagi Shares subject to the irrevocable Proxy. Therefore, the Trump Group retains the Sagi Shares, FN147 is entitled to 64% of the Balance Shares, and can vote all of the Trans-Resources shares it holds as it wishes. The parties shall submit an implementing order by Wednesday, July 28, 2010.

FN147. Genger's claim that he is entitled to purchase the Sagi Shares under § 3.2 of the Stockholders Agreement because the Trump Group pledged (a disputed amount of) those Shares to a party from which they obtained purchase financing fails because Genger never signed on to the Stockholders Agreement. Tr. 950 (A.Genger). Until he accepts the burdens of that contract, Genger cannot expect to enjoy its benefits. See, e.g., *Red Clay Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. of Red Clay Consol. School Dist.*, 1992 WL 14965, at \*10 (Del.Ch. Jan.16, 1992) (holding that plaintiff could not "accept the benefits of a contract without also bearing the corresponding burdens"). Furthermore, Genger cannot now claim entitlements under a contract that he intentionally flaunted. See *PAMI-LEMB I Inc. v. EMB-NIC, L.L.C.*, 857 A.2d 998, 1014-15 (Del.Ch.2004) (holding that a party that repudiates or breaches a contract cannot then



# Exhibit 7

**IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE**

DALIA GENGER, as Trustee of the Orly )  
Genger 1993 Trust, )  
Plaintiff, )  
v. ) Civil Action No. \_\_\_\_\_  
TR INVESTORS, LLC, GLENCOVA )  
INVESTMENT CO., NEW TR EQUITY I, )  
LLC, NEW TR EQUITY II, LLC, TRANS- )  
RESOURCES, INC. and TPR )  
INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., )  
Defendants. )

**VERIFIED COMPLAINT**

Plaintiff Dalia Genger ("Dalia"), as Trustee of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust (the "Orly Trust"), by her undersigned attorneys, for her Verified Complaint against Defendants TR Investors, LLC ("Investors"), Glenclova Investment Co. ("Glenclova"), TR Equity I, LLC ("Equity I"), TR Equity II, LLC ("Equity II" and together with Investors, Glenclova and Equity I, "The Trump Group"), TPR Investment Associates, Inc. ("TPR") and Trans-Resources, Inc. ("Trans-Resources") alleges upon knowledge, information and belief as follows:

**NATURE OF THE ACTION**

1. On October 29, 2004, as part of a wider multi-million dollar divorce settlement agreement between Arie Genger ("Arie") and Dalia, Arie caused TPR to transfer 794.40 shares (13.99%) of Trans-Resource's stock to himself, and 1,102.80 shares (19.43%) of Trans-Resources stock to each of the 1993 Sagi and Orly Trusts.

2. In reliance upon (i) Arie's representation that no consent or approval was required for TPR to transfer the shares to her children and (ii) the representation that Arie caused TPR to make that the shares being transferred to the Orly Trust were "free and clear of any liens, claims or encumbrances" and that the transfer "does not violate the certificate of Incorporation of TPR or *any agreement to which TPR is subject*" (emphasis added), Dalia gave up valuable claims in the divorce settlement to ensure that her children's trusts would be well funded. The Orly Trust also relied on those representations in purchasing the Trans-Resources shares.

3. On October 30, 2004, Trans-Resource issued a share certificate in the name of the Orly Trust for 1,102.80 shares of Trans-Resources common stock. The share certificate was signed by Arie, as President of Trans-Resources, and Edward Klimerman, Assistant Secretary of Trans-Resources and outside counsel to the company.

4. Trans-Resources delivered the Orly Trust's share certificate to Arie, who was contractually obligated to act as the Orly Trust's proxy for voting the Trans-Resources shares. Arie maintained possession of the Orly Trusts' original share certificate and sent a copy of it to both Dalia and the Orly Trust.

5. Thus, the Orly Trust is a bona fide and protected purchaser of the Trans-Resources stock because (i) value was given for the Orly Trust's shares of Trans-Resources stock, (ii) the Orly Trust did not have notice of any adverse claim to the shares represented by its share certificate, and (iii) the Orly Trust obtained control of its Trans-Resources share certificate by way of its delivery to Arie, who held the certificate on the Orly Trust's behalf.

6. Consequently, the Orly Trust seeks a declaratory judgment that it is the beneficial owner of the 1,102.80 shares of Trans-Resources stock represented by the share certificate.

#### PARTIES

7. The Plaintiff Dalia Genger ("Dalia") is the mother of Sagi Genger ("Sagi") and Orly Genger ("Orly") and the former wife of Arie Genger ("Arie"). Dalia is the trustee of the 1993 Orly Genger Trust.

8. Defendant Trans-Resources, a privately-held Delaware Corporation, is a manufacturer and worldwide distributor of agricultural fertilizer.

9. Defendant TPR, a Delaware corporation, is the record holder of the 1,102.80 shares that the Orly Trust purchased in 2004.

10. Defendant Investors, a New Jersey Limited Liability Company, purportedly exercised its rights under the 2008 Side Letter Agreement to purchase from TPR the Trans-Resources common stock that was previously purchased by the Orly Trust.

11. Defendant Glenclova, a Cayman Islands company, purportedly exercised its rights under the 2008 Side Letter Agreement to purchase from TPR the Trans-Resources common stock that was previously purchased by the Orly Trust.

12. Defendant Equity I, a Delaware limited liability company, purportedly exercised its rights under the 2008 Side Letter Agreement to purchase from TPR the Trans-Resources common stock that was previously purchased by the Orly Trust.

13. Defendant Equity II, a Delaware limited liability company, purportedly exercised its rights under the 2008 Side Letter Agreement to purchase from TPR the Trans-Resources common stock that was previously purchased by the Orly Trust.

## JURISDICTION

14. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 111 and 10 Del. C. § 6501, et. seq.

## FACTUAL BACKGROUND

### The 2001 Stockholders Agreement

15. In 1985, Arie formed Trans-Resources.

16. Until 2001, TPR held Arie's 100% stake in Trans-Resources. TPR was owned by Arie, Dalia and their two children, Sagi and Orly. As TPR's majority (51%) shareholder, Arie controlled Trans-Resources.

17. Dalia, Sagi and Orly, through the Sagi and Orly Trusts (which were established by Arie in 1993 as part of a Genger family estate plan), held a minority (49%) interest in TPR.

18. In 2001, Glenclova and Investors entered into an agreement with Trans-Resources and TPR to convert their bond holdings into an equity interest in Trans-Resources (the "Stockholders Agreement"). Under the Stockholders Agreement, Glenclova and Investors acquired 47.15% of Trans-Resources common stock from Arie (through TPR), thereby reducing Arie's ownership interest in Trans-Resources to 52.85%.

19. The Stockholders Agreement restricted the transfer of Trans-Resources stock to any persons or entities except those who were designated as "Permitted Transferees." If a party to the Stockholders Agreement wished to transfer or sell its shares to a non-Permitted Transferee, the selling party was required to give written notice to the other Trans-Resources shareholders, who would have a right of first refusal. A transfer that failed to comply with those restrictions and the prior notice requirement

would be deemed invalid and void, and would trigger the non-selling shareholders' right to purchase the invalidly-transferred shares.

**The Orly Trust Receives Trans-Resources Stock, for Valuable Consideration, Without Notice of Any Adverse Claim**

20. After years of litigation regarding their divorce, on October 30, 2004, Arie and Dalia executed a stipulation of settlement (the "Divorce Agreement").

21. The Divorce Agreement equitably divided Arie and Dalia's marriage assets and provided for certain assets to be transferred to the Sagi and Orly Trusts, assets in which they already had an equitable stake through their minority ownership in TPR.

22. Thus, simultaneously with the Divorce Agreement, TPR entered into an agreement (the "Letter Agreement") with the Sagi and Orly trusts to sell, transfer and convey 1,102.80 shares of Trans-Resources stock to each of those entities. *See Letter Agreement dated October 29, 2004, attached hereto as Exhibit A.*

23. Arie, as CEO of Trans-Resources, represented in the Divorce Agreement that "[e]xcept for the Consent of TPR . . . no consent, approval or similar action of any person is required in connection with the transfer of [Trans-Resources] Stock as contemplated hereby . . ."

24. Moreover, in the Letter Agreement, which transferred the Trans-Resources stock from TPR to the Orly Trust, Arie caused TPR to represent that "the shares are being transferred hereunder free and clear of any liens, claims or encumbrances and such transfer does not violate the certificate of incorporation of TPR or any agreement to which TPR is subject." Ex. A.

25. Dalia relied on those representations in giving up certain claims in the divorce so as to financially benefit her children's trusts and provide for their inheritance.

The Orly Trust also relied on those representations in purchasing the Trans-Resources shares from TPR.

**Trans-Resources Delivers a Stock Certificate to the Orly Trust**

26. On October 30, 2004, Trans-Resources issued a stock certificate to the Orly Trust for 1,102.80 shares of its common stock.

27. The stock certificate was signed by Arie as President of Trans-Resources, and Edward Klimerman, as Assistant Secretary of Trans-Resources.

28. The transfer of the Trans-Resources stock to the Orly Trust in October 2004 was registered in the books and records of Trans-Resources.

29. Trans-Resources delivered the Orly Trust's share certificate to Arie, the Orly Trust's proxy for voting the Trans-Resources shares.

30. Arie maintained physical possession of the Orly Trust's stock certificate, and forwarded a copy of the certificate to both Dalia and the Orly Trust.

**The Trump Group Exercises an Option to Purchase the Orly Trust Shares**

31. On August 22, 2008, TPR entered into an agreement with the Trump Group to sell the Trump Group an option to purchase the Trans-Resources shares transferred to the Orly Trust in 2004 if a court found that the transfers of the Trans-Resources shares were void (the "Side Letter Agreement").

32. The Side Letter Agreement expressly provides that if a court determines "that the Orly Genger 1993 Trust is not the record and beneficial owner of the 1,102.80 shares of Common Stock of the Company purportedly transferred to such Trust by TPR in October, 2004," then Trump Group could exercise an option to purchase those shares.

33. In February 2011, the Trump Group exercised its option to purchase the Trans-Resources stock held by the Orly Trust.

**The Supreme Court Reverses this Court's Holding Regarding Beneficial Ownership of the Shares Held in the Orly Trust**

34. On July 18, 2011, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, among other things, this Court's finding in its August 9, 2010 Side Letter Opinion (the "Side Letter Opinion") that TPR was the record owner of the shares transferred to Arie pursuant to the 2004 Letter Agreement.

35. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed this Court's determinations in the Side Letter Opinion and August 18, 2010 Final Judgment Order to the extent that it adjudicated "the beneficial ownership of the Orly Trust Shares." (Op. at 44)

36. This action addresses one of the issues that the Delaware Supreme Court held that this Court did not have jurisdiction to decide: the Orly Trust's beneficial ownership of the Trans-Resources shares.

**COUNT I**  
**(Declaratory Judgment that the Orly Trust is the Beneficial Owner of 1,102.80 of Trans-Resources Common Stock)**

37. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth above in the preceding paragraphs.

38. Based upon representations that Arie made or caused to be made that the restrictions in the Stock Purchase Agreement did not apply or were waived, the Trustee for the Orly Trust, Dalia (the eventual Trustee) and Orly had no knowledge, either actual or constructive, of any current or potential adverse claim against those shares.

39. In reliance upon those representations, Dalia provided valuable consideration for the Trans-Resources shares that TPR transferred to the Orly Trust by

relinquishing significant claims in the divorce. In further reliance upon those representations, the Orly Trust purchased the 1,102.80 shares of Trans-Resources stock.

40. The share certificate issued to the Orly Trust was signed by authorized officers of Trans-Resources.

41. Trans-Resources delivered the Orly Trust's share certificate to Arie, who held possession of it as the Orly Trust's proxy for voting the shares. Arie delivered a copy of the share certificate to the Orly Trust and Dalia.

42. Because the Orly Trust acquired the legal rights to the Trans-Resources shares for value, with no knowledge of any adverse claim, it is a "bona fide purchaser" or protected purchaser whose rights to the Trans-Resources shares may not be nullified by the Trump Group.

43. The Orly Trust is entitled to a declaratory judgment that it is the beneficial owner of Trans-Resources shares that it purchased from TPR in October 2004.

#### **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter an order:

- a) Declaring that the Orly Trust is the beneficial owner of the 1,102.80 Trans-Resources shares that it purchased in 2004, for all purposes;
- b) Requiring Trans-Resources to pay to the Orly Trust any dividends that have been issued on the Trans-Resources shares since the Orly Trust acquired them on October 29, 2004.
- c) Granting the Orly Trust such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: October 4, 2011

CONNOLLY BOVE LODGE & HUTZ LLP

/s/ Jeremy D. Anderson  
Jeremy D. Anderson (No. 4515)  
The Nemours Building  
1007 N. Orange Street  
P. O. Box 2207  
Wilmington, DE 19899  
Tel: (302) 658-9141  
Fax: (302) 658-5614  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff*

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## **EXHIBIT A**

TPR INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.

200 West 57<sup>th</sup> Street  
New York, NY 10019

October 27, 2004

Mr. Aris Genger  
2680 Island Blvd, Penthouse One  
Williams Island, Aventura, FL 33166

Sagi Genger 1993 Trust  
200 West 57<sup>th</sup> Street  
New York, NY 10019

Only Genger 1993 Trust  
200 West 57<sup>th</sup> Street  
New York, NY 10019

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This letter will set forth our agreement pursuant to which you will purchase the 3,000 shares of common stock ("the Shares") of Trans-Revolcas, Inc. ("TRI") owned by TPR Investment Associates, Inc. ("TPR"). TPR hereby sells, transfers and conveys the Shares to you as follows:

- (i) 794.40 Shares to Aris Genger;
- (ii) 1,102.80 Shares to the Sagi Genger 1993 Trust, and
- (iii) 1,102.80 Shares to the Only Genger 1993 Trust.

The purchase price is \$1.00 per share, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.

The Shares represent 52.83% of the issued and outstanding shares of TRI. The Shares are being transferred free and clear of any liens, claims or encumbrances and such transfer does not violate the Certificate of Incorporation of TPI or any agreement to which TPR is subject.

The trustees of the Sagi Genger 1993 Trust and of the Only Genger 1993 Trust ("Trusts") have agreed to execute on behalf of the Trusts (i) an Irrevocable Proxy to appoint Aris Genger to vote the Shares owned by the Trusts and (ii) a voting trust letter agreement, copies of which are annexed hereto.

In case, at any time hereinafter, any further action is necessary or desirable to carry out the purposes of this Letter Agreement, each of the parties hereto shall take or cause to be taken all necessary action, including, without limitation, the execution and delivery of such

docs-1

Page 2  
Mr. Aris Genger  
Sagi Genger 1993 Trust  
Orly Genger 1993 Trust

further instruments and documents as may be reasonably requested by any party for such purpose or otherwise to complete or perfect the transactions contemplated hereby.


This Letter Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflicts of law principles.

Very truly yours,


TPR INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.


By:   
Sagi Genger, President

AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED  
THIS 24 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2004


  
ARIS GЕНЕР


SAGI GЕНЕР 1993 TRUST

By:   
David A. Farber, Trustee

  
Eric Gilbetz, Trustee

ONLY GЕНЕР 1993 TRUST

By:   
David A. Farber, Trustee

  
Eric Gilbetz, Trustee

DRAFT

200

Irrevocable Proxy

The Segi Genger 1993 Trust (the "Trust"), being the current record and beneficial owner of 1,102.80 shares of common stock of Trade-Resource, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the Laws of the State of Delaware ("TRI"), with its principal place of business at 200 West 57<sup>th</sup> Street, New York, New York, 10019, does hereby constitute and appoint Arie Genger, Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer, and the owner of approximately fourteen percent (14%) of the shares of common stock of TRI, to vote as its proxy, all shares of common stock of TRI which are now or hereafter owned by the Trust, at any and all meetings of the stockholders of TRI, regular or special (or by consent in lieu of a meeting) or any adjournments thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent that the Trust might, were the Trust present at said meeting (or executing such consent), upon any issue or proposal which may be brought before stock meeting or by such consent.

This Irrevocable Proxy shall be deemed coupled with an interest and be irrevocable from the date hereof, and shall continue for the duration of Arie Genger's life.

Dated: October 27, 2004


The Segi Genger 1993 Trust

By \_\_\_\_\_  
Edo Grilits, Trustee

By \_\_\_\_\_  
David A. Parnas, Trustee

STATE OF NEW YORK )  
ss:  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

On the 21 day of October, in the year 2004 before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for the State of New York, personally appeared ERIC GRIBBIZ, personally known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the individual whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that she executed the same in her capacity, and that by her signature on the instrument, the individual, or the person upon behalf of whom the individual acted, executed the instrument.

  
Notary Public

STEPHEN M. KATZING  
Notary Public, State of New York  
No. 422355  
Qualified in New York County  
Commission Expires July 12, 2006

STATE OF NEW YORK )  
ss:  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

On the 20 day of August, in the year 2004 before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for the State of New York, personally appeared DAVID A. FARNES, personally known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the individual whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that she executed the same in her capacity, and that by her signature on the instrument, the individual, or the person upon behalf of whom the individual acted, executed the instrument.

  
Notary Public

DEBORAH KELLY  
Notary Public, State of New York  
No. ST-C-045-AE2004  
Qualified in New York County  
Commission Expires August 8, 2006

Irrevocable Proxy

The Ody Genger 1993 Trust (the "Trust"), being the current record and beneficial owner of 1,102,30 shares of common stock of Trig-Retriefer, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware ("TRI"), with its principal place of business at 200 West 37<sup>th</sup> Street, New York, New York, 10019, does hereby constitute and appoint Aric Genger, Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer, and the owner of approximately fourteen percent (14%) of the shares of common stock of TRI, to vote as its proxy, all shares of common stock of TRI which are now or hereafter owned by the Trust, at any and all meetings of the stockholders of TRI, regular or special (or by consent in lieu of a meeting) or any adjournments thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent that the Trust might, were the Trust present at said meeting (or executing such consent), upon any issue or proposal which may be brought before such meeting or by such consent.

This Irrevocable Proxy shall be deemed coupled with an interest and be irrevocable from the date hereof, and shall continue for the duration of Aric Genger's life.

Dated: October 29, 2004

The Ody Genger 1993 Trust

By \_\_\_\_\_  
Heidi Cribatz, Trustee

By \_\_\_\_\_  
David A. Parker, Trustee


STATE OF NEW YORK )  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

On the 29 day of October, in the year 2004 before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for the State of New York, personally appeared BRIC GRIBBLE, personally known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the individual whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that she executed the same in her capacity, and that by her signature on the instrument, the individual, or the person upon behalf of whom the individual acted, executed the instrument.

  
Notary Public  
State of New York  
No. 4000188  
Qualified in New York County  
Commission Expires July 12, 2006

STATE OF NEW YORK )  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

On the 20 day of October, in the year 2004 before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for the State of New York, personally appeared DAVID A. PARNESS, personally known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the individual whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that she executed the same in her capacity, and that by her signature on the instrument, the individual, or the person upon behalf of whom the individual acted, executed the instrument.

  
Notary Public  
DEBORAH KEMP  
Notary Public, State of New York  
No. 4000188  
Qualified in New York County  
Commission Expires August 8, 2006

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE


DALIA Genger, as Trustee of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust, )  
Plaintiff, )  
v. )  
TR INVESTORS, LLC, GLEN CLOVA )  
INVESTMENT CO., NEW TR EQUITY I, )  
LLC, NEW TR EQUITY II, LLC, TRANS- )  
RESOURCES, INC. and TPR )  
INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., )  
Defendants. )  
Civil Action No. \_\_\_\_\_

VERIFICATION


STATE OF NEW YORK ) ss:  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

Dalia Genger, being duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

I am the trustee of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust. I know the allegations contained in the Complaint to be true and correct of my own knowledge, except as to matters alleged upon information and belief. As to those matters, I believe them to be true.

  
Name: Dalia Genger  
Trustee of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust

SWORN to and SUBSCRIBED before  
me this 7<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2011

  
Notary Public

ROBERT A. MEISTER  
Notary Public, State of New York  
No. 31-0244E2653350  
Qualified in New York County  
Commission Expires March 30, 2014

# Exhibit 8

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/29/2011  
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 2

INDEX NO. 113862/2010

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/29/2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

	X	Date Filed: October 21, 2009
DALIA GENTER, as Trustee on behalf of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust, and DALIA GENTER, in her individual capacity,	:	Index No. 16113862
Plaintiff,	:	<b>SUMMONS</b>
-against-	:	Basis of venue is Plaintiff's Residency in New York County
ARIE GENTER	:	Plaintiff resides at: 200 East 65 <sup>th</sup> Street, # 32W New York, NY 10021
	X	

To the Above-named Defendant:

**YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED** and required to serve upon plaintiff's attorney an answer to the complaint in this action within twenty (20) days after the service of this summons, exclusive of the day of service, or within 30 days after service is complete if this summons is not personally delivered to you within the State of New York. In case of your failure to answer, judgment will be taken against you by default for the relief demanded in the complaint.

The basis of the venue designated is the county of plaintiff's place of residence, namely New York County.

Dated: New York, New York  
October 21, 2010

**FILED**

OCT 21 2010  
PEDOWITZ & MEISTER, LLP  
COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE  
NEW YORK

ROBERT A. MEISTER  
Attorneys for Plaintiff  
1501 Broadway, Suite 800  
New York, New York 10036  
(212) 403-7330

Defendant's Addresses:

Arie Genger  
2600 Island Boulevard, Penthouse One  
Williams Island  
Aventura, Florida 33160

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

DALIA GENTER, as Trustee on behalf of the Orly :  
Genger 1993 Trust, and DALIA GENTER, in her  
individual capacity,

Plaintiff,

X Index No.

16113862

-against-

ARIE GENTER,

COMPLAINT

Defendant.

X

Plaintiff, Dalia Genger, by her attorneys, Pedowitz & Meister, LLP, for her Complaint  
alleges:

THE PARTIES

1. Plaintiff Dalia Genger ("Dalia") resides in New York County, New York, New York.
2. Dalia Genger is the trustee of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust (the "Orly Trust") created by a Trust Agreement executed on December 13, 1993, between Arie Genger, as Grantor, and Lawrence M. Small and Sash A. Spencer, as Trustees.
3. Defendant Arie Genger ("Arie") resides at 2600 Island Boulevard, Penthouse One, Williams Island, Aventura, Florida 33160.
4. In 1985, Arie founded Trans-Resources, Inc. ("TRI"), a closely held private corporation.
5. Prior to October, 2004, Arie was the controlling shareholder of defendant TPR, a closely held corporation. FILED  
OCT 21 2010  
COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE  
NEW YORK
6. Prior to October, 2004, TPR owned 3,000 shares of the common stock of TRI, which comprised approximately 52.85 percent of TRI's outstanding shares.
7. On March 30, 2001, TRI, the other shareholders of TRI, TR Investors, LLC and Glencova Investment Co. (collectively, the "Trump Group") and TPR and Arie executed a Stockholders

Agreement (the "TRI Stockholders Agreement"). Exhibit 1 hereto is a true copy of the TRI Stockholders Agreement.

8. The TRI Stockholders Agreement was in full force and effect in October, 2006, and it remains in full force and effect.

9. Section 2.1 of the Stockholders Agreement prevented TPR from transferring or pledging TRI stock to any party other than a party expressly permitted to receive such a transfer (a "Permitted Transferee"). Section 2.1 provides in relevant part:

From and after the date hereof, no Stockholder shall directly or indirectly, offer, transfer, sell, assign, pledge, encumber, hypothecate or otherwise dispose of any Shares (including any derivative transaction) (a) until after December 21, 2003, and, thereafter, only as provided in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of this Agreement, or (b) after written notice to the Company and the other Stockholders ... to (i) in the case of either of the Initial Non-TPR Stockholders or their respective Permitted Transferees (A) to [certain Permitted Transferees], or (ii) in the case of TPR or a Permitted Transferee thereof, to (w) Arie Genger, (x) any entity or entities in which TPR or Arie Genger directly owns a majority of the equity interest and directly controls a majority of the voting power ... (y) the estate of [f] Arie Genger or (z) any immediate family members or lineal descendants of Arie Genger, or trusts of which they are the sole beneficiaries-in-interest, who receive such Shares in consequence of the death of Arie Genger, which transferee(s) become a party to this Agreement....

10. Therefore the TRI Stockholders Agreement specified that the only Permitted Transferees to whom TPR could transfer TPR's TRI stock were: (i) Arie Genger himself; (ii) any entity in which TPR or Arie directly owned a majority of the equity interest and a majority of the voting power at the time of the transfer, (iii) the estate of Arie Genger; or (iv) any of Arie's immediate family members or lineal descendants, or trusts of which they are the sole beneficiaries-in-trust, who receive the transfer of shares as a result of Arie's death. And, even as to these Permitted Transferees, written notice of the transfers was required to be given to the Trump Group.

11. Article 3 of the TRI Stockholder Agreement requires that in the event a transfer was being made to a party who was not a Permitted Transferee, “[t]he Selling Stockholders shall give [TRI] and to each Covered Stockholder who is not the Selling Stockholder (the “Non-Selling Stockholders”) written notice containing the terms and conditions of the Offer.” Section 3.1 the stated that:

Until 30 days after receipt of such notice, the Non-Selling Stockholders shall have the right to elect to purchase all of the Offered Shares at the price offered by the prospective purchaser and specified in such notice.

12. The TRI Stockholders Agreement specified two remedies for transfers made in violation of the agreement. First, section 2.4 states that “[a]ny attempt by a Stockholder to transfer Shares in violation of this Agreement shall be void and the Company agrees that it will not effect such a transfer or treat any alleged transferee as the holder of such Shares.” Second, section 3.2(a) provides that the Trump Group 90 days to exercise the right to repurchase TPR’s shares of TRI if the shares were transferred to a non-Permitted Transferee.

13. On or about October 28, 2004, Arie and Dalia Genger entered into a contract in connection with the settlement of their divorce (“Stipulation Agreement”).

14. In the Stipulation Agreement, Aric agreed to cause TPR to transfer 1,102.80 shares of TRI Stock to the Orly Trust, which would give it 19.42766% of the common stock of TRI.

15. In the Stipulation Agreement, Arie also agreed to cause TPR to transfer 1,102.80 shares of TRI Stock to the Sagi Genger 1993 Trust, which would give it 19.42766% of the common stock of TRI, and to cause TPR to transfer to Arie and 794.40 shares of TRI stock, which would give Arie 13.99468% of the common stock of TRI.

16. In the Stipulation Agreement, Arie warranted that

Except for the consent of TPR...no consent, approval or similar action of any person is required in connection with the transfer of TRI Stock as contemplated hereby and

that such transfer will not conflict with any agreement to which Husband [Arie] is [a] party or by which he is bound.

17. On October 29, 2004, TPR and Arie entered into an agreement ("Letter Agreement") with the Orly and Sagi Trusts. Exhibit 2 is a true copy of the Letter Agreement.

18. By the Letter Agreement, TPR purported to sell to the Orly Trust and the Orly Trust bought 1,102.80 shares of TRI stock.

19. By the Letter Agreement, TPR purported to sell to the Sagi Trust and to Arie and the Sagi Trust and Arie bought 1,102.80 and 794.40 shares of TRI stock, respectively.

20. Neither Arie nor TPR gave the Trump Group written notice of the transfers of TRI stock by TPR provided for the Stipulation Agreement.

21. The Trump Group did not consent to the transfers of TRI stock by TPR provided for the Stipulation Agreement.


22. On August 18, 2010, the Delaware Chancery Court issued a Final Judgment Order in TRI Investors, et. al. v. Arie Genger, Civil Court Action Number 3994-VCS, which held that the October 29, 2004, transfers of TRI stock to the Orly Trust, the Sagi Trust and to Arie violated the TRI Stockholders Agreement and were void because the Trump Group was not given written notice of the transfers and the Orly Trust and the Sagi Trust were non-permitted transferees. Thus, the Court determined that therefore those 3,000 shares of TRI stock were owned by TPR.

23. Arie's failure to cause TPR to validly transfer 1,102.80 shares of TRI Stock to the Orly Trust was a breach of the Stipulation Agreement with Dalia Genger.

24. Arie's failure to cause TPR to validly transfer 1,102.80 shares of TRI Stock to the Orly Trust damaged the Orly Trust in the amount of the value of those shares.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter Judgment against Arie Genger and in favor of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust for the value of 1,102.80 shares of TRI Stock, plus interest from October 29, 2004, and awarding plaintiff her costs and attorneys fees and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

PEDOWITZ & MEISTER, LLP

By:   
Robert A. Meister  
1501 Broadway  
New York, NY 10036  
Attorneys for Plaintiff  
212-403-7330

# Exhibit 9

**FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 09/20/2011**  
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 112

INDEX NO. 651089/2010  
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/20/2011

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK  
COUNTY OF NEW YORK.

ARIE GENGER and ORLY GENGER, in her individual capacity and on behalf of the ORLY GENGER 1993 Trust,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

SAGI GINGER, TPR INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., DALIA GINGER, THE SAGI GENGEBR 1993 TRUST, ROCHELLE FANG, Individually and as Trustee of THE SAGI GINGER 1993 TRUST, GLEN CLOVA INVESTMENT COMPANY, TR INVESTORS, LLC, NEW TR EQUITY I, LLC, NEW TR EQUITY II, LLC, JULES TRUMP, EDDIE TRUMP, MARK HIRSCH, and TRANS-RESOURCES, INC.

Defendants.

INDEX NO. 651089/2010

THIRD AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Arie Genger and Orly Genger, in her individual capacity and on behalf of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust, by their respective attorneys, for their Third Amended and Supplemental Complaint against the defendants in this action allege, on information and belief, as follows:

**I. THE PARTIES**

1. Plaintiff Arie Genger ("Arie") is a resident of the State of Florida, and the father of the Plaintiff Orly Genger ("Orly") and the defendant Sagi Genger ("Sagi").
2. Plaintiff Orly Genger is the adult daughter of Arie Genger and Dalia Genger, and the beneficiary of the Orly Trust, and a resident of the State of New York and is the beneficiary of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust (the "Orly Trust"). She brings this action on behalf of the Orly Trust as the beneficiary of the Orly Trust to protect her interests thereunder.

3. Defendant Sagi Genger ("Sagi") is the estranged adult son of plaintiff Arie Genger and Defendant Dalia Genger, and is a resident of the City, County, and State of New York, and maintains an office at 1211 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10128.

4. Defendant TPR Investment Associates, Inc. ("TPR") is a Delaware Corporation with a principal office located at 1211 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10128.

5. At all relevant times to this Complaint Sagi is the President of defendant TPR and continues to be a controlling member of TPR's Board of Directors.

6. Defendant Dalia Genger ("Dalia") is the mother of Sagi Genger and Orly Genger and the former wife of the Plaintiff Arie Genger, and is a resident of the City, County and State of New York. Dalia is the putative trustee of the Orly Trust and at relevant times to this Complaint is believed to have been a director of TPR.

7. Defendant The Sagi Genger 1993 Trust ("Sagi Trust") is a trust entity, and the beneficiary of the Sagi Trust is Sagi.

8. Defendant Rochelle Fang ("Fang") is the mother-in-law of the Defendant Sagi Genger and was the Trustee of the Sagi Trust during relevant periods in 2008, and is a resident of the City, County and State of New York.

9. Defendant Glenclova Investment Company ("Glenclova") is a Cayman Islands company with a business address in the Bahamas, and an owner of common stock of Trans-Resources, Inc. ("TRP"). On information and belief Glenclova is in turn owned by other offshore companies directly or indirectly controlled by the Trump Parties as defined below.

10. Defendant TR Investors, LLC ("TR Investors") is a New Jersey Limited Liability Company and an owner of common stock of TRI. On information and belief TR Investors is in

turn owned by other off-shore companies directly or indirectly controlled by the Trump Parties as defined below.

11. Together Glenclova and TR Investors are controlled by the Trump Group of South Africa and are collectively referred to herein as the "Trump Group".
12. Defendant New TR Equity I, LLC ("New TR I") is a Delaware Limited Liability Company, controlled by Jules Trump and/or Eddie Trump.
13. Defendant New TR Equity II, LLC ("New TR II") is a Delaware Limited Liability Company, controlled by Jules Trump and/or Eddie Trump.
14. Defendant Jules Trump is a resident of Florida, and an officer and director of Glenclova.
15. Defendant Eddie Trump is a resident of Florida, and an officer and director of Glenclova.
16. Defendant Mark Hirsch is a resident of New York, and an officer and director of Glenclova.
17. The Trump Group, New TR I , New TR II, Jules Trump, Eddie Trump and Mark Hirsch are referred to herein as the "Trump Parties."
18. Defendant Trans-Resources, Inc. ("TRI") is a Delaware Corporation which is doing business in the City, County and State of New York, with its principal place of business located in the City, County and State of New York.
19. The claims set forth in this Complaint arise from the conduct of each of the defendants, or their respective agents and co-conspirators, who committed one or more (i) tortious acts within the state, (ii) tortious acts without New York State causing injury to the

Plaintiffs or their property within New York State, and (iii) breaches of contract or fiduciary duty arising from contractual obligations, transactions and fiduciary obligations performed or to be performed in New York State.

## II. NATURE OF THE CASE

20. In this case, Plaintiffs Arie and Orly, in her individual capacity and on behalf of the Orly Trust, are seeking declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief, as well as additional compensatory damages in an amount yet to be determined arising from, inter alia, the loss of Arie's voting control of TRI and the tortious conduct of the defendants as set forth herein, in connection with the Trump Parties' campaign to take over and dilute the value of plaintiffs' interests in TRI, a company founded by Arie nearly three decades ago, including the defendants' wrongful, concerted efforts to strip Arie of his ownership and control of 52.85% of the shares of TRI's common stock, including the Orly Trust's interest in a portion of this TRI stock, and to oust Arie from his management control of TRI—all in an audacious series of breaches of contractual, fiduciary and legal obligations giving rise to each of the causes of action alleged in this Complaint.

## III. FACTS RELEVANT TO ALL CLAIMS

### A. Background

21. The Plaintiff Arie is the founder and former Chairman of TRI, a private corporation which, through its subsidiaries, is a leading distributor and manufacturer of agricultural fertilizer worldwide.

22. Arie founded TRI in 1985. Until 2001, TRI was wholly-owned by TPR Investment Associates, Inc. ("TPR"), a Genger family corporation established by Arie.

23. Prior to October 30, 2004, TPR was controlled by Plaintiff Arie who owned 51% of TPR stock.

24. Prior to October 30, 2004, Arie maintained majority control of TRI through his 51% majority ownership and control of TPR.

25. The minority 49% interest in TPR, prior to October 30, 2004, was owned by D&K, Ltd. Partnership ("D&K"), also a Genger family company, which was in turn owned by Arie's wife, Dalia, (4%), the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust (48% each).

26. The Sagi and Orly Trusts were established in 1993 by Arie as part of a family estate plan.

27. In 2001, defendants Glenclova and TR Investors became minority shareholders of TRI, acquiring approximately 47.15% of TRI common stock.

28. As a result of the Trump Group acquiring 47.15% of TRI common stock, TPR became the owner of 52.85% of TRI stock with Arie maintaining a 51% controlling interest in TPR. Through his 51% ownership of TPR, Arie maintained control of a majority 52.85% interest in TRI, the company he founded.

29. When the Trump Group became a minority shareholder of TRI, the Trump Group and TPR entered into the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement, dated March 30, 2001 (the "2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement") which, among other things, was intended to ensure that Arie (through his controlling interest in TPR) would continue to control the majority voting rights of TRI shares for the duration of his life.

30. The 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement specifically recognized that Arie was the 51% owner of TPR and that Dalia and the Orly Trust and the Sagi Trust through the D&K Limited Partnership together owned 49% of TPR.

31. The 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement contains certain provisions restricting the transfer of TPR's majority interest in TRI to someone other than Arie during his lifetime, except under certain enumerated conditions intended to ensure that Arie, as the majority shareholder of TPR, would maintain control over 52.85% of TRI shares during his life. The 2001 Stockholders Agreement specifically provides that exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to this 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement shall be in Federal courts or New York State courts sitting in the City, State, and County of New York. The full terms and conditions of the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement are incorporated herein by reference.

**B. The Genger Divorce and Court-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement**

32. In 2002, Dalia and Arie became embroiled in a bitter divorce action venued in the Supreme Court, New York County, entitled *Dalia Genger v. Arie Genger*, Index No. 302436-2002 ("Genger Divorce Action").

33. In October of 2004, Dalia and Arie agreed to a Stipulation of Settlement, which was incorporated into a Judgment of Divorce in the Genger Divorce Action on January 7, 2005 ("Stipulation of Settlement"), attached hereto as Exhibit A. This Court-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, among other things equitably distributed between Arie and Dalia various marital assets, including the ownership interests in the family holding company TPR which then held 52.85% of TRI common stock which was controlled by Arie through his control of TPR. Pursuant to the terms of the Judgment of Divorce, the New York State Supreme Court retained

jurisdiction over the parties with respect to the enforcement of the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement.

34. Pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement and certain 2004 TPR Transaction Documents (described below) implementing the Stipulation of Settlement, it was agreed by and among Arie, Dalia, Sagi, Orly, the Orly Trust, and the Sagi Trust that as part of the settlement of the Genger Divorce Action, that Arie would transfer his 51% interest in the TPR marital asset to Dalia, in consideration of TPR concurrently divesting itself of its 52.85% majority interest in TRI on the following terms and conditions, which were all part of a single integrated transaction:

- i. The defendant Sagi would become the President of TPR;
- ii. TPR, by Sagi as President of TPR, would transfer to the plaintiff Arie direct ownership of 794.40 shares of TRI common stock representing 13.99468% of the common stock of TRI;
- iii. TPR, by Sagi as President of TPR, would transfer to each of the Sagi Trust and Orly Trust, record ownership of 1,102.80 shares (or 19.42766 % each) of TRI stock, subject to and on the further conditions that:
  - (a) the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust would each execute and deliver a 2004 Voting Trust Agreement to Arie which provides further that:
    - (i) the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust would immediately execute and deliver to Arie an irrevocable voting proxy ("Putative Irrevocable Proxies") intended to ensure that Arie would maintain voting control over the Sagi Trust TRI shares and the Orly Trust TRI Shares for the duration of Arie's life, and
    - (ii) in the event that the Putative Irrevocable Proxies granted by the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust to Arie were ever held to be invalid then:
      - (1) a Back-up Voting Trust Agreement would be entered into promptly between each of the Sagi and Orly Trusts and Arie which:

(a) grants Arie the right to vote the Orly Trust and Sagi Trust TRI shares for the duration of Arie's life,

(b) provides that Arie is entitled to keep possession of the Sagi Trust and Orly Trust TRI Shares pursuant to a Voting Trust Agreement in a form attached to the 2004 Voting Trust Agreement, and

(c) provides that the Orly and Sagi Trust TRI shares would not be sold without a prior Court order,

and the 2004 Voting Trust Agreement further provides that:

(2) pending the execution of the Back-up Voting Trust Agreement, the Orly and Sagi Trusts would be obligated to vote the Orly Trust and Sagi Trust Shares as directed by Arie during his lifetime.

*Id.(emphasis added)*

35. The Court-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement in the Genger Divorce Action is attached as Exhibit A hereto.

36. Article II of the Stipulation of Settlement in the Divorce Action, entitled "Distribution of Assets," specifically provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

[2. (a)] "(ii) [Dalia] shall receive . . . sole ownership of the husband's [Arie's] two hundred and fifty (250) shares of common stock of TPR Investment Associates, Inc. ("TPR"), . . . which represents fifty-one percent (51%) of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock of TPR (exclusive of the 1.96% ownership of TPR, which the wife [Dalia] owns indirectly through her general partnership interests in D&K [partnership].

\* \* \*

"9. (a) TPR owns 3,000 shares of stock in Trans-Resources, Inc. ("TRI Stock") . . . Concurrently with the execution of this agreement, the TRI Stock shall be distributed as follows:

"(i) The husband [Arie], shall receive 794.40 shares of the TRI Stock, representing 13.99468% of the common stock of TRI;

(ii) Each of Sagi Genger and Orly Genger, will receive in trust 1,102.80 shares of TRI Stock representing 19.42766% of the common stock of TRI for each of Sagi and Orly, and such trusts will simultaneously therewith execute and deliver irrevocable proxies to the husband for all of the TRI Stock owned by the trusts; and

"(c) Concurrently with the execution of this Agreement, each of the Husband and Wife will execute and deliver or cause TPR to execute and deliver (i) all documents reasonably necessary to effect the transfers required by subparagraph (a) of this Section 9, and (ii) duly executed stock powers to transfer the shares as required by subparagraph (a) of this Section 9.

\* \* \*

"(e) Following the foregoing transfers of the TRI Stock, the wife [Dalia] will have no ownership interest in TRI."

(Stipulation of Settlement, Exhibit A hereto, Article II, paragraph 2(a) (ii), p.5, and paragraph 9 (a), (c) & (e) at pp. 13, 14) (emphasis added).

37. The Stipulation of Settlement also provides that this TPR/TRI transaction was a fundamental part of the Stipulation of Settlement, and specifically states in pertinent part, in bold and capital letter type:

**"A FUNDAMENTAL PART OF THIS AGREEMENT IS THE HUSBAND'S RELINQUISHMENT OF HIS OWNERSHIP OF SHARES OF COMMON STOCK IN TPR, AND THE TRANSFER OF SUCH OWNERSHIP TO THE WIFE."**

Stipulation of Settlement, Exhibit A hereto, Article 3, para. 1.

38. The Stipulation of Settlement also included an express reformation clause which provides that in the event that any term of the Stipulation of Settlement were to be voided by a court of competent jurisdiction for any reason, then either Dalia or Arie would be entitled to seek court-ordered reformation of the Stipulation of Settlement in a New York Court to give effect to

the intent of the parties to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of the State of New York. This reformation clause of the Stipulation of Settlement provides:

**"ARTICLE XVI**  
**POSSIBLE INVALIDITY**

"If any provision of this [Stipulation of Settlement], for any reason whatsoever, be declared . . . unenforceable by any Court of competent jurisdiction . . . the remainder of this Agreement and the application of such provision to any person or situations, other than those as to which such provision may have been invalid or unenforceable shall not be affected thereby and shall continue to be enforced to the fullest extent that such severance of the invalid portions is possible without vitiating the original intent and purposes and economic intentions of the parties (the "Original Intent"), as herein set forth. . . . In the event a provision is superseded under this [Stipulation of Settlement], either party may seek reformation of the affected provision in any court of competent jurisdiction which shall be empowered to revise the provision to reflect the parties' Original Intent to the greatest extent possible, consistent with New York law. It is the intention of the parties hereto that this provision may be enforced in equity in addition to, and not to the exclusion of, any other remedies which may be available to the parties."

(Stipulation of Settlement, ARTICLE XVI, Exhibit A at pages 47-48) (emphasis added)).

39. Dalia was represented by separate, independent legal counsel in connection with the negotiation and her execution of the Stipulation of Settlement.

40. Dalia, through her counsel, received a complete copy of the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement prior to the execution of the Stipulation of Settlement.

41. Sagi had full knowledge of the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement prior to, and at the time that it was negotiated and executed, and was named as a fiduciary with regard to certain marital property distributed or to be distributed under the Stipulation of Settlement.

42. Sagi and his own counsel were provided with a full and complete copy of the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement prior to the execution of the Stipulation of Settlement.

43. Edward Klimmerman, a partner at Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, LLP (now known as SNR Denton), represented Arie in the Genger Divorce Action, had full knowledge of the negotiation and terms of the Stipulation of Settlement at the time the Stipulation of Settlement was executed. Mr. Klimmerman signed the Stipulation of Settlement as a witness. Mr. Klimmerman was also legal counsel for TRI and TPR at the time the Stipulation of Settlement was executed.

44. As counsel for TRI and TPR, Mr. Klimmerman participated in the actual drafting of the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement. As Arie's counsel in the Genger Divorce Action, he did not advise Arie that anything in the Stipulation of Settlement violated any term of the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement between TPR and the Trump Group.

45. Arie reasonably believed that the transfers set forth in the 2004 Transfer Documents and Court-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement were valid and enforceable.

46. Dalia and her legal representatives reasonably believed that the 2004 Transfers provided for in the Stipulation of Settlement were valid and enforceable at the time Dalia entered into the Stipulation of Settlement.

47. Defendant Jules Trump, a representative of the Trump Group was aware of the Genger Divorce Action, and prior to the execution of the Stipulation of Settlement testified as a witness in the Genger Divorce Action in connection with the ownership of TRI shares.

C. The 2004 TPR Transfer of TRI Shares Pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement

48. To implement the TPR and TRI share transfer provisions in the Stipulation of

Settlement, Arie, the Sagi Trust, the Orly Trust and TPR, concurrently with the execution of the Stipulation of Settlement, entered into the following "2004 TPR Transaction Documents" in accordance with the express terms and intent set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement:

(i) a 2004 TPR Agreement to Transfer TRI Shares, dated October 29, 2004 (the "2004 TPR Transfer Agreement", attached hereto as Exhibit B); and

(ii) a 2004 Voting Trust Agreement, dated October 29, 2004 (the "2004 Voting Trust Agreement", attached hereto as Exhibit C), which attached:

(a) Executed Documents referred to as Putative Irrevocable Proxies, dated October 29, 2004, executed by the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust ("Putative Irrevocable Proxies", attached hereto as Exhibit D) which by their specific terms purported to grant to the Plaintiff Arie the right to control and vote the Sagi Trust TRI shares and the Orly Trust TRI shares for the duration of his life, and

(b) a form Back-up Voting Trust Agreements ("Back up Voting Trust Agreements", attached here to Exhibit E), which were to be executed promptly by the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust in the event that the Putative Irrevocable Proxies granted by the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust to Arie were ever held to be invalid, and provided that:

(i) the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust were required to vote the TRI shares in accordance with Arie's directions pending the execution of the Back-up Voting Trust Agreements in accordance with the express intent in the Stipulation of Settlement that Arie was to maintain voting control of the Sagi Trust and Orly Trust TRI shares for the duration of his life;

(ii) Arie would be entitled to keep possession of the Sagi Trust and Orly Trust TRI Shares pursuant to a Voting Trust Agreement in the form attached to the 2004 Voting Trust Agreement; and

(iii) the Orly and Sagi Trust TRI shares would not be sold without a prior Court Order.

49. Each of the 2004 Transaction Documents confirm the stated intention of the parties to the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 Transaction Documents that Arie, for the duration of his life, would continue to have voting control over 52.85% of the outstanding shares of TRI that were previously owned by TPR and controlled in turn by Arie through his 51% ownership of TPR.

D. The 2004 TPR Transfer Agreement-Exhibit B

50. The 2004 Transfer Agreement executed by Sagi himself on behalf of TPR, provides :

"This letter will set forth our agreement pursuant to which you will purchase the 3,000 shares of common stock ("the Shares") of Trans-Resources, Inc. ("TRI") owned by TPR Investment Associates, Inc. ("TPR"). TPR hereby sells, transfers and conveys the Shares to you as follows:

- (i) 794.40 shares to Arie Genger;
- (ii) 1,102.80 Shares to the Sagi Genger 1993 Trust, and
- (iii) 1,102.80 Shares to the Orly Genger 1993 Trust.

\* \* \*

"The Shares represent 52.85% of the issued and outstanding shares of TRI. The Shares are being transferred hereunder free and clear of any liens, claims or encumbrances and such transfer does not violate the Certificate of Incorporation of TPR or any agreement to which TPR is subject.

"The trustees of the Sagi Genger 1993 Trust and of the Orly Genger 1993 Trust ("Trusts") have agreed to execute on behalf of the Trusts (i) an Irrevocable Proxy to appoint Arie Genger to vote the Shares owned by the Trusts and (ii) a voting trust letter agreement, copies of which are annexed hereto."

"In case, at any time hereinafter, any further action is necessary or desirable to carry out the purposes of this Letter Agreement, each of the parties hereto shall take or cause to be taken all necessary action, including, without limitation, the execution and delivery of such further instruments and documents which may be reasonably requested by any party for such purpose or otherwise to complete or perfect the transactions contemplated hereby."

This Letter Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflicts of law principles.

(2004 TPR Transfer Agreement, Exhibit B) (emphasis added)

E. The 2004 Voting Trust Agreements (Exhibit C hereto)

51. In accordance with the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement (Exhibit A) and the 2004 TPR Transfer Agreement (Exhibit B), Arie and the Sagi and Orly Trusts, respectively, entered into identical 2004 Voting Trust Letter Agreements in favor of Arie (Exhibit C) which provide as follows:

"In connection with the transfer to the [Sagi and Orly Trusts] of 1,102.80 shares [each] of common stock (the "Shares") of Trans-Resources, Inc. (TRI) pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Stipulation of Settlement of even date herewith, the [Sagi and Orly] trust is [each] granting to Arie Genger an irrevocable proxy ("the Proxy") for the shares, a copy of which is annexed hereto.

(Exhibit C)(emphasis added).

F. The 2004 Putative Irrevocable Proxies Executed By The Sagi and Orly Trusts (Exhibit D, hereto)

52. In accordance with the 2004 TPR Transfer Agreement, the Stipulation of Settlement, and the 2004 Voting Trust Agreement, the Sagi and Orly Trusts executed two identical Putative Irrevocable Proxies, each of which states, in relevant part, that:

"[The Sagi Trust and Orly Trust, each respectively], ("the Trust") being the current record and beneficial owner of 1,102.80 shares of common stock of [TRI] does hereby constitute and appoint Arie

Genger, Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer, and owner of approximately fourteen percent (14%) of the shares of common stock of TRI to vote as its proxy, all shares of common stock of TRI which are now or hereafter owned by the Trust, at any and all meetings of the stockholders of TRI, regular or special, or by consent in lieu of meeting or any adjournments thereof in the same manner and to the same extent that the Trust might were the Trust present at said meeting (or executing such consent), upon any issue or proposal which may be brought before such meeting or by such consent.

"This Irrevocable Proxy shall be deemed coupled with an interest and be irrevocable from the date hereof, and shall continue for the duration of Arie Genger's life."

(Exhibit D)(emphasis added).

53. The 2004 Voting Trust Agreement further provides that in the event that the Putative Irrevocable Proxies were ever declared invalid, the Orly and Sagi Trusts would be obligated to enter into a Back-up Voting Trust Agreement (Exhibit E) to assure that Arie would maintain voting control over a majority of TRI shares for the duration of his life. This part of the 2004 Voting Trust Agreement, executed by the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust, provides:

"In the event that for any reason the Proxy is declared invalid and is no longer in effect, the Trust agrees, as promptly as practicable, to enter into a Voting Trust Agreement (the "Voting Agreement") with Arie Genger as the voting trustee, which shall be substantially in the form annexed hereto.

During the time the Proxy is not in effect and prior to the time the Voting Agreement is entered into, the Sagi Trust agrees to vote the shares as directed in writing by Arie Genger."

(2004 Voting Trust Agreement, Exhibit C.) (emphasis added).

G. Back-Up Voting Trust Agreement - (Exhibit E hereto)

54. The Backup Voting Trust Agreement, which springs into effect upon the Putative Irrevocable Proxies being voided, provides:

"The Trust Securities [the Sagi and Orly TRI Shares subject to the Voting Trust] shall be held by the Trustee [Arie Genger] for the purposes of and in accordance with this Agreement and none of the Trust Securities shall be sold or otherwise disposed of by the Trustee except as herein expressly provided or in accordance with a final order of any Court or administrative agency with jurisdiction thereover."

\* \* \*

"This Agreement shall continue in effect for the duration of Arie Genger's Life"

Exhibit E. (emphasis added)

55. In order to ensure that he maintained absolute control of the TRI shares for the duration of his life, Arie never delivered physical copies of TPR's TRI shares to the Orly or Sagi Trusts.

H. The Intent of the Parties

56. The written 2004 Transaction Documents and the Stipulation of Settlement reflect the stated intention of all the parties to these collective documents, to wit, that in order to resolve the contested Genger Divorce Action, Arie agreed as part of the distribution of marital assets to transfer his 51% interest in the family holding company, TPR, to Dalia, in exchange for Dalia agreeing that TPR would concurrently divest itself of its 52.85% interest in the common stock of TRI by distributing TPR's 52.85% majority interest in TRI to Arie (14%), the Sagi Trust (19.425%), and the Orly Trust (19.425%) each, on the express further condition that Arie maintain voting rights for the Sagi Trust and Orly Trust TRI shares for the duration of his life.

57. Arie, Dalia, Sagi and Orly each reasonably believed that the 2004 Transfers provided for in the Stipulation of Settlement were valid and enforceable.

58. Arie, Dalia, Sagi and Orly each reasonably believed that the Putative Irrevocable Proxies and Voting Trust Agreements were valid and assured that Arie would be able to maintain 58.85% voting control for the duration of his life.

59. Accordingly, the concurrently executed integrated 2004 Transfer Documents were intended to implement the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement which provided expressly that Arie was to retain his 52.85% voting control over TRI and concomitantly continue to control the management and Board of TRI during his lifetime.

60. It was also the parties' stated intention, and all parties reasonably believed, that the terms of the court-ordered Stipulation of Settlement with Dalia would not violate the terms or intent of the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement because Arie would still control what had been TPR's voting majority of TRI shares.

61. The Genger Divorce Action was not concealed from TRI, the Trump Group, or the Trump Parties at any time.

62. The 2004 transfers of TRI shares to Arie, the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust were reflected in the books and records of TRI.

63. Prior to 2008, Jules Trump, and Mark Hirsch, each individually and on behalf of the Trump Group between 2004 and 2008 had access to the books and records of TRI.

64. Between 2004 and 2008, as a Director of TRI, Jules Trump and Mark Hirsch, each had a fiduciary duty and legal duty of reasonable care to the record and beneficial owners, including TPR and TRI, to know the identity of all TRI shareholders of record as set forth in the books and records of TRI- a close corporation.

65. As a Directors of TRI, Jules Trump, and Mark Hirsch, each individually and on behalf of TRI, had a fiduciary and legal duty of reasonable care to TPR and Arie to read all corporate Board minutes and other documents presented to the Directors and/or shareholders of TRI, in their entirety, prior to signing such documents.

66. Prior to 2008, the books and records of TRI show that:

- (i) Arie was record owner of 794.40 shares of TRI, representing 13.9946% of the common stock of TRI;
- (ii) the Sagi Trust was the record owner of 1102.80 TRI shares, representing 19.42766% of the common stock of TRI; and
- (iii) the Orly Trust was the record owner of 1102.80 TRI shares, representing 19.42766% of the common stock of TRI.

67. Prior to 2008, the 2004 Transfers and the record ownership of TRI shares was known by:

- (i) the officers and directors of TRI, in addition to Arie
- (ii) TRI's legal counsel; and
- (iii) TRI's Certified Public Accountant.

68. Jules Trump, and Mark Hirsch, each individually and on behalf of the Trump Group executed corporate TRI documents as Director and/or on behalf of a shareholder of TRI which indicated that Arie, the Orly Trust and the Sagi Trust were the record owners of TRI shares.

69. The terms of the Stipulation of Settlement relating to the distribution of TPR and TRI shares as marital assets in connection with the Genger Divorce Action were not in any way or at any time concealed from TRI, the Trump Group, or the Trump Parties.

70. Prior to 2008, the Trump Group, through Jules Trump, who testified in the Genger Divorce Action, and otherwise knew, and was aware that the Genger Divorce Action could involve in some way the equitable distribution of TPR shares owned by Arie as part of the divorce action.

71. Prior to 2008, the Trump Group, through Jules Trump, who testified in the Genger Divorce Action, knew, and was aware that the Genger Divorce Action involved in some way the value of TPR's ownership of TRI shares.

72. Prior to 2008, the Trump Group, through Jules Trump, who testified in the Genger Divorce Action, knew, and was aware that the Genger Divorce Action involved in some way Arie's management and control over TRI, the company that he had founded and managed since 1985.

73. Prior to 2008, Jules Trump knew that ownership of TPR, as a marital asset which owned 52.85% of TRI shares, was a major asset and was the subject of a claim by Dalia for equitable distribution in the Genger Divorce Action.

74. Prior to 2008, the Trump Group, through Jules Trump, who testified in the Genger Divorce Action, knew, and was aware that the Genger Divorce Action would involve in some way the equitable distribution of TPR assets, including Arie's 51% majority ownership of TPR.

75. Prior to 2008, the Trump Group, through Jules Trump who testified in the Genger Divorce Action, and otherwise knew, and was aware that the Genger Divorce Action could

involve D&K Limited Partnership, which was identified in the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement as an owner of 49% of TPR (the majority Shareholder of TRI) and further disclosed that in turn this 49% minority ownership of TPR by D&K was owned by Arie's wife Dalia (4%) the Sagi Trust (48%) and the Orly Trust (48%), and that these Trust interests could be effected by the equitable distribution of TPR assets as part of the Genger Divorce Action.

76. The Trump Group knew that the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement did not contain an express provision setting forth the rights and obligations of TPR, Arie or the Trump Group in the event of a contested divorce involving Arie's ownership of TPR shares as marital property, including TPR's ownership of TRI shares under New York's equitable distribution laws or otherwise.

77. Prior to 2008, Arie had reason to believe that The Trump Group, through Jules Trump, and otherwise, had notice of the 2004 Transfers.

78. Prior to 2008, Arie had reason to believe that The Trump Group had notice of the 2004 Transfers which were reflected in TRI corporate documents.

79. Prior to 2008, the Trump Group and Jules Trump, in particular, had knowledge of facts in 2002-2004 including, but not limited, to the fact that Arie was involved in a bitter contested divorce, and that the issue of Arie's ownership interests in TRI, through TPR or otherwise, was an issue raised in the Genger Divorce Action.

80. Between 2004 and 2008, Directors of TRI, its legal counsel, Secretary, as well as its Controller, knew of the 2004 transfers.

81. Between 2004 and 2008, TRI, under Arie's management, reported the new company ownership resulting from the 2004 transfers to its lead bank, the IRS, and TRI's insurance company.

82. Between October 2004 and August of 2008 nothing prevented the Trump Group, Jules Trump, TRI or its officers or directors, or any of them, from making any inquiry whatsoever of Arie, Orly, TPR, TRI, TRI's general counsel, Dalia, Sagi, the Sagi Trust, the Orly Trust, or D&K, concerning the effect, if any, that the Genger Divorce Action, or any judgment or resolution of the Genger Divorce Action had, would or could have, on (i) the ownership of TPR, (ii) Arie's ownership of a majority interest of TPR, (iii) TPR's ownership of TRI, (iv) Dalia's interest in D&K minority ownership of TRI, or the rights of the Sagi Trust or the Orly Trust as limited partners of D&K which owned approximately 49% each of TPR -- which ownership was acknowledged by the Trump Group in the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement.

83. Between October 2004 and August of 2008 nothing prevented the Trump Group, Jules Trump, TRI or its officers or directors, or any of them, from making any inquiry whatsoever of Arie, Orly, TPR, TRI, TRI's general counsel, Dalia, Sagi, the Sagi Trust, the Orly Trust, or D&K as to the identity of the record owners of TRI.

84. Jules Trump, Eddie Trump and Mark Hirsch (an attorney) at all times relevant to this complaint were sophisticated business individuals, with special expertise in corporate governance and ownership.

85. At all times relevant to this action the Trump Parties had access to independent legal counsel.

86. Prior to 2008, the Trump Group, by Jules Trump, and otherwise, acted with willful blindness and indifference to facts which put The Trump Group on notice of (i) the 2004 Transfers, and (ii) that Arie, the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust were record owners of their respective TRI shares.

87. The Trump Group, by Jules Trump, and otherwise, waived any objection to the 2004 Transfers.

88. Between 2004 and 2008, under Arie's management, TRI's business performance improved consistently without any complaint or objection by TRI's Board of Directors including but not limited to representatives of the Trump Group.

I. The Trump Parties' 2008 Scheme and Conspiracy to Seize Majority Control of TRI, Squeeze Out Arie as an Officer, Director and Shareholder of TRI and Dilute the Value of Arie's, Orly's and the Orly Trust's Interests in the Affected TRI Shares

89. There was no hint of any substantial disagreement between Arie and the Trump Group relating to the Genger Divorce Action, or otherwise, until June of 2008, when TRI's value increased substantially as a result of improved performance.

90. In the early Spring of 2008, TRI was facing a threat of foreclosure of one of its major operating units by Bank Hapoalim, a long-time lender of TRI.

91. To address this foreclosure threat, Arie and the Trump Group explored the possibility of a sale of assets and restructuring plan involving the spin-off of all of TRI's North American assets to a separate entity and a capital loan by the Trump Group into a residual TRI to retire the Bank Hapoalim debt in exchange for increasing the equity position of the Trump Group in the restructured TRI so that the Trump Group would obtain a majority position (the "Funding Plan").

92. Had the Funding Plan been implemented, in return for providing funding Jules and Eddie Trump through TR-I and TR-II would, for the first time, have been permitted to obtain a direct ownership interest in TRI, and the Trump Parties, under the Funding Plan, would have obtained majority control over TRI, the company that Arie had founded and worked so hard to make succeed.

93. TRI's legal counsel advised that it would be necessary for a special committee of the Board to be constituted in order for the Board to approve the Funding Plan without the vote of Jules Trump who was an interested Director with a conflict of interest.

94. Despite requests from Arie to constitute such a committee, the Trump Group Directors failed to agree to the appointment of such committee.

95. The Board of TRI never constituted a special committee in order for the Board to approve the Funding Plan.

96. The implementation of the Funding Plan was also subject to other conditions relating to the value of the transaction which conditions were never met.

97. While the proposed Funding Plan was being worked on, the financial condition of TRI began to improve substantially. By late June 2004, TRI was generating positive cash flow of \$15-20 million per month. This represented a dramatic improvement in TRI's earnings within a matter of months in 2004, and rendered the Funding Plan unnecessary.

98. As a result, there was no longer a need for TRI or Arie to move forward with the Trump Group Funding Plan that would have given the Trump Parties' majority control of TRI.

99. To proceed with the Funding Agreement would have diluted the shares of existing shareholders and cause TRI to pay the Trump Group unreasonable fees for a loan that was not needed.

100. Based on the advice of TRI's Delaware corporate counsel concerning the establishment of an independent committee of the Board to approve the Funding Plan, which the Trump Group refused to empanel, and the fact such a Funding Plan was no longer necessary because of improved performance of TRI which permitted the satisfaction of the Bank Hapoalim loan, the Funding Plan was rejected and the Bank Hapoalim loan satisfied with TRI's own substantially improved earnings without the need for funding from the Trump Parties or any other third-party.

101. On information and belief, the Bank Haopolim's threat of foreclosure and the Funding Plan takeover proposed by the Trump Group were also engineered by Jules Trump, individually, and on behalf of the Trump Group with the aid, assistance and further illegal conduct of the Trump Group and a principal officer of Bank Haopolim with whom the Trump Group had other business entanglements.

102. Thwarted in their effort to take over the controlling interest in TRI through the rejected Funding Plan, the Trump Group, Mark Hirsch, Eddie Trump, and Jules Trump formulated a further illegal scheme and plan to take over the then very profitable TRI, and oust Arie as its CEO, and steal the Genger family TRI shares at a fraction of their value.

103. In furtherance of this plan, the Trump Group leveled an extortionate threat at Arie demanding that unless Arie agreed to turn over majority control of TRI to the Trump Group pursuant to the Funding Plan (which was no longer necessary ), the Trump Group would declare

that the 2004 TPR transfers of TRI shares to Arie, the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust under the Stipulation of Settlement were void under the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement even though Arie as a permitted Transferee held 14% of TRI outright, and had received a Voting Trust Agreement and Putative Irrevocable Proxies from the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust which, on their face, gave Arie the right during his lifetime to control the management of TRI, and vote the same 52.85% shares of TRI stock that had been controlled by Arie through his 51% ownership of TPR prior to the Stipulation of Settlement and the execution of the 2004 Transfer Documents. Thus, there was virtually no effective difference in Arie's control of TRI Shares as between his majority control of TPR prior to the execution of the Stipulation of Settlement, and the intended control that Arie would exercise after the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 Transfer Documents were executed.

104. At the time they made this threat in 2008, the Trump Parties, among other things, knew that:

- (i) the intent of the parties pursuant to the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement in restricting certain transfers to Genger family members was to ensure that (a) Arie, personally, would continue to have management and majority shareholder voting control over TPR's TRI shares for the duration of his life, and (b) prevent any other Genger family member from having any management or voting control over TRI during Arie's lifetime;
- (ii) pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement and the 2004 TPR-TRI Transfer Documents Arie, Dalia, Orly and Sagi, specifically intended to preserve Arie's management and voting control of TRI, in the context of resolving the equitable distribution of marital property issues concerning TPR raised in the Genger Divorce Action;

(iii) that as a condition for Arie transferring his 51% interest in TPR to Dalia in the Genger Divorce Action, it was intended that pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 Transaction Documents Arie would receive valid Putative Irrevocable Proxies and Back-up Voting Trust Agreements from the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust designed to ensure that Arie would retain voting control over a majority of TRI shares for the duration of his life even if the Putative Irrevocable Proxies were held to be invalid; and

(iv) that if the 2004 TPR transfer of TRI shares were voided, as threatened by the Trump Group, then:

(a) 52.85% of TRI shares would revert to TPR, which would be unjustly enriched because TPR, under the Stipulation of Settlement and implementing 2004 Transaction Documents, had already divested itself of those TRI shares in consideration of Arie relinquishing his 51% ownership of TPR to Dalia;

(b) that Arie would be the beneficial owners of such 3000 TRI Shares, and Arie would have the right to vote the 52.85% of TRI shares that were returned to TPR, subject to the Orly and Sagi Trust rights to receive certain of these shares upon Arie's death;

(c) Sagi was not authorized to act on behalf of TPR to sell any of the TRI shares without the consent of Arie as the beneficial owner of the Arie TRI Shares, and the beneficial holder of the voting rights to TPR's TRI Shares;

(d) Arie would be entitled to reform the Stipulation of Settlement, pursuant to the express terms of the Stipulation of Settlement, so that Arie would regain control of 51% of TPR's ownership and control of 52.85% of TRI's shares;

(c) that the New York Supreme Court under the Judgment of Divorce, had retained jurisdiction over Arie and Dalia in connection with enforcing the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement, including Arie's reformation claims; and

(f) TPR, under Sagi's control, was not authorized to sell TRI shares to the Trump Group without the consent of Arie, as beneficial owner of TPR's record ownership of the TRI shares, in the event the 2004 Transfers were held to be invalid;

(v) that if the Putative Irrevocable Proxies (Exhibit D) were held to be invalid, that the Sagi and Orly Trust shares would be subject to the Back-Up Voting Trust Agreement (Exhibit E) which was referred to in the 2004 Voting Trust Agreement (Exhibit C).

105. Nevertheless, on August 8, 2008, the Trump Group, in furtherance of their plan to pressure Arie and take over a majority control of TRI, sent a letter to TPR asserting that it had the right under Section 3.2 of the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement to purchase all of the TRI shares that were the subject of the Stipulation of Settlement transfers in 2004, at 2004 prices – a small fraction of what is believed to have been a TRI value in excess of \$1 billion in 2008, which had net after-tax income in excess of \$150 million in that year. The Trump Group provided no such letter or notice to Orly or the Orly Trust or the Sagi Trust.

106. Three days later, on August 11, 2008, the Trump Parties, through Glenelova, commenced an action in the Federal District Court of the Southern District of New York against TPR (the "Federal Action") claiming that the transfer of the TRI shares by TPR to Arie Genger, the Orly Trust and the Sagi Trust pursuant to the express terms of the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 Transaction Documents, was void.

107. Notwithstanding the Trump Parties' respective specific knowledge in 2008 of the existence and terms of the Court-ordered Stipulation of Settlement and the 2004 TPR Transfer Documents, the Trump Group did not name Arie, Dalia, the Sagi Trust or the Orly Trust as parties in the Federal Action.

108. The Trump Parties knew at the time they commenced the Federal Action that Arie was a known third party beneficiary under the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement and that the 2004 Transfers were approved in a Court-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement in the Genger Divorce Action, but nevertheless opposed Arie's motion to intervene in the Federal Action.

109. The Trump Parties also knew that Sagi, as a result of the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 TPR Transfer Documents, became the president of TPR, but that he had since become estranged from his father, and that Sagi had installed his mother-in-law Rochelle Fang as the nominal trustee of the Sagi Trust and that he exercised total dominion and control over her.

110. The Trump Parties also knew that if the 2004 TPR transfers of TRI shares to Arie, the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust pursuant to the "So-Ordered" Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 Transfer Documents were voided, that Arie's transfer of his 51% ownership in TPR to Dalia would also have to be voided, and that as a consequence Dalia, or Sagi as her successor-in-interest, as a matter of New York law, would have to hold this 51% TPR interest in a constructive trust for the benefit of Arie with respect to TPR's ownership of the TRI Shares.

111. The Trump Parties knew that neither TPR, nor Sagi as its President, would be authorized to sell any of TPR's shares of TRI to the Trump Group in the event that the 2004 TPR Transfers of TRI Shares to Arie, the Sagi Trust or the Orly Trust were voided because in that

event those TRI shares would be returned to TPR subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of Arie.

112. Prior to August 22, 2008, the Trump Group also knew that in the event that the 2004 transfers by TPR of TRI Shares to Arie, the Sagi Trust or the Orly Trust were voided, Sagi, as the President of TPR, also owed a separate fiduciary duty to Arie and the Orly Trust with respect to the 3000 TRI shares that would revert to TPR.

113. TPR and Sagi each had a fiduciary and contractual duty to Arie to hold any TRI shares that reverted to TPR in a constructive trust for their respective benefits as the beneficial owner of such shares, and also owed a fiduciary duty to Orly and the Orly Trust with respect to her interest in a portion of these shares.

114. Nevertheless, in August, 2008, the Trump Group met, conspired and schemed with Sagi and/or his representatives to contrive a plan to offer Sagi approximately \$26.7 million to induce Sagi to cause the Sagi Trust, through his mother-in-law Pang, to transfer to the Trump Parties the Sagi Trust's 19.425% of TRI shares that the Sagi Trust received pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 TPR Transaction Documents. This \$26.7 million payment was a fraction of the value of those shares at that time given the performance of TRI which, in 2008 had after tax earnings of \$150,000,000 of sales of approximately \$1 billion.

115. As part of this conspiracy and scheme, the purchase of the Sagi Trust Shares was to be conditioned on Sagi, purportedly as the President of TPR, further agreeing that if the Court in the Federal Action, or any other court, held that the 2004 TPR Transactions were void, then TPR would be "deemed" the Seller of the Sagi Shares, even though the Sagi Trust could keep the \$26.7 million, and even though TPR had no right or authority to sell the Arie, the Sagi Trust and

Orly Trust Shares without the consent of Arie as beneficial owners of these respective shares, subject to Orly's interest to receive the Orly Trust TRI Shares upon Arie's death, and Arie's beneficial interest in the voting rights for the Sagi Trust, Orly Trust and Arie TRI Shares.

116. The Trump Group defendants knew that if the \$26.7 million purported purchase price of the Sagi Trust Shares was paid to the Sagi Trust that the money would need to be returned to TPR.

117. The Trump Group defendants knew that Sagi, on behalf of TPR was not authorized to sell the Sagi Trust Shares, in the event the 2004 Transfers were declared invalid.

118. The Trump Group defendants never sought or received a representation by TPR or Sagi that Sagi, on behalf of TPR was authorized to sell any TRI Shares to the Trump Group.

119. The Trump Group defendants knew that Sagi on behalf of TPR was not authorized to sell any of TPR's TRI shares to the Trump Group in the event that the 2004 Shares reverted to TPR that Sagi and TPR had a fiduciary and contractual duty to protect Arie's control over the 52.85% of TRI Shares for the duration of his life.

120. The Trump Group did not obtain a representation from Sagi or TPR as to whether any sale by the Sagi Trust or TPR would be subject to Arie's right to vote those Shares for the duration of his life in accordance with the terms of the Court-ordered Stipulation of Settlement and the 2004 Transaction Documents.

121. As part of this conspiracy and scheme the Trump Parties also required that in order for Sagi to get the \$26.7 million put in his Trust, Sagi purportedly as the President of TPR would have to further agree in a "side letter" that if the Court in the Federal Action, or any other court, held that the 2004 TPR Transactions were void, then TPR would also agree to sell the 14%

Arie TRI shares and the 19.425% Orly Trust Shares, which TPR had already sold to Arie and the Orly Trust pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement and the 2004 Transaction Documents, to the Trump Parties at a price that was 60% less than the price per share to be paid to the Sagi Trust. Again, Sagi had no authority to make this sale on behalf of TPR.

122. As part of the same conspiracy and scheme, the Trump Parties also insisted that neither the Sagi Trust nor TPR take any action to protect the voting rights of Arie that were granted to Arie by the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust under the 2004 Voting Trust Agreements in accordance with the 2004 TPR Transfer Agreement.

123. To induce Sagi to sell the Sagi Trust Shares to the Trump Parties, the Trump Group proposed a scheme and conspiracy that the Trump Parties knew would require Sagi to use his position as President of TPR to obtain a personal benefit by having \$26.7 million paid to his Sagi Trust, while selling out Arie's and the Orly Trust's TRI shares for a fraction of their real value in an obvious breach of Sagi's fiduciary and contractual duties to Arie and the Orly Trust, which breaches of duty arose from, among other things, (i) Sagi's self-dealing transactions as an officer of TPR to get \$26.7 million from the Trump Group for his Sagi Trust shares while at the same time and at the expense of Arie and the Orly Trust agreeing to sell their TRI shares at a price per share that was 60% lower than the deal Sagi was making for himself through the sale of the Sagi Trust shares to the Trump Parties; (ii) ignoring Arie's and the Orly Trust's beneficial interest in the value of TPR's ownership of specific TRI stock that TPR had already transferred to Arie and the Orly Trust for valuable consideration pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement and the 2004 TPR Transaction documents; (iii) inducing Fang as the Trustee of the Sagi Trust to violate the 2004 Voting Trust Agreement with Arie; (iv) inducing the trustees of the Orly Trust

to violate their fiduciary obligations to the Orly Trust and Orly; (v) failing to protect Arie's voting rights to 52.85% of TRI shares in accordance with the express intent and provisions of the Stipulation of Settlement and the 2004 Transaction Documents; (vi) disposing of and substantially devaluing the asset value of TPR's ownership of TRI shares, with knowledge that such shares would be subject to Arie's claims for imposing a constructive trust on such shares, reformation and/or rescission under the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement with respect to restoring Arie's rights to a 51 % ownership of TPR insofar as TPR's ownership of TRI shares was concerned; (vii) failing to disclose to Arie, Orly, or the Orly Trust the terms of the Trump Parties' proposed scheme and plan to purchase the same TRI shares that TPR previously sold to Arie and the Orly Trust under the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 TPR Transfer Agreement, (viii) failing to take all actions necessary to comply with the stated intentions of the parties to the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 Transaction Documents, and (ix) entering a self-interested, unauthorized, ultra-vires agreement, ostensibly on behalf of TPR but in reality using his position as President of TPR for his own personal gain to the detriment of Arie's and the Orly Trust's legal and equitable interests in TPR's ownership of the TRI shares that were transferred to each of them by TPR four years earlier, pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 Transaction Documents.

124. In furtherance of this scheme and conspiracy, the Trump Parties, the Sagi Trust, by Rochelle Fang, and Sagi, purportedly on behalf of TPR, executed a 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement with the Sagi Trust without the knowledge or consent of Arie or the Orly Trust, to sell the 1102.80 Sagi Trust Shares of TRI common stock representing 19.425% of the shares of

stock to the Trump Group and two new entities – TR I and TR II – for \$26,715,416.00. ("2008 Stock Purchase Agreement", attached hereto as Exhibit F).

125. When combined with the Trump Parties' minority share of 47.15 %, this Sagi Trust sale would give the Trump Parties a 66.575% majority and controlling voting interest in TRI, in direct derogation of the intent of the Court-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement and the Putative Irrevocable Proxies and 2004 Voting Trust Letter Agreement.

126. The Trump Parties acknowledged the existence of the Putative Irrevocable Proxies and 2004 Voting Trust Letter Agreement in the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement, representing and warranting that:

"Such Purchaser hereby acknowledges receipt of copies of the irrevocable proxy dated as of October 29, 2004, issued by Seller ("Sagi Trust") in favor of Arie Genger with respect to the shares (the "Proxy"), a backup form of voting trust agreement and voting trust certificate delivered in connection with the Proxy and the Letter Agreement dated October 29, 2004 [2004 Voting Trust Letter Agreement] with respect to the transfer of shares from TPR to Seller"

127. The 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement also states that if the 2004 transfer of TRI shares by TPR to the Sagi Trust were determined to be void and the shares returned to TPR then TPR would be deemed the seller of the Sagi Trust Shares to the Trump Parties for \$26.7 million, even though this \$26.7 million would have already been paid to the Sagi Trust controlled by Sagi through his mother-in-law Fang. There was no provision with respect to the reallocation of the sales proceeds to TPR.

128. The 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement violated the terms of the 2001 Stockholders Agreement, including, but not limited to, Section 3.2 of that Agreement.

129. By entering into the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement, the Trump Group voluntarily and intentionally waived any right to purchase the Sagi Trust Shares under the 2001 Stockholders Agreement.

130. Also through its intentional conduct, including its violation of the 2001 Stockholders Agreement, the Trump Group is estopped from utilizing any purported right to purchase under the 2001 Stockholders Agreement.

131. In addition, Sagi, ostensibly acting for TPR, but without authority and in violation of his contractual, legal and fiduciary duties owed to Arie and Orly, signed a side letter on the very same day as the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement that provides that if the 2004 transfer by TPR of TRI Shares to Arie and the Orly Trust under the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 Transaction Documents were declared void, then Sagi, purportedly on behalf of TPR, would transfer the Arie Shares and Orly Trust Shares to the Trump Parties at a price per share 60% per share lower than the Sagi Trust was to receive under the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement, which would then be deemed a sale by TPR ("2008 Stock Purchase Side Letter Agreement", attached hereto as Exhibit G).

132. The terms of both the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement and the Side Letter violated the 2001 Stockholders Agreement, including, but not limited to Section 3.2 of the 2001 Stockholders Agreement.

133. The Trump Group defendants waived, and are estopped from asserting, any right under the 2001 Stockholders Agreement to purchase the Arie and Orly Trust TRI Shares from TPR.

134. Neither Arie on behalf of TRI or the Board of Directors of TRI approved the transaction set forth in the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement and Side Letter.

135. This Side Letter was not only an insidious requirement mandated by the Trump Parties to get a majority interest in TRI for the first time, but was tantamount to a \$26.7 million bribe offered by the Trump Parties to Sagi, the estranged son of Arie, to betray his father and rob his sister of the true value of their respective legal and equitable interests in the TRI stock previously owned by TPR in order for the Trump Group to completely squeeze out Arie and the Orly Trust at unconscionably low prices.

136. At the time the Trump Parties, TR-I and TR II, the Sagi Trust and Sagi purportedly on behalf of TPR, executed the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement, the Trump Parties also knew that if the 2004 transactions were voided, TPR, Sagi, the Sagi Trust and the Trump Parties would all be unjustly enriched by the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement and Side Letter.

137. The Trump Parties also knew that if the 2004 TPR Transfers of TRI shares to Arie, the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust were voided, that these TRI shares recovered by TPR would be the subject of a constructive trust established for the benefit of Arie, the Orly Trust and the Sagi Trust.

138. The Trump Parties, Sagi, and the Sagi Trust knew that Sagi, as an officer and director of TPR, owed a fiduciary duty to Arie, the Orly Trust, and the Sagi Trust, not to devalue or alienate Arie's and the Orly Trust's beneficial ownership of TPR insofar as TPR's ownership of the TRI shares was concerned, and not to strip Arie of his voting rights with respect to these TRI Shares.

139. The Trump Parties, Sagi and the Sagi Trust knew at the time they executed the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement that pursuant to the Court-Ordered Stipulation of Settlement, Arie had a contractual right to seek to reform the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement in order to give full effect to the intent of the parties with respect to his relinquishment of control in TPR in exchange for Arie's continuing control of 52.85% of TRI shares and outright ownership of 14% of TRI's stock, as a permitted transferee.

140. The Trump Parties, Sagi, and the Sagi Trust knew at the time they executed the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement and Side Letter that Arie was entitled to rescission for failure of consideration of that part of the Stipulation of Settlement that transferred his 51% of TPR to Dalia, in exchange for Dalia's agreement to have TPR concurrently transfer 14% of TRI's shares to Arie outright, and that Arie would maintain voting control, or 52.85% of TRI for the duration of his life.

141. In connection with the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement and in furtherance of the plan and scheme to wrest control of TRI from Arie's control, the Trump Parties aided and abetted the preparation of a sworn affidavit swearing that the Sagi Trust shares had been lost, when the Trump Parties knew that was not a true statement.

J. The Trump Parties Declare Themselves The Majority Owners Of TRI, and Commence An Action In The Delaware Chancery Court To Determine The Composition of TRI's Board of Directors

142. On August 25, 2008, only three days after the 2008 Stock Purchase Agreement and 2008 Stock Purchase Side Letter Agreement were executed, the Trump Group asserted that it was in control of TRI through the acquisition of 1102.80 shares that were purportedly transferred to them by the Sagi Trust.

143. On August 25, 2008, the Trump Parties commenced a Chancery Court in rem summary proceeding in the State of Delaware pursuant to 8 Del.C § 225(a) to determine the composition of the Board of Directors of TRI ("The Delaware Action") and to declare, *inter alia* that:

- i. the Trump Parties are the majority shareholders of TRI and have the right to vote all of its shares including the shares which were allegedly purchased pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement;
- ii. the 2004 transfers to Arie Genger, the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust are void and continue to belong to TPR; and
- iii. that the Putative Irrevocable Proxies do not apply to the shares transferred pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement.

144. Neither TPR, the Sagi Trust, nor the Orly Trust were a party to the Delaware Action, although TPR was given an opportunity to participate in that action, and refused to do so.

145. The Trump Group as interested Directors in control of TRI had a fiduciary and legal duty to authorize the appointment of separate, independent counsel for TRI in connection with the Delaware proceeding and otherwise with respect to determining the beneficial and record ownership of the Arie, Orly Trust and Sagi Trust TRI shares.

**K. The July 23, 2010 Opinion of the Delaware Chancery Court**

146. On July 23, 2010 the Delaware Chancery Court issued a lengthy written decision which held that the transfers of TPR's TRI shares to Arie, the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement and 2004 Transaction Documents were void and ownership reverted to TPR and that TPR's sale of the Sagi Trust TRI Shares to the Trump Group pursuant to the 2008 Stockholders Agreement was valid.

147. The Chancery Court also held that the Sagi Trust Irrevocable Proxy was not valid under New York or Delaware law. The Chancery Court in this § 225 proceeding held that the Trump Group was entitled to elect a majority of TRI Board members.

148. While voiding the 2004 Transfers, however, the Chancery Court in this July 23 decision also held that because Arie was a "permitted transferee" under the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement, the transfer of the TRI shares to him did not warrant a forfeiture of Arie's TRI Shares.

149. Because Arie was a permitted transferee of the TRI shares owned by TPR (a Genger family holding company that Arie had created) the Trump Group would have no right to stop the transfer of these TPR TRI shares to Arie once it received contractual notice and Arie agreed to be personally bound by the TRI Stockholders Agreement.

150. Under the Delaware Chancery Court's July 23 decision, Arie would retain his TRI shares once he gave formal notice of TPR's 2004 transfer and agreed to be bound by the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement, which Arie promptly agreed to do shortly thereafter.

151. In its July 23, 2010 decision, the Court of Chancery also held that because neither Orly nor the Orly Trust were parties to the Delaware Chancery Court action, the Delaware Court declined to issue any ruling with respect to the Orly Trust TRI Shares.

L. The July 26, 2010 TRO in this New York Action

152. Based on the July 23, 2010 Chancery Court decision, Arie and Orly sought and obtained a temporary restraining order from this Court, restraining Sagi and TPR from selling or encumbering the Arie and Orly Trust TRI shares. This temporary restraining order was granted on July 26, 2010 and extended by this Court on July 28, 2010.

M. The August Opinion of the Delaware Chancery Court

153. After being advised by the Trump Group of plaintiff being granted a TRO in this New York Action, the Delaware Chancery Court indicated that it would reexamine its rulings with regard to the Arie and Orly Trust TRI shares, and expressed concern about whether the New York TRO was designed to undermine its ruling in the Delaware Court, which it was not.

154. On August 3, 2010, to allay the Court of Chancery's concerns, Arie's counsel in this case wrote to this Court advising that because defendants Sagi and TPR had agreed to abide by a *status quo order* entered by the Delaware Chancery Court, which provided that Arie would be given notice in the event TPR or Sagi intended to sell the Arie and Orly TRI Shares to the Trump Group, it was agreed among counsel for TPR, Sagi, Dalia and the plaintiffs, that the temporary restraining order would be vacated and plaintiffs in this action would accordingly withdraw their application for a preliminary injunction, without prejudice.

155. On August 9, 2010, the Chancery Court made an abrupt "about face" regarding its determination earlier relating to the Arie and Orly Trust TRI Shares. In this second opinion, the Delaware Chancery reversed itself regarding the ownership of the Arie and Orly Trust Shares, and held that the Trump Group had the right to purchase the Arie and Orly Trust TRI shares from TPR under the 2008 Side Letter Agreement, even though the Court had held only two weeks earlier that Arie was a permitted transferee under the Stockholders Agreement and should be permitted to keep his shares, and that the Orly Trust was never a party to the § 225 proceeding. The Chancery Court also held that Arie and the Orly Trust had no beneficial interest in the Arie and Orly Trust TRI shares—even though TPR, Sagi, the Sagi Trust and the Orly Trust were never parties to the Delaware § 225 proceeding.

N. The Delaware Chancery Court's Final Judgment Order of August 18, 2010

156. On August 18, 2010, the Delaware Chancery Court entered a Final Judgment

Order which found (i) that TPR's 2004 transfers of the Arie TRI Shares, and the Orly Trust TRI shares were void under the 2001 TRI Stockholders Agreement, (ii) that title to the Sagi Trust TRI Shares, the Orly Trust TRI Shares and the Arie TRI Shares, all reverted to TPR; (iii) that the Irrevocable Proxy for the Sagi Trust was not valid; (iv) that the sale of the Sagi Trust TRI shares by Sagi on behalf of TPR was valid; (v) that the Side Letter was a valid agreement; and (vi) that Arie and the Orly Trust had no beneficial or legal ownership interest in the Arie and Orly Trust TRI shares.

157. There was no discussion or finding in the Chancery Court Decision as to whether Sagi was authorized to sell the Arie, Orly and Sagi Trust TRI Shares out of TPR.

158. In addition to these holdings, the Chancery Court entered an anti-lawsuit injunction, which prohibited Arie from "commenc[ing] or prosecut[ing] any legal proceeding . . . in any [state] court [including the action in this Court which had already been commenced] constituting a collateral attack on, attempt to prevent implementation of, or relitigation of any of the [Chancery] Court's holdings set out in paragraphs 2 through 16 inclusive (summarized above), of this final judgment order" pending a determination of an appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, with certain limited exceptions, but even the Chancery Court specifically recognized Arie's right to apply to this Court to seek to escrow the proceeds from TPR's impending sale of the Arie TRI Shares to the Trump Group, as follows:

"Arie Genger shall have the right to seek an order from a court of competent jurisdiction requiring TPR Investment Associates, Inc. and its officers and directors to place in escrow the proceeds of sale of the shares of TRI referenced in paragraph 14 of this Order. [the "Arie TRI Shares"]."

**O. Arie Appeals From the Chancery Court's Final Judgment Order**

159. Arie timely appealed from the Chancery Court's rulings, arguing, *inter alia*, that (i) the Trumps ratified the 2004 transfers, as a matter of law; (ii) the Irrevocable Proxy was valid under New York law; and (iii) the Delaware Chancery Court had no jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the Arie and Orly TRI shares or the validity of the Side Letter.

160. Under threat of contempt, Arie agreed to stay this case pending a final determination by the Delaware Supreme Court.

**P. The Purported Sale by TPR of the Arie and Orly Trust TRI Shares**

161. While Arie's appeal was pending, Arie was informed that TPR, without Arie's consent or approval, intended to sell the Arie TRI shares to the Trump Group for \$7,424,994.

162. While the Trump Group and TPR agreed to hold \$5,924,944 of these sale proceeds in escrow pending a determination by the Delaware Supreme Court relative to the ownership of the Arie and Orly Trust TRI shares, Sagi, as the CEO of TPR, insisted that TPR was entitled to keep and spend the \$1.5 million of the proceeds from the sale of the Arie TRI shares, notwithstanding the pending appeal challenging the Chancery Court's rulings relating to the ownership of the Arie and Orly Trust TRI Shares.

163. While the appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court was pending, TPR, without the consent or approval of Arie or Orly, also entered into an agreement to sell the Orly Trust TRI Shares to the Trump Group for \$10,314,005, with the proceed to be held in escrow by counsel for Dalia as the nominal trustee of the Orly Trust.

164. The Trump Group as interested Directors in control of TRI had a fiduciary and legal duty to authorize the appointment of separate, independent counsel for TRI in connection with the Delaware proceeding and otherwise with respect to determining the beneficial and

record ownership of the Arie, Orly Trust and Sagi Trust TRI shares prior to TRI recording the transfer of the Arie and Orly Trust Shares to the Trump Group in 2010.

165. Neither Sagi nor TPR had any authority to sell the Arie or Orly Trust Shares to the Trump Group.

Q. This Court Enjoins TPR and Sagi From Taking or Using the \$1.5 million Sale Proceeds From the Purported TPR Sale of the Arie Shares to the Trump Group

166. Arie moved by Order to Show Cause to restrain and enjoin Sagi and TPR from using or disposing of the \$1.5 million sale proceeds that were about to be released to TPR, and requested that these specifically identified funds be placed in an acceptable escrow account or paid into Court. This Court by its February 17, 2011 Decision and Order decreed as follows:

"ORDERED that the defendants Sagi Genger and TPR Investment Associates, Inc., and their agents, servants, employees and all other persons acting under the jurisdiction, supervision and/or direction of the defendants, are enjoined and restrained, during the pendency of this action, from doing or suffering to be done, directly or through any attorney, agent, servant, or employee or other person under the supervision or control of the defendants, from taking, using, or spending or converting to their own use otherwise, the \$1.5 million proceeds from the sale of certain common stock in Trans-Resources, Inc. in which plaintiff claims an interest"

R. The Decision of the Delaware Supreme Court

167. On July 18, 2011, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed that part of the Delaware Chancery Court's Judgment that held that Arie and the Orly Trust were not the beneficial owners of the Arie and Orly Trust TRI Shares.

168. On Arie's appeal the Delaware Supreme Court described the limited nature of the §225 proceeding as follows:

A Section 225 proceeding is not an *in-personam* action. Rather, it is "in the nature of an *in rem* proceeding," where the

"defendants" are before the court, not individually, but rather, as respondents being invited to litigate their claims to the *res* (here, the disputed corporate office) or forever barred from doing so.

\* \* \*

[For example] in a Section 225 proceeding the court "cannot go further and actually rescind a transaction procured through such unlawful behavior or award money damages to those harmed by that behavior." That type of ultimate relief can only be obtained in a plenary action in a court that has *in personam* jurisdiction over any necessary or indispensable parties.

169. Further explaining the limited holding of the Delaware Chancery Court, the Delaware Supreme Court held:

Given the jurisdictional limitations that inhere in a Section 225 action, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Chancery insofar as it determines the *record* [emphasis in original] ownership of the disputed Trans-Resources shares in the Side Letter Opinion and the Final Judgment Order.

\* \* \*

An adjudication of who has the right to vote disputed corporate shares for Section 225 purposes cannot constitute a binding adjudication of who beneficially owns those shares, because a Section 225 action is by its nature an *in rem*, not a plenary, proceeding. Only in a plenary proceeding before a court that has *in personam* jurisdiction over the litigants may the court adjudicate the litigants' property interest in disputed corporate shares.

(Emphasis added)

170. The Delaware Supreme Court also held that the issue of ultimate beneficial ownership of the Arie TRI Shares and the Orly Trust TRI Shares was beyond the equity jurisdiction of the Chancery Court in the summary § 225 *in rem* proceeding, and that the issue of the beneficial ownership of those shares needed to be adjudicated in a plenary action in a jurisdiction where the Court has *in personam* jurisdiction over all indispensable parties. These